On the wide, open plain of Cannae, the two armies finally met. The Romans were confident that their superior numbers would guarantee success. Some argue Rome fielded around 50,000 men to Hannibal’s 35,000, though speculative figures rise to as many as 90,000 Romans and allies facing the Carthaginians’ army of 40,000. In a pitched battle, the Romans were on familiar ground. But they lost. How did it happen?

The Roman advance

Hannibal was confident and prepared for battle. He deployed his Gallic light infantry at the front of his army, concealing his heavier infantry – the veterans of Trebbia and Trasimene – in a long, thin, crescent shape behind. As for the Romans, Varro reverted to the primary Roman stratagem of placing his lightly-armed velites at the head of his army, with the principes behind. On either wing were the supporting cavalry. Altogether in one single block, this force would advance, intending to overwhelm the opposing army with their numbers and mass. The Romans sounded the advance.

1885 impression of the Cannae battlefield.

Image Credit: Public Domain

At first, everything seemed to be going well for the Romans, as the velites easily overcame the Gallic light infantry and pushed forward. On the flanks however, a rather different outcome was emerging. As the Romans made progress in the centre, the quality of Hannibal’s cavalry – and especially his Numidians – proved too much for their Roman counterparts. Unaware of the cavalry’s collapse, the infantry in the centre continued to advance.

Despite overwhelming numbers, only the first few lines could directly engage the enemy. The rest were blindly pushing others forward, keeping the momentum going. Little did they know that once again Hannibal had anticipated the Roman move. The Romans were leading themselves into a deadly trap.

Carthaginian envelopment

Overwhelmed by the velites, the centre of the Gallic light infantry crumpled. Yet the Roman success was short-lived.  At the sides, the crescent shape adopted by Hannibal’s forces now came into effect. The formations of light infantry essentially resembling big pincers, Carthaginians enclosed the Roman army on its flanks.

At the front, too, the Roman light infantry encountered fresh, fierce resistance as the Gallic light infantry gave way to the elite Carthaginian heavy infantry concealed behind. Very quickly, the tide of battle began to shift.

How did the Romans lose at Cannae?

Surrounded on three sides, the advancing mass of Roman soldiers came to an abrupt halt. The Romans now realised the perilous situation they were in; they had been sucked into a death trap, once again. Standing stock-still, they were now easy targets for the returning Numidian cavalry who prevented the Romans escaping from the rear. There was to be no mercy. Almost none survived.

It is both strange and remarkable to us that the Romans, with two consuls present, alternated command of the army on a daily basis. On the day of the battle it is said Varro was in command. However, this version of events may result from aristocratic prejudice, determined to make a scapegoat of Varro on account of his humble background.

Battles of Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae, Italy.

Image Credit: The Department of History, United States Military Academy / Public Domain

Nevertheless, Varro was one of the few Romans who managed to escape by punching through the weakest part of the Carthaginian line; Paullus wasn’t so lucky. With three defeats under its belt, Rome had finally learnt their lesson never to risk the full strength of their armies against Hannibal again.

Rome within sight

The disaster at Cannae sent a shockwave throughout the Mediterranean. The Roman army in Italy was all but destroyed. Hannibal’s path to Rome was clear. Furthermore, the loyalty of socii states to Rome also began to waver.

Coveting Rome’s status as the pre-eminent city in Italy, Capua persuaded the region of Campania to join Hannibal. At the same time, Philip V of Macedon made an alliance with Hannibal igniting a war with Rome in the east.  Meanwhile, Syracuse and the other Greek cities in Sicily defected to Hannibal while many of the Greek cities in southern Italy were also offering the Barcid support. To these factions, Hannibal’s final victory looked all-but assured.

Yet, on the verge of victory, Hannibal froze. Whilst he now had the support and siege equipment capable of besieging Rome, for the first time Hannibal was doubtful of success. If he should fail to capture Rome, those who had just joined him would just as easily abandon him. Their loyalty was dependent on his success.

What is more, most of Italy remained hostile to Hannibal. The Latins, Etruscans and the Umbrians – all had rebuked the Carthaginian general and remained loyal to Rome while many Roman strongholds in southern Italy, cities such as Venusia, Paestum and Nola, also kept faith.

The decision

Hannibal made the decision that would decide the fate of his expedition. Instead of taking the risk of laying siege to Rome, Hannibal turned away, determined to cultivate more support. The news wasn’t entirely well received by his generals. Maharbal, Hannibal’s greatest cavalry general and a leading advocate of marching on Rome, would famously say,

You know how to gain a victory, Hannibal: you know not how to use one.

Livy 22.51

He was soon proved right. Hannibal’s decision not to besiege Rome would come back to haunt him.

No surrender

Rome was sure to learn lessons from their crushing defeat at Cannae. So scathing had this tragedy been, that it was said everyone in Rome could name either a friend or relative who had perished on that ill-fated battleground. Once again, they adopted the Fabian strategy, realising, with the majority of Italy still loyal to Rome, they could gradually wear down Hannibal and his army.

Hannibal continued to rampage through southern Italy in the meantime, trying to galvanise more support. But each victory reaped fewer and fewer rewards. In 212 BC Hannibal took Tarentum, a city with a long history of hostility to Rome, with help from a pro-Carthaginian faction who staged a coup. In the same year, the Romans in Sicily under Marcellus’ leadership seized Syracuse.

Hannibal under threat

Hannibal’s new allies soon proved more of a burden than an aid. As Rome strengthened, levying large numbers of fresh recruits, the Barcid general found that he was spending more time protecting his allies from the Romans than benefitting from their support. This began to take its toll on his weary army.

The fortress of Nola, a suburb of modern Naples, had remained loyal to Rome. It was a persistent thorn in the side of the Campanian allies and therefore to Hannibal himself. Nola’s harbour also represented a key opportunity for Hannibal to resupply and reinforce his army. Unable to abandon his allies lest they defect back to Rome, and desperate for reinforcements, Hannibal was forced to besiege Nola following his victory at Cannae. For three years his army would surround the city, yet to no avail.

Desperately, Hannibal had sent Hanno, one of his lieutenants, south with Mago to gather sorely-needed reinforcements. Having managed to levy Lucanians and Bruttians, from the toe of Italy, to fight for the Carthaginians, Hanno marched north to unite with Hannibal. Meanwhile, Mago returned to the Carthaginian Senate to request more reinforcements.

Disaster at Beneventum

Yet as Hanno sought to re-join Hannibal disaster struck. At Beneventum in 212 BC, barely thirty miles northeast of Nola, the Romans intercepted and utterly destroyed the reinforcement army.

Starved of fresh troops, Hannibal had no alternative but to forsake the siege. If Nola could keep Hannibal at bay without reinforcements, then surely any attempt to march north and capture Rome would prove similarly futile. Reluctantly, Hannibal abandoned Campania and his northern possessions, retreating to the south.

The Romans were slowly confining Hannibal’s army to southern Italy. Gradually, they re-established control over cities exited by the Carthaginians. Hannibal could never hope to protect them all. One by one they fell to the legions. By 209 BC, Fabius recaptured Tarentum, the last of Hannibal’s major allies in southern Italy. With its fall, Hannibal was now essentially isolated in the toe of Italy. The tide appeared to have turned.

Their plan appeared sound. Wherever Hannibal attempted to cross these mountains, he would find himself trapped between the two Roman armies – Flaminius being in the West at Arretium and Geminus to the East at Ariminum. With Hannibal confined in Etruria, Flaminius and Geminus could then slowly tighten the noose, uniting their forces and overwhelming their foe. But Hannibal was not going to be so easily cornered.

As expected, in the spring Hannibal crossed the Apennines into Etruria, taking the western path to Arretium. Despite Hannibal’s attempts to lure Flaminius into the open field, the Roman consul did not budge. A seasoned and popular general, Flaminius was patiently waiting for Geminus’ arrival. Hannibal, knowing this all too well, persisted.

Psychological warfare

Marching around Arretium, he goaded Flaminius into pursuing him. Not only did he cut off Flaminius’ communications with Rome, but he also began setting the nearby settlements ablaze. Though Flaminius had so far restrained from rash action, this latest terror policy proved too much.

Abandoning the plan to wait for Geminus, he marched his forces from the defences of Arretium. This was exactly what Hannibal wanted; once again, his tactics had riled his Roman opponent into fighting a battle on his terms.

Early modern depiction of the battle of lake Trasimene

Image Credit: Public Domain

Setting the Ambush

On the northern bank of Lake Trasimene, Hannibal prepared his trap. He ordered a small part of his army to set alight campfires on the hill ahead to deceive his foe into believing his army had continued east in escape of their pursuers. Meanwhile, Hannibal moved most of army into the woods north of the lake, above the path. There, Hannibal and his army of Celts, Carthaginians, Iberians and Numidians, awaited the Romans to pass below.

Who won the battle of Lake Trasimene?

Flaminius fell for Hannibal’s deception. Believing he was closing in on the Carthaginians, he hastened the army’s pace. As the legions marched along the track, the Carthaginians sprung from their concealments, surrounding the Romans on three sides.  Disorganised and taken by complete surprise, the Romans were slowly forced back into the lake.

There was no escape, with many soldiers drowning in their attempts to swim to safety, weighed down by their armour. Flaminius and his men were annihilated. This may well be the biggest ambush in military history.

A new strategy

After two devastating defeats by Hannibal in their own country, the exasperated Romans took radical action. They appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus, an experienced statesman, as dictator. This position, in times of military crisis, allowed the holder to wield the military command of the entire state for six months.

Fabius decided to alter Roman tactics. During his tenure, the Romans never faced Hannibal in open battle but constantly tailed him, limiting engagements to minor skirmishes. By embracing guerrilla warfare and scorched earth tactics, Fabius intended to defeat Hannibal by eroding his strength.

Heavily rebuked for what his political rivals considered a cowardly strategy, Fabius was nicknamed ‘the Delayer.’ Yet very quickly, the new strategy started to produce results. Hannibal knew that one of the greatest weaknesses in his army was his lack of siege equipment. Having failed to bring any of these destructive war machines with him on his Alpine crossing, any attempt at a frontal assault on Rome would prove futile.

Hannibal had thus planned to defeat his foe a different way: he intended to ravage the Italian peninsula to persuade the socii states to join his cause. But with the Fabian strategy now in place, Hannibal’s army began to struggle to live off the land and maintain this strategy. Hannibal was running the risk of being isolated without supplies.

The tide turns twice

Just as the tide was turning back in Rome’s favour, Fabius’ six month term as dictator ended.  The start of 216 BC saw the election of the consuls again – Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus.

Concerned that the Fabian strategy might compel their allies to defect in the long-term, Varro and Paullus wished to bring the war to a swift resolution. And so, they gathered together not the usual four but eight legions to confront the Barcid. It was the largest army Rome had ever fielded.

Ignoring Fabius’ warnings of provoking Hannibal, the two consuls departed for Apulia – the region which Hannibal had targeted as essential for supplies. Fabius’ strategy was abandoned.

They had hoped to confront Hannibal at the Rhône river, far to the west of Italy in Gaul. Yet much to their dismay, their Punic foe successfully evaded them, having pushed ahead towards the Alps without hesitating. Hannibal was determined to fight this war on his field of choosing, not Rome’s.

News of Hannibal’s arrival in northern Italy in November 218 BC therefore caught the Romans off-guard. Not only did they have no idea of where exactly Hannibal’s army was marauding, but most of their troops were still lodged in their winter barracks.

The Battle of the Ticino River: November 218 BC

Near the Ticino River, Hannibal and his army came face to face with their foe. The Roman army under the command of Publius Cornelius Scipio, the Roman consul of 218 BC, was sizeable, believed to be around 20,000 men strong. Yet the result of this initial clash proved anticlimactic. It ended up being little more than a cavalry skirmish. But it was the Roman cavalry that came off worse in this melee. Scipio himself was among those who suffered in the fighting, rescued from certain death by the heroics of his son, also called Publius. Scipio retreated with his army south, across the Trebia River. It was first blood to Hannibal.

Citizen soldiers of Carthage on parade, as envisaged by French painter Georges Rochegrosse (1859-1938).

Image Credit: Public Domain

Much of Cisalpine Gaul was now at the mercy of Hannibal’s army. Two major Celtic tribes in the region, the Insubres and the Boii, were already favourable to Hannibal’s conquest. His victory at the Ticino quickly convinced the rest of the region’s Celtic tribes to follow suit. His army doubled in size, the manpower lost while crossing the Alps replaced by ferocious Celtic warriors. These weer some of the most renowned fighters in the Mediterranean.

Altered plans

Meanwhile, as Hannibal was making progress in northern Italy, to the south in Sicily another Roman force, under the command of Tiberius Sempronius Longus, had been preparing its own expedition. Following in the footsteps of generals Agathocles and Pyrrhus, Longus and his army were getting ready to set sail from Sicily and invade Africa with a large army. They sought to strike directly at Carthage, the heart of the Carthaginian Empire. But when news of the defeat at the Ticino River arrived, the plan was altered completely.

Seeing Hannibal as the most pressing threat, Longus was ordered north to reinforce Scipio. The invasion of Africa was put on hold; it would remain so for the next 14 years.

What happened at the battle of the Trebia?

Longus and his army of over 25,000 men reached his fellow consul on the eastern bank of the Trebia River in December 218 BC. Hannibal’s army was close by, encamped opposite the Romans on the western bank. Longus, assuming command of the army as Scipio was injured, believed he could defeat the Carthaginians in a pitched battle on open plains. But Hannibal was prepared: he would fight this war on his own terms.

Battle details based on Goldsworthy, Adrian (2006). The Fall of Carthage: The Punic Wars 265–146 BC.

Image Credit: Harrias on Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0

Early one morning, Hannibal put his plan into action. He sent his elite Numidian cavalry, lightly-armed with javelins and swift mounts, to raid the Roman encampment. He hoped to lure the Romans across the icy river to its western bank. Longus quickly retaliated, sounding the advance. He had taken the bait.

Crossing the river

Without breakfast the Roman foot-soldiers began to wade through the icy river – first the lighter troops, the velites, and followed up by the heavy infantry, the principes. By the time they had reached the far side of the Trebia, its cold waters had severely sapped their energy. Now they had to fight.

Meanwhile the Roman cavalry had been hopelessly pursuing their Numidian counterparts. Overstretched and exhausted from the chase, they soon gave up and returned to the Roman line now forming up on the western bank of the Trebbia. Yet there would be no respite for the shivering Romans. As Longus’ velites began to reform in front of the army, Hannibal’s swift Numidian cavalry came charging in, breaking their ranks.

Calamity on the Trebia

Seeing his skirmishers being slaughtered, Longus ordered them to pull back. Now was the time, he thought, to send forwards his heavy infantry, his principes, and crush Hannibal’s battle line. It was all or nothing. The result was calamity. As these heavily-armed footmen advanced, Hannibal’s Numidian cavalry continued to prove their worth. Seeing an opportunity, these versatile light cavalry troops, along with Hannibal’s elephants, descended on the exhausted Roman cavalry positioned on either flank, routing them completely.

Stripped of support, fatigued and suffering from hypothermia, the principes now found themselves in dire straits. Any chance of them confronting Hannibal’s main battle line had evaporated. Already, the battle of the Trebia was turning into an unmitigated disaster for the Romans. But the worst was yet to come.

The night before, Hannibal had sent his younger brother, Mago, with a detachment of troops to encamp by the south-west side of the river. Until this stage of the battle, Mago’s troops had been lurking from an unseen vantage point. But when they saw the velites retreating and the principes drawing closer to Hannibal’s main battle line, they made their move. Breaking from cover, they ambushed the vulnerable flanks of the Roman heavy infantry and trapped the velites on the western bank.  A massacre ensued. Hannibal emerged victorious.

Rome regroups

Though having just gained a stunning victory, Hannibal was forced to regroup before he could continue the offensive and plunge into the heart of Italy. For the next three months, he would thus remain in northern Italy, awaiting the spring. For the Romans, the respite was welcome news. It provided them with precious time – time in which they were able to muster four new legions and reorganise the remnants of Scipio’s and Longus’ armies. Replenished, they once again planned to confront the Carthaginian menace.

Carthage was plagued with revolts from mercenaries demanding money for their service in the past war. It took two years for the Carthaginians to suppress these uprisings. Meanwhile the Romans saw their chance to steal Corsica and Sardinia from right under the Carthaginians’ noses.

Hamilcar Barca – a formidable Carthaginian general and veteran of the First Punic War – saw this act as a personal insult. His popularity with the people and respectability amongst the opposition party in the Carthaginian assembly granted him the means to begin training a new generation of troops. By 236 BC, and without permission from the Carthaginian government, Hamilcar set out on his own crusade.

What started the Second Punic War?

Furious and humiliated by Rome, Hamilcar intended to carve a new empire in Spain. Rich in natural resources, the Iberian Peninsula was the perfect springboard to take revenge on Rome. Among those Hamilcar took with him on campaign was his son, Hannibal. It was then that Hamilcar made his son swear the infamous oath: that he would never be a friend of Rome.

Hamilcar campaigned as far north as Barcelona today. But his untimely death in battle in 228 BC left his work unfinished. Fortunately, his legacy became the family business. For the next ten years, his sons – Hannibal, Hasdrubal and Mago – consolidated Carthaginian rule on Spain’s east coast and began subduing tribes further inland. Rome was sure to keep notice.

Paranoid with the growing Carthaginian power in Spain, Rome persuaded Hasdrubal the Fair, leader of the Carthaginian forces after Hamilcar’s death (not to be confused with Hasdrubal Barca, Hannibal’s brother) to sign a treaty setting the Ebro River as the border between the Roman sphere of influence to the north and Carthage’s sphere to the south. But then disaster struck. In 221 BC Hasdrubal the Fair was assassinated and Hannibal became commander-in-chief. What were the chances the peace would hold?

The peace breaks: Saguntum

Rome could not help itself from butting in. Aware of a coalition between the Carthaginians and the Celts in northern Italy, Rome lost no time in annexing the Alpine region. Still not satisfied, Rome allied with the stronghold of Saguntum, a city on Spain’s east coast far to the south of the Ebro and well within the Carthaginian sphere. Perhaps it was simply the Romans’ pre-emptive war instincts?  Or maybe this was a way for the Romans to confine the inevitable war with Hannibal to Spain?

Hannibal could not proceed with his plans without first securing his authority in the Iberian peninsula – something Rome’s alliance with Saguntum directly threatened. The Romans were forcing Hannibal into a corner. Sooner or later he would have to act.

Besieging Saguntum would be a long, arduous and necessary task. Yet the Barcid knew the rewards for its capture would be far-reaching, providing Hannibal with lucrative plunder necessary to pay his mercenary troops. Timing would be everything. Whilst the Romans were engaged fighting Demetrius, the ruler of Pharos who had been sacking cities in Illyria allied to Rome, Hannibal saw his chance. In 219 BC he attacked Saguntum. The Second Punic War had begun.

Hannibal’s war?

But was this Hannibal’s or Carthage’s war against Rome in the first place? The high drama of the author Livy would have you believe the former – Hannibal – the main antagonist and Rome’s deadliest foe. Hannibal never received the unconditional endorsement of the Carthaginian assembly of the war against Rome, even when he was close to achieving complete victory But in the end, he didn’t need to.

Thanks to the foresight of Hamilcar, Hannibal already had a power base in Spain to facilitate the war. The Spanish territories under his command were some of the wealthiest in the region, so much so that,

One of these mines, which at the present day is still called Baebelo, furnished Hannibal with three hundred pounds’ weight of silver per day.

Pliny, Natural History 33.31.6

Ultimately, Hannibal was not completely dependent on Carthage to conduct this undertaking. But neither was he entirely independent. Nonetheless, the Second Punic War would prove much bigger than any one individual; it encompassed the whole of the Mediterranean, from Spain to Greece.

The scale and complexity of the war was evident from the beginning. Despite the Romans being occupied in Illyria, they were confident they could deal with Demetrius before turning their attention to Hannibal. This was a serious miscalculation. Saguntum fell after only eight months, too soon for Roman legions to arrive. Their hope of isolating Hannibal in Spain looked increasingly slim. But who amongst them could have predicted the existential threat Hannibal would pose?

Hannibal crosses the Alps

The crossing had been years in the planning.  Before embarking on this intrepid voyage, Hannibal had determinedly won the support of the tribes in the Alpine regions, especially those of Cisalpine Gaul. Peoples like the Insubres and Boii, who had long been disillusioned with Rome, had intimate knowledge of the terrain. Hannibal realised that having their support was therefore crucial if he were to descend safely into northern Italy.

With local aid, Hannibal’s use of guerrilla warfare put Rome on the back foot. Unlike the conflict of attrition which the First Punic War exemplified, Hannibal was gambling with the alternative. His plan was ambitious, risky and decisive which, if successful, would bring an end to Rome once and for all. The necessity of a speedy crossing of the Alps was essential to protect supply lines once he had landed in Italy. Consequently, Hannibal had conducted a complete topographical reconnaissance.

‘Snow Storm: Hannibal and his Army Crossing the Alps’ (1812) by J. M. W. Turner

Image Credit: Public Domain

By dividing his army into three divisions, Hannibal swiftly conquered resisting tribes in the Pyrenees. Meanwhile, Hannibal left behind his younger brother, Hasdrubal, to prevent the Romans from invading Iberia and isolating Hannibal in Italy. In the spring of 218 BC, Hannibal set off on his epic journey, crossing the Rhône by September. What precise route Hannibal took over the Alps scholars continue to debate. Suggested routes range from the southerly path through the Drôme valley to the northerly route up the Isère valley near what is today Grenoble.

A costly journey

Regardless of the specific route, battling with the logistical challenges of the climate and terrain ensured that accomplishing the feat was a triumph in itself. Hannibal’s arrival in northern Italy in November 218 BC caught the Romans completely off-guard. Even so, Hannibal’s army paid dearly: only half of his original force survived the journey.

In contrast, the Romans had waves of reserves at their disposal. Anxious to know their precise strength, all Roman men of military age were obliged to present themselves to the authorities. The Romans and Campanians by themselves could raise 250,000 soldiers. Combined with their allies, Rome was capable of mustering 700,000 troops. Most troops were, however, confined to their barracks.

With Hannibal’s army weak and demoralised from crossing the Alps there was no margin for error. He seized the initiative: Hannibal quickly established a foothold by conquering the Taurini, a Celtic tribe hostile to Hannibal’s regional allies, the Insubres. Revitalised from their arduous Alpine crossing with this success, Hannibal’s 20,000-strong army now felt ready to confront the Romans in battle.

The opportunity came soon enough. In a skirmish at the Ticino River, Hannibal forced a Roman army to retreat. Then in December 218 BC, he met Roman troops again at the River Trebia. It would be the first major battle of the Second Punic Wwar.

This enormous toll, which came in the age of mechanised and mass mobilised warfare, is well known. What isn’t well known, however, is that more than 2,000 years before, in the era of the sword, shield and bow, the Republican Roman Army lost 2.5 times that many men in just a single day.

And, as if a death toll of 50,000 wasn’t shocking enough, it was suffered at the hands of a smaller and more lightly equipped Carthaginian army. This battle, which took place at Cannae, was the masterpiece of Hannibal Barca, and is undoubtedly one of the most spectacular military victories of all time.

The Punic Wars

Few tales from history can match the epic grandeur of Hannibal’s march into modern-day Italy during the Second Punic War. It was set against the backdrop of two powers that had grown too big to share the central Mediterranean and as a result came to clash with each other through the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC.

Carthage was a powerful maritime empire based around its capital of the same name which now lies in modern Tunisia. Predating Rome as a major power, by 264 BC (the year of its first clash with Rome), Carthage controlled much of North Africa, Spain and the western part of Sicily.

It was this last province that would cause Carthage to come into contact with Rome, the city-state that had now come to dominate much of Italy after defeating the Greek states of Magna Grecia (modern-day southern Italy).

How the western Mediterranean looked at the start of the First Punic War. Image Credit: CC

The first war between the two powers, known as the First Punic War, was fought over Sicily, and proved to be a see-sawing contest that took place on both land and at sea – the latter a theatre of war that the Carthaginians had previously dominated.

In the end, however, the bloody-minded and determined Romans were victorious, much to the disgust of the Carthaginian commander, Hamilcar Barca. Barca made his nine-year-old son, Hannibal, swear that as long as he lived, he would never be a friend of Rome.

Hamilcar’s revenge

After its defeat, the navy and finances of Carthage were in a sorry state. But Hamilcar wasn’t done. Taking his sons with him, he lead an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in order to subdue the hardy tribes that resisted Carthaginian rule. After the death of his father, 26-year-old Hannibal took command in 221 and immediately made a name for himself.

His youth and energy made him popular with the multinational soldiers under his command, and a string of impressive victories helped subdue the Iberians and ensure that across the Balearic Sea the Romans were paying close attention to the revival of their old enemy.

The central government in Carthage had signed a peace treaty with Rome after their earlier defeat. But now the Roman government declared an alliance with the independent Spanish city of Saguntum, knowing that Hannibal was planning on attacking it.

The remains of the Roman forum at Saguntum. Seven years after Hannibal captured the city in 219 BC, it was taken by the Romans. Image Credit: CC

The young Carthaginian commander was popular enough at this stage to take politics into his own hands, and marched to besiege the city anyway, perhaps thinking of his promise to his father. The government back in Africa had little choice but to support the decision.

A brutal eight-month siege ensued before Saguntum’s eventual bloody fall. Rome demanded an explanation for Hannibal’s actions and by 218 BC the two empires were once again at war – but this time on a far greater scale. In the eyes of the Romans, they had already given Carthage one chance and this time it was all or nothing.

Hannibal’s march into Italy

Hannibal’s reponse to the declaration of war was simple. He would continue his march north through Spain, all the way to the Alps, and on into Rome’s heartland. He had a 40,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry and 38 war elephants by the time he’d reached the foothills of the Alps – as well as boundless ambition.

But the crossing of the mountains in spring proved a disaster for Hannibal, costing him half of his men and almost all of his war elephants. Most generals would have given up at this stage, or at least limited their objectives.

Hannibal is depicted crossing the Alps on none other than an elephant. Image Credit: Public Domain

Hannibal, however, managed to win over the allegiances of many of the Alpine Gauls who had been troubling Rome with their raids for centuries. And he also had a plan to attract Rome’s reluctant southern and northern subjects to his cause.

By the time of his first major battle with Rome at Trebia in December, Hannibal’s army was back up to 40,000 infantry (though they were not well-armoured like their Roman foes). His army was still heavily outnumbered, but it did not seem to matter as the Romans were soundly defeated at Trebia and Lake Trasimene.

This latter victory took Hannibal deep into the fertile lands of Italy and put Rome into a state of blind panic. Had Hannibal struck at Rome then, history could have been very different, but he had no siege weapons and was still waiting for Rome’s allies to defect to even up the numbers.

Amid these circumstances, Quintus Fabius was appointed an emergency dictator in Rome. He pursued a policy of attrition, while refusing to meet the Carthaginians in a pitched battle. These tactics succeeded in frustrating Hannibal for a year, but by 216 BC the people of Rome were growing angry. They wanted victory and this invader to be removed at any cost.

The Romans go to Hannibal

To meet the demands of the people of Rome and take on Hannibal, a Roman army of unprecedented size had to be assembled. Some estimates put the size of this army as high as 90,000 men, though 50-70,000 is considered more likely.

Even so, an army of such a size was hugely impressive for a state still smaller than modern-day Italy in the ancient world. It dwarfed even the highest counts of Hannibal’s forces, which only numbered around 40-50,000.

The Romans’ enemy, meanwhile, was far to the south of Rome, attempting to court the former Greek city-states there, which had little fondness for their Roman conquerors. Hannibal had spent the winter and spring down in these balmy and fertile lands, and his own men had collected the harvest, meaning that they were well-fed and ready.

Eager to take the initiative, Hannibal seized the important supply post at Cannae in the spring, and waited for the Romans to come to him. They obliged.

The Romans were commanded by two consuls named Varro and Paullus, and the accounts of ancient historians tell of Varro winning a minor skirmish along the way to Cannae, which cultivated a dangerous sense of hubris in the days ahead.

Though modern historians believe that Varro’s fairly lowly origins made him something of a scapegoat for later writers, he still had every reason to be confident following the skirmish. Not only did he have more men, but they were also clad in heavy armour and fighting for their homelands against a ragged army of Gauls, Africans and Spaniards who were a very long way from home.

Hannibal’s invasion route. Image Credit: The Department of History, United States Military Academy / CC

Varro takes a risk

In ancient warfare the deployment of troops was crucial. The standard formation of the times was lines of lighter at the front and then heavier infantry in the centre, with the cavalry protecting the flanks. Varro, however, was wary of Hannibal’s genius and wanted to try something different.

He directed his men in the centre to stand much closer together than was normal, creating a dense fist of armoured men who would smash through the weaker Carthaginian line.

Hannibal, meanwhile, placed his Spaniards and Iberians in the centre and his veteran Africans on the flanks. This meant that, to the Romans, the task of breaking through the middle of the line and dividing the enemy army looked easy.

But Hannibal knew that the battle could be won via the Carthaginian cavalrymen – who he placed opposite their Roman counterparts – rather than in the unequal clash of infantry.

This part of the battlefield was also where the fighting began. As the Roman infantry marched forwards, Hannibal’s horsemen – commanded by his brother Hasdrubal – engaged their counterparts and put them to flight after a brief and vicious struggle.

Hannibal’s African soldiers win the day

By now, the slow-moving Roman infantry was already exposed, but the clouds of dust thrown up by so many thousands of men on a hot August day meant that they were oblivious to the danger. When they met the light Gallic and Spanish infantry in the centre, the Carthaginian general ordered his troops not to engage fully but to retreat steadily in the face of the closely-packed enemy.

The Romans, meanwhile, kept pressing further and further forwards, so enraged by the enemy refusing to stay put that they ignored the veteran Africans, who had remained in place and were now dangerously positioned on the Romans’ flanks.

How Hannibal’s men defeated the Roman army. Image Credit: The Department of History, United States Military Academy / CC

As Varro’s men advanced, the Africans began to press in on them until eventually they were so pressed together that they could barely swing their swords. Hannibal then gave his Africans the order to charge at the Roman flanks, completely encircling the Roman army and completing the pincer movement – one of the earliest examples of this tactic being used in military history.

Once Hannibal’s cavalrymen had hit the Roman rear to complete the chaos, the battle ended as a contest. The slaughter, however, continued.

Panicking, confused and hemmed in like cattle, thousands of Romans were massacred throughout the morning, with no means of escape with Carthaginians on all sides. Though some cut their way through to the nearest town, the vast majority of the massive army lay dead on the plain of Cannae, and Rome was in a state of numbed terror.

Rome lives to fight another day – just

Following the battle, Rome’s survival seemed genuinely threatened. Over a fifth of all Roman males over the age of 17 had died in a single day, while the old Greek cities, along with King Phillip of Macedon, joined Hannibal after the defeat.

This statue shows Hannibal counting the signet rings of Roman knights killed in the Battle of Cannae. Image Credit: Public Domain

And yet Rome survived. Perhaps its reaction to Cannae is the best demonstration of why Romans came to rule the known world. Refusing to give in, they stopped risking all against Hannibal in open battle, formed new armies and ground him down with a scorched earth policy until he was forced to return to Africa in the face of a Roman invasion.

The new hero of Rome, Scipio Africanus, formed the nucleus of his army with the survivors of Cannae, who had been humiliatingly exiled to Sicily after their defeat, but won redemption at the decisively fought battle of Zama in 202 BC.

As a result, the reasons for the Battle of Cannae’s enduring fame are not political ones, though it did form the climax of the romantic period of Hannibal’s doomed invasion of Italy. It did not topple Rome, nor – ultimately – save Carthage from destruction at the hands of the newer power less than a hundred years later.

However, it has been taught consistently in military academies ever since as the perfect way of destroying a superior force utterly using encirclement, and has fascinated all the great commanders of modern times, from Frederick the Great and Napoleon to Eisenhower, who said, “In modern war, every ground commander seeks to duplicate the classic example of Cannae”.

Origins

Hannibal was born around 247 BC, as the First Punic War raged in the Western Mediterranean. Carthage and Rome were at war, fighting on land and at sea in the area around Sicily. The Romans ultimately won this titanic war in 241 BC, and the Carthaginians lost Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia. It was in the heartlands of this much-reduced Carthaginian Empire that Hannibal spent his early years.

Frustratingly little is known about Hannibal’s family and their background. Hamilcar, his father, was a leading Carthaginian general during the First Punic War – cementing his reputation as a successful commander when he crushed a mercenary uprising among his former soldiers at the end of the war.

Next to nothing is known about his mother, but we know that Hannibal had older sisters (their names unknown) and two younger brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago. All were probably taught to speak a series of languages, particularly Greek (the lingua franca of the Mediterranean at that time), but also probably African languages such as Numidian.

Scholars debate the origins of Hannibal’s family, the Barcids. One theory is that the Barcids were a very old, elite family that came over with the first Phoenician colonists that founded Carthage. But another interesting proposal is that the family actually hailed from the Hellenic city-state of Barca, in Cyrenaica (Libya today), and that they were incorporated into the Carthaginian elite after a Cyrenaican expedition against Carthage went awry in the late 4^th century BC.

A military upbringing

Keen to revive Carthaginian military fortunes, in the 230s Hamilcar planned to take a Carthaginian army to Spain for a campaign of conquest. Before he left, however, he asked the 9-year-old Hannibal whether he would like to accompany him. Hannibal said yes and the famous story goes that Hamilcar kept his word, but on one condition. He took Hannibal to the Temple of Melqart in Carthage, where he made Hannibal swear a famous oath: never to be a friend of the Romans.

Hannibal headed to Spain with his father and his brothers, where he received a military education (which also involved philosophy). For several years he campaigned alongside his father, watching on as Hamilcar cemented a Carthaginian presence in the Iberian Peninsula. But Hamilcar’s luck ran out in 228 BC. Whilst fighting in the rearguard of a battle against Iberians, Hamilcar was killed – his sons supposedly being present when their father lost his life.

A young Hannibal swears enmity to Rome – Giovanni Antonio Pellegrini, c. 1731.

Image Credit: Public Domain

Hannibal remained in Spain following the death of his father, continuing to see service under his brother-in-law Hasdrubal. Hannibal, now in his early 20s, rose to a senior position under Hasdrubal, serving as his brother-in-law’s ‘hypostrategos’ (commander in charge of the cavalry). Serving in such a high position, despite his young age, only serves to further highlight the young man’s evident talent as a military leader and the great trust placed in him to command by his brother-in-law.

Hannibal continued to campaign alongside Hasdrubal in Iberia for much of the 220s – Hasdrubal’s most famous achievement perhaps being his founding of New Carthage (Cartagena today) in 228 BC. But in 222 BC Hasdrubal was assassinated. In his place, the officers of the battle-hardened Carthaginian army selected the 24-year-old Hannibal as their new general. And Hannibal now had, at his command, one of the most formidable forces in the Western Mediterranean.

A rising star

The army itself consisted largely of 2 components. The first component was an African contingent: Carthaginian officers, Libyans, Libby-Phoenicians and Numidian troops that served both as infantry and as cavalry. The second component was an Iberian one: warriors from various Spanish tribes as well as legendary slingers that hailed from the nearby Balearic Islands.

But among this Iberian contingent were also Celtiberians, fierce warriors of Gallic descent that also resided in Spain. All these units combined to form a formidable force – battle-hardened after many years of fierce campaigning in Spain. And, of course, we can’t forget to mention the elephants. 37 of which Hannibal would take with him on his legendary journey to Italy.

Following in the footsteps of his father and brother-in-law, Hannibal continued to campaign in Spain, perhaps reaching as far north as modern-day Salamanca. This aggressive Carthaginian expansion soon resulted in conflict.

Conflict with Saguntum

Saguntum itself was a formidable stronghold, beyond the area that Carthage dominated by 219 BC, but very much in the firing line of Hannibal’s rapid recent expansion. A dispute between the Saguntines and Hannibal soon arose when some of the latter’s allies complained about the Saguntines fighting on behalf of their rivals.

Hannibal came to the aid of his allies, putting him directly at odds with the Saguntines. Tensions were coming to a head in this area of southeast Spain, but this local dispute soon erupted into something much bigger.

Sometime during the 220s BC, the Saguntines had made an alliance with Rome. When Hannibal and his army arrived to threaten their city, the Saguntines sent a call for aid to the Romans, who in turn sent an embassy to Hannibal, demanding that he leave Saguntum alone. Hannibal, however, refused to back down and he soon laid siege to Saguntum.

After some 8 months, Hannibal’s troops finally stormed Saguntum and sacked the city. The Romans, aghast at how a former defeated enemy was behaving, sent another embassy to Carthage in which the Roman ambassador famously held out the folds of his toga in either hand, stating that he held in his hands either peace or war and demanded which the Carthaginians chose. The Carthaginians opted for war.

War with Rome

Hannibal had his war with Rome. Whether he had prepared for such a conflict in advance is unknown but he quickly opted for a strategy fighting the Romans very different from that employed by the Carthaginians during the First Punic War.

Roman attacks on Spain and North Africa were expected in the war ahead, especially given the power that Rome already held in places such as Sicily and Sardinia. Rather than wait for the expected attacks on Spain and North Africa, Hannibal decided that he would march his army to Italy and take the fight to the Romans.

Map detailing Hannibal’s route of invasion.

Image Credit: Abalg / CC

The actions of the dashing Hellenistic general King Pyrrhus in Italy some 60 years earlier provided Hannibal a precedent for how he could conduct a war against the Romans in Italy. The lessons from Pyrrhus were several: that to beat the Romans you had to fight them in Italy and you had to take their allies away from them. Otherwise the Romans, in an almost hydra-like fashion, would continue raising armies until victory was eventually gained.

Getting to Italy would not be easy. Transporting his army by sea was out of the question. Carthage had lost access to the important ports in Sicily at the end of the First Punic War and its navy was not the formidable fleet that it had been some 50 years earlier.

Furthermore, Hannibal’s army consisted of a large proportion of cavalry. Horses – and elephants – are difficult to transport on ships. This is, of course, not to mention that Hannibal’s army is based around Spain, far away from the Carthaginian heartlands. All this combined made it clear to Hannibal that if he wanted to reach Italy with his army, he would have to march there.

And so, in the spring of 218 BC, Hannibal set off from New Carthage with an army of just over 100,000 soldiers and commenced his legendary journey to Italy, a journey that would see several remarkable feats: his securing of the River Ebro, his crossing of the River Rhone and, of course, his famous traversing of the Alps with elephants.

While Hannibal fought in Italy, his brother Mago appealed for reinforcements from the Carthaginian senate. But their other brother, Hasdrubal, was at arms in Iberia, himself playing a significant role in Carthage‘s successes — and failures.

Hasdrubal in the spotlight

Since 218 BC, Hasdrubal had been preoccupied with uprisings in the Iberian peninsula. In the spring of 217 BC, Rome defeated a Carthaginian fleet at the mouth of the Ebro River, on the coast of modern Catalonia. The victory triggered rebellions against Carthaginian rule, and gave the Romans, led by the Scipios, Gnaeus Cornelius and his brother Publius, opportunities to gain a foothold in Spain.

Hasdrubal’s ambitions extended beyond Iberia, however. Following his elder brother’s great victory at Cannae in 216 BC, Hasdrubal began to plot his own dramatic advance over the Alps, quite literally in his brother’s footsteps. Should his army meet with Hannibal’s, they would put severe pressure on Rome.

The Death of Aemilius Paulus at Cannae.

Image Credit: Public Domain

The Battle of Dertosa

The Scipios’ set about keeping Hasdrubal busy. They targeted Ibera, effectively blocking Hasdrubal’s route to the Pyrenees. In response, Hasdrubal besieged the Roman ally of Dertosa. Sure enough, the Scipio brothers withdrew from Ibera for Dertosa.

Both armies were matched numerically in the ensuing battle in 215 BC. The Romans had the stronger infantry, while Hasdrubal had superior cavalry, plus twenty elephants. As they had at Cannae, the Romans committed their strongest infantry early and swiftly pushed back their opponents’ centre. This buckle was Hasdrubal’s plan: he was imitating his brother’s double envelopment by placing his weakest troops in the centre. On their flanks, formidable Libyan spearmen repelled the Roman infantry. But the plan soon faltered.

Hasdrubal’s elite troops failed to outflank most of the Roman infantry. Determined to encircle the Romans, Hasdrubal ordered his Numidian cavalry and elephants to crush the cavalry on the wings. It didn’t work. Instead, when the Roman forces broke through, they turned full circle and routed the Libyans. Hasdrubal’s miscalculation had cost him the battle.

Stalemate

The result was devastating. Not only did it prevent Hasdrubal from reinforcing Hannibal in Italy, but resulted in the 12,000 reinforcements Mago had mustered being diverted to Spain. All that Carthage was prepared to send to Italy was 4,000 Numidian horses and 40 elephants. Hannibal’s reliance on Carthage — and his brothers — had cost him dearly.

By 214 BC, Hannibal’s campaign had lost its impetus. Despite their victory at Dertosa, the Scipios struggled to break out from north-eastern Spain. Resources were stretched to their limits and Rome struggled to supply its various military operations.

The Scipios persuaded Syphax, a Numidian king in North Africa, to declare war against Gala, a Carthaginian ally. With Roman military training, Syphax soon prevailed, forcing Hasdrubal to come to Gala’s aid. In Hasdrubal’s absence, many towns sided with Rome. But on Hasdrubal’s return with a larger army, the stalemate resumed.

Celtic aid

By 211 BC the Scipios sought the help of Celtic warriors inhabiting the Iberian Peninsula. By this time the Carthaginians had divided their armies into three forces to quash Iberian uprisings, led by Hasdrubal, his younger brother Mago, and Hasdrubal Gisco, a prestigious Carthaginian commander. In response, the Romans split their own forces in two. They intended to use the Celtiberian support to wipe out two of the Carthaginian armies in one devastating offensive before all three could unite.

The Battles of the Upper Baetis

Publius Scipio advanced on Mago near Castulo. As Publius drew nearer, he realised one of Carthage’s Iberian allies covered his line of retreat. So he attacked the Iberian force first, who desperately held their ground. Carthage’s cavalry soon arrived, giving Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco time to close the distance. Outnumbered, Publius Scipio’s troops were sitting ducks.

Gnaeus Scipio had begun his attack on Hasdrubal Barca’s camp. To withstand the assault, Hasdrubal bribed the Celtiberian mercenaries to abandon Gnaeus, forcing him to retreat towards Ilorca, unaware of his brother’s end. Unable to outrun the Numidian cavalry, Gnaeus made a futile stand as the three Carthaginian armies sealed his fate.

Citizen soldiers of Carthage on parade, as envisaged by French painter Georges Rochegrosse (1859-1938).

Image Credit: Public Domain

Rise of Scipio Africanus

With the Scipio brothers dead, just a few thousand Romans safely made it to north of the Ebro. The Romans were back to square one, but they were persistent. The following year another 10,000 soldiers were mustered to reignite the Iberian campaign. In command was Publius Cornelius Scipio, the future “Scipio Africanus”. He was just 26 years old.

His arrival in Spain in 210 BC bolstered Roman numbers to 30,000. Carthage had defeated the Scipios, but they were not a cohesive force. They suffered from personal animosities, were spread wide, while Iberian resistance proved an enduring nuisance.

Qart-Hadasht

Scipio went for the head of the snake, advancing south to Qart-Hadasht, the centre of Punic power in Iberia. With all Carthaginian armies at least 10 days away, Scipio was confident he could seize the fortress. Qart-Hadast was located on a peninsula, connected to the mainland by an isthmus to the east. To the north and west was a swamp, while a calm bay welcomed sailors from the south.

Roman ships bombarded the city while Scipio attacked from the eastern isthmus. This provided a diversion for Roman troops to wade through the swamps, resulting in a four-pronged assault which Qart-Hadast could not endure. In one stroke, Scipio usurped Carthage’s hold on Spain’s eastern coast. He had also established a permanent base south of the Ebro.

The Battle of Baecula: 208 BC

With his opponents scattered, Scipio closed in on Hasdrubal Barca. Hasdrubal occupied a plateau near Baecula which offered protection – a river covered his rear with ravines guarding his flanks. Scipio’s light infantry advanced directly towards the enemy line under a shower of missiles. Entrusting his defensive position, Hasdrubal had delayed assembling his forces, believing Scipio was merely offering a skirmish. With time against Scipio, he used the rest of his forces to encircle Hasdrubal’s troops, spreading panic. The battle was already over.

According to Polybius, Hasdrubal had already persuaded himself that if Fortune chose he should lose the battle, he would no longer hesitate to combine forces with Hannibal in Italy. Determined therefore to minimise his losses, Hasdrubal withdrew with his heavy infantry and elephants, abandoning his light infantry and Iberian allies to a slaughter.

Hasdrubal crosses the Alps

When Hasdrubal first attempted to join Hannibal in Italy seven years previous, he failed to reach the Pyrenees. After his humiliating defeat at Baecula, Hasdrubal had already lost a third of his army. But thanks to his brother’s initial Alpine crossing, the scale of the feat which stood before Hasdrubal was not as daunting. Hasdrubal faced no serious opposition from tribal chieftains, as Hannibal had. In fact, passing through only served to reinforce Hasdrubal’s numbers with Gallic allies. In the late spring of 207 BC, Hasdrubal finally reached Italy.

War elephants depicted in Hannibal’s army crossing the Rhône, by Henri Motte, 1878.

Image Credit: Hannibal's army crossing the Rhône, by Henri Motte, 1878 / Public Domain

Roman patience

Successfully combining forces with Hannibal was a difficult task in enemy territory, where communications were easily intercepted. The Romans shied away from major battles with the Barca brothers, despite their home advantage and a levy of 40,000 troops under the consul, Claudius Nero. Rome sought instead to contain Hannibal in southern Italy with a minor engagement at Grumentum.

Hasdrubal proceeded southwards. The other consul, Marcus Livius, checked Hasdrubal’s advance and allowed him to cross the Metaurus River. Roman patience soon won out. Shortly Grumentum, Carthaginian messengers were intercepted. Hasdrubal’s aim to meet his brother in Umbria was exposed to Claudius Nero. With breath-taking speed, Claudius Nero marched north through the night to crush Hasdrubal.

Carthage in disarray

Hasdrubal was caught off-guard. He only realised Rome’s forces had grown when his formations assembled for battle. Though the exact size of Hasdrubal’s forces is unclear, Claudius’ additional 7,000 troops were enough to deter Hasdrubal. Hasdrubal retreated towards the Metaurus River at night.

According to Livy, Hasdrubal’s guides abandoned him, leaving his army in disarray. However the blunder was likely accidental. Hasdrubal reached the river during the night, but could not cross to the northern bank. When sunrise came, his troops were exhausted and on the wrong side of the river. Hasdrubal ordered his troops to set up camp – a costly mistake.

The Battle of the Metaurus: 207 BC

The southern bank of the Metaurus River seems the most likely spot for the ensuing battle. Its uneven terrain favoured the Romans who had grown accustomed to the guerrilla warfare against Hannibal in southern Italy. As battle commenced, Marcus Livius engaged the Carthaginian right whilst Hasdrubal’s elephants charged the Roman centre. Panic spread in the Roman line. On the other wing, Nero could not hope to make a successful head-on assault against the Gauls: Hasdrubal had stationed them on high ground that was impossible to outflank. Nero made a bold move. He sent half of his forces to the Roman left wing to outflank Hasdrubal who was fighting amid the Spanish ranks.

A map describing the Battle of Metaurus featured in J.G. Bartholomew’s A Literary & Historical Atlas of Europe (1910).

Image Credit: Public Domain / Shutterstock

Overwhelmed by this two-pronged assault, the Carthaginian right flank crumbled. The rest followed. Hasdrubal himself died in the throes of battle.

The ancient sources for the battle are frustratingly contradictory. Livy makes the extraordinary claim that 61,000 Carthaginian troops were killed or captured. Polybius’ figures are more reasonable: 10,000 Carthaginian and 2,000 Romans dead. The Romans are unlikely to have fielded over 40,000. Hasdrubal’s aversion for a pitched battle suggests he was outnumbered.

Metaurus’ place in history

The victory at Metaurus was joyously received in Rome. Livius – the consul in charge on the day – was awarded a triumph. Claudius Nero was granted the smaller honour of an ovation, though it was his daring decisions which were pivotal in achieving victory. In six days, Nero had Hasdrubal’s severed head thrown into the Carthaginian camp – a blow to Hannibal with clear symbolism: you’ll be next.

The battle of Metaurus is easy to overlook from a distance. More impressive clashes took place during the Second Punic War. But if Hasdrubal’s reinforcements joined Hannibal, might their forces have been enough to capture Rome? Certainly the battle was pivotal. It forced Carthage to effectively abandon Spain to Scipio Africanus. Rome exploited this, using the Iberian peninsula as a springboard to North Africa towards Carthage’s final defeat.

Some were caused by underestimating the enemy, others by failing to understand the battlefield terrain, but all brought disaster for these commanders and their men.

Here are ten of the worst mistakes in military history:

1. The Romans at the Battle of Cannae

In 216 BC Hannibal Barca famously crossed the Alps into Italy with only 40,000 soldiers. A vast Roman army of around 80,000 men was raised to oppose him, led by the two Roman consuls. At Cannae the majority of this huge force were lost owing to a disastrous error on the part of their Roman commanders.

The Roman generals’ plan at Cannae was to advance and punch through Hannibal’s thin battle-line, putting faith in their much larger infantry force. Hannibal, in contrast, had prepared a complex strategy.

He first ordered his infantry to feign withdrawals in the centre of his formation, drawing the eager Romans towards his crescent-shaped battle-line. The Romans, unsuspecting, thought they had the Carthaginians on the run and drove their forces deep into this crescent. Hannibal’s cavalry then drove off the horsemen who protected the Roman flank, and circled around the back of the huge Roman force, charging their rear.

The Roman commanders did not realise their mistake in time: the Carthaginian infantry’s crescent formation now surrounded them at the front, and Hannibal’s cavalry was driving into their rear. Roman soldiers were so tightly packed in this Carthaginian trap that they were unable even to swing their swords.

The Death of Aemilius Pallus at Cannae. Image Credit: Public Domain

Around 60,000 Romans perished owing to their generals’ over-confidence, including Aemilius Paullus, one of the Roman consuls. It ranks alongside the the Battle of the Somme as one of the bloodiest days in western military history.

2. Crassus at the Battle of Carrhae

In 53 BC Marcus Licinius Crassus and his Roman legions were utterly crushed by the Parthians at the Battle of Carrhae. Crassus made the mistake of failing to recognise the importance of terrain and the skills of the Parthian horse-archers.

Crassus had marched 40,000 legionaries and auxiliary troops into the desert in pursuit of the Parthian army. He ignored the advice of his allies and advisers who had proposed staying in the mountains or near the Euphrates to reduce the danger from the Parthian cavalry.

Weakened by thirst and heat, the Romans were attacked by the Parthians deep in the desert. Misjudging the size of the Parthian army, Crassus ordered his men to form an immobile square which was devastated by the Parthian horse archers. When Crassus had his men pursue the enemy they were charged by cataphracts, the Parthian heavy cavalry.

Crassus’ many blunders resulted in his own death, and that of his son and 20,000 Roman soldiers. He also lost several Legionary Eagles, the Roman military standards, which were not recovered for over thirty years.

3. The Romans at the Teutoburg Forest

Across their long military history, few defeats left such an impact on the Romans as that of Varus’ legions at the Teutoburg Forest in 9 AD. On hearing news of the disaster, the Emperor Augustus famously cried aloud to himself repeatedly, ‘Quintilius Varus, give me back my legions!’.

Varus first made the error of trusting Arminius, a Germanic chieftain serving as his advisor. When Arminius informed him that a revolt had begun nearby, Varus marched his army through the Teutoburg Forest to deal with the problem.

Varus vastly underestimated the organisation of the Germanic tribes and their ability to use the local terrain; he did not reconnoitre the forest or even march his army in combat formation. As the Romans marched through the dense woodland, they were suddenly ambushed by a hidden and well-disciplined Germanic army led by Arminius himself.

Only a few thousand Romans escaped, and Varus himself was forced to commit suicide during the battle. Arminius’ victory prevented the Roman empire from ever establishing a firm grip on Germania.

4. The French at the Battle of Agincourt

On the morning of 25 October 1415, the French army at Agincourt would have been expecting a famous victory. Their army greatly outnumbered the English host under Henry V, and they had a much larger force of knights and men-at-arms.

The French, however, made a ruinous mistake, miscalculating the accuracy, range and firing rate of the English longbows. During the battle, the French cavalry attempted to charge the English archers, but were unable to pass the sharpened stakes which protected them. Meanwhile the French men-at-arms moved slowly over the muddy ground separating them from the English.

In these conditions, the entire French army was hugely vulnerable to the constant hail of arrows from the English longbows. The French were easily beaten back when they finally pushed through the arrows to Henry V’s lines. Their mistakes resulted in the French losing around ten times the number of English casualties.

5. The Austrians at the Battle of Karánsebes

On the night of 21-22 September 1788, during the Austro-Turkish War, the Austrian army under Emperor Joseph II defeated itself in a major friendly-fire incident.

Emperor Joseph II and his Soldiers. Image Credit: Public Domain

Clashes between Austrian troops began when the Austrian Hussars who were serving as scouts refused to share their schnapps with some infantry. After one of the drunken Hussars fired a shot, the infantry opened fire in return. As the two groups fought, they heard shouts of ‘Turks! Turks!’, leading them to believe the Ottomans were nearby.

The Hussars fled back into the Austrian camp, and a confused officer ordered his artillery to fire upon them. In the darkness, the Austrians believed the Ottoman cavalry were attacking them unawares and turned on each other in terror.

Over 1,000 Austrians were killed during the night, and Joseph II ordered a general withdrawal on account of the chaos. When the Ottomans actually arrived two days later, they took Karánsebes without a fight.

6. Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia

The invasion force which Napoleon mustered for his campaign against Russia was the largest army ever assembled in the history of warfare. Over 685,000 men from France and Germany crossed the Neman River and began the invasion. After Napoleon’s failure to force the Russians to surrender and lengthy retreat, his army would suffer 500,000 casualties.

Napoleon falsely believed the Russians would deploy their army in a conclusive battle, but instead they withdrew deeper into Russian territory. As the Russians retreated they destroyed crops and villages, making it impossible for Napoleon to supply his huge host.

Napoleon managed to inflict an inconclusive defeat on the Russians and seize Moscow, but even the capital had been destroyed by the withdrawing army. After waiting in vain for Emperor Alexander I to surrender, Napoleon fell back from Moscow.

As winter approached, snows slowed the French army, who suffered from starvation and desertion as the Russians harried their long retreat.

7. The Charge of the Light Brigade

Immortalised by Alfred, Lord Tennyson’s poem, this British light cavalry charge during the Battle of Balaclava is one of the most renowned military mistakes in history. After a miscommunication in the chain of command, the Light Brigade was ordered on a frontal assault against a large Russian artillery battery.

As the Light Brigade charged between the Fedyukhin Heights and the Causeway Heights (the so-called ‘Valley of Death’), they faced devastating fire from three sides. They reached the artillery but were driven back, receiving more fire during their retreat.

The Charge of the Light Brigade. Image Credit: Public Domain

In the end, the miscommunication caused nearly 300 casualties in a matter of minutes.

8. Custer at the Battle of the Little Bighorn

The Battle of the Little Bighorn is one of the most well-known engagements in America’s military history. For decades after the battle Lieutenant-Colonel George Custer was considered an American hero for his Last Stand against the forces of the Lakota, Northern Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes.

Modern historians have documented Custer’s various mistakes before and during the battle, which led to a decisive victory for the tribal war leaders Crazy Horse and Chief Gall. Notably, Custer seriously misjudged the number of enemies camped before the Little Big Horn River, ignoring his Native scouts’ reports that the encampment was the largest they had ever seen.

‘Custer’s Last Stand’ by Edgar Samuel Paxson. Image Credit: Public Domain

Custer was also supposed to wait for Brigadier General Alfred Terry and Colonel John Gibson’s troops to arrive before launching an attack. Instead, Custer decided to make his move immediately, afraid that the Sioux and Cheyennes would escape if he waited.

Custer was forced to retreat his own battalion to a nearby hill, where they all perished facing repeated assaults.

9. Hitler’s Invasion of the Soviet Union

Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s failed invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, was one of the most significant military campaigns in history. Following the invasion, Germany was engaged in a war on two fronts which stretched their forces to breaking point.

Image credit: Bundesarchiv / Commons.

Much like Napoleon before him, Hitler underestimated the resolve of the Russians and the difficulties of supplying his forces for the Russian terrain and weather. He believed that his army could seize Russia in only a few months, so his men were not prepared for a harsh Russian winter.

Following the German defeat in the largest battle in history at Stalingrad, Hitler was forced to redeploy troops from the western front to Russia, weakening his hold on Europe. The Axis Powers suffered nearly 1,000,000 casualties during the campaign, which proved a turning point in the Second World War.

10. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor

The USS Arizona burning after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Image Credut: Public Domain

In the early hours of 7 December 1941 the Japanese launched a pre-emptive strike against the American naval base at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese intended the attack to be a preventative action, hoping to stop the American Pacific Fleet from halting Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia. Instead, the strike drove America to join the Allies and enter the Second World War.

Initially the Pearl Harbor attack, which coincided with other strikes on American naval bases, was a success for the Japanese. 2,400 American personnel were killed, four battleships were sank and many more suffered severe damage.

However, the Japanese failed to deliver a decisive blow, and American popular opinion turned from isolationism towards involvement in the war. Over the coming years America not only helped turn the tide of the conflict in Europe, but also ended the Japanese Empire in the Pacific.

But Caesar’s rise was different.

The Julii

Although Caesar’s uncle was the incredibly influential Gaius Marius, the so-called “Third Founder of Rome”, Caesar himself came a rather unremarkable equestrian clan called the Julii.

Prior to the 1st century BC the Julii clan’s history had been rather insignificant. Yet things started to change when Marius appointed Caesar’s father, also called Julius, the governor of the rich Roman province of Asia (today western Anatolia).

The Roman province of Asia is modern day western Anatolia. At the start of the 1st century BC it was a relatively new Roman province, after the Attalid king Attalus III had bequeathed his kingdom to Rome in 133 BC.

This Julii rise to prominence halted abruptly in 85 BC when Caesar’s father unexpectedly died as he was bending down to tie his shoelace – perhaps from a heart attack.

Following the sudden death of his father, Caesar became the head of his family, aged just 16.

Thrown in at the deep end

Caesar’s succession as the Julii clan chief occurred at a time of internal turmoil in the Roman Empire.

In 85 BC the Republic was at the height of the Civil Wars between the radical populares (the men who championed the Roman lower social classes, known as the “plebeians”) and the optimates (those who wished to reduce the power of the plebeians).

Caesar’s highly-influential uncle Marius and his populares quickly appointed the 16 year-old as the flamen dialis, the second most important religious figure in Rome – a remarkably senior position for such a young man.

Caesar’s early prominence soon ended however. In 82 BC Sulla, the optimates figurehead, returned from his campaign against Mithridates in the east and restored optimate control in Rome.

Caesar, by then already married to the daughter of one of Sulla’s leading political opponents, was soon targeted. Defying Sulla’s direct orders, he refused to divorce his wife and was forced to flee Rome.

A temporary, unstable truce between Caesar and Sulla soon followed, but Caesar – fearing for his life – soon decided to go abroad and make his name in the legions. He went to Asia to serve as a junior officer and soon started to make his mark on the military stage.

He participated in the Roman attack on the Greek city-state of Mytilene in 81 BC, where he showed exceptional bravery and was awarded the Civic Crown – one of the highest military honours in the Roman army.

After a brief period back in Rome, Caesar once again headed east to study rhetoric on the island of Rhodes. Pirates captured him on his journey however and Caesar had to be ransomed by his companions.

Upon his release, Caesar promised his former captives he would return, capture them and crucify them all. He was sure to follow through on his word, raising a small private army, hunting down his former captors and executing them.

Fresco showing Caesar speaking to the pirates after the biography by Suetonius. Credit: Wolfgang Sauber / Commons.

Working his way up

Following his episode with the pirates Caesar returned to Rome, where he remained for a prolonged period. Through political bribery and public office, Caesar slowly worked his way up the Cursus Honorum, a set career path for aspiring patricians in the Roman Republic.

Financially his father had left him little. To rise through the ranks, Caesar thus had to borrow a lot of money from creditors, most notably from Marcus Crassus.

This money lending caused the Julii chief to gain a lot of political enemies – enemies who Caesar only managed to avoid falling into the hands of by showing remarkable ingenuity.

Caesar’s rise up the Cursus Honorum took time – most of his life in fact. When he became governor of Cisalpine Gaul (northern Italy) and Provincia (southern France) and launched his famous conquest of Gaul in 58 BC, he was already 42 years old.

Unlike either Alexander or Hannibal, Caesar had a father who left him little bar his patrician clan status and his close connection to Gaius Marius. Caesar had to work his way up to power with skill, ingenuity and bribery. And because of that, he was the most self-made of the three.

Featured image credit: A bust of Julius Caesar, Summer garden, Saint-Petersburg Lvova Anastasiya / Commons.

Although the empire quickly crumbled following his death, he left one of history’s most remarkable legacies. Here are several examples of the significant imprint Alexander left on the World.

The legend that was Alexander

Stories relating to Alexander’s conquests soon became the stuff of legend. His young age, his divinity, his charisma and his megalomania were romanticised into fictional stories that remained popular down into medieval times.

“Arthurian” tales of Alexander emerged in several different cultures, each supplementing Alexander’s conquests with many fictional stories that suited their own ethnic agendas.

Jewish versions of the Alexander Romance, for instance, claimed that Alexander the Great visited the Temple of Jerusalem; meanwhile in Ptolemaic Egypt, stories spread that the Macedonian king was actually the son of the last Egyptian pharaoh Nectanebo II.

Alexander is also mentioned in the Quran as Dhul-Qharnayn – literally ‘the two-horned one.’

Romanticised versions of Alexander’s conquests became abundant. They include him venturing to far-flung mythical places, using a flying machine, learning about his death from a talking tree, going to the depths of the sea in a submarine and fighting mythical beasts in India with his army.

Arthurian tales of Alexander shone throughout Europe and the Near-East until the Renaissance period.

Divine Alexander

An illustration of Alexander the Great’s elaborate funeral carriage. A description of it survives in detail thanks to the historical source Diodorus Siculus.

After Alexander died and his body ran cold, his corpse became a symbol of divine power and legitimacy. Whoever possessed the corpse secured great sway in a post-Alexander world. A war was even fought over its possession, such was the impact he left on the world.

Following the climactic battle of Ipsus in 301 BC Ptolemy, the Successor king ruling Egypt, had Alexander’s body moved to the centre of his new capital at Alexandria and placed in a magnificent tomb.

From far and wide for the next 600 years visitors journeyed to Alexander’s city to see the tomb.

In 47 BC Julius Caesar, following his triumphant entry into Alexandria, visited the tomb in homage to his hero.

Caesar proved the first of many prominent Romans to pay such homage. To those Romans who desired great power, Alexander was an immortalised conqueror who epitomised world conquest – a man to admire and emulate.

Throughout the Roman Imperial period, many emperors would visit Alexander’s tomb – emperors including Augustus, Caligula, Vespasian, Titus and Hadrian. For them all, the body symbolised the zenith of imperial power.

Many would thus associate themselves with Alexander – some more obsessively than others. The mad emperor Caligula for instance looted Alexander’s corpse of his breastplate.

Alexander’s body remained a place of pagan pilgrimage in Alexandria until 391 AD, when the Eastern Roman Emperor Theodosius officially banned paganism throughout the Empire. It is likely Alexander’s tomb was either destroyed or converted during this crisis.

To this day the whereabouts of Alexander’s body and his tomb remain shrouded in mystery.

Augustus visits the tomb of Alexander the Great.

Setting the military bar

Throughout the rest of antiquity many generals revered Alexander the Great as the ideal military commander. This was especially true of his ‘Successors.’

Alexander the Great’s demise unleashed chaos onto his empire as various ambitious generals waged wars to become his true successor. Over the next forty years many formidable figures would rise and fall in antiquity’s version of Game of Thrones.

During this period many generals sought to emulate the leadership of Alexander the Great. The man who perhaps came closest was Pyrrhus, the leader of the most powerful tribe in Epirus and famous for his campaign against Rome.

It was said of Pyrrhus that, of all the generals that came after Alexander, he was the one who most resembled the great conqueror:

They saw in him shadows, as it were, and intimations of that leader’s impetuosity and might in conflicts.

Later notable commanders such as Hannibal Barca and Julius Caesar similarly revered Alexander as a man to admire and emulate on the battlefield.

Upon meeting Hannibal at Ephesus in 193 BC, Scipio Africanus, the victor of Zama, asked his former foe whom he considered to be the greatest general of all time, to which Hannibal replied:

“Alexander … because with a small force he routed armies of countless numbers, and because he traversed the remotest lands.”

Hannibal placed himself third in the list.

As for Caesar, he held similar adulation for the Macedonian conqueror. A story goes that while a 31-year-old Caesar was travelling in Spain, he noticed a statue of Alexander the Great. Seeing the statue Caesar wept, lamenting how Alexander had forged a huge empire by the age of 31, while he himself had accomplished nothing.

Alexander the Great’s generalship thus inspired many of history’s most outstanding generals, including Pyrrhus, Hannibal, Caesar and, more recently, Napoleon Bonaparte.

Creating the Hellenistic World

Alexander’s conquests spread Greek culture far and wide. During his campaigns he established Hellenic-style cities throughout his empire to improve administration, communication and trade.

Several of these cities remain prominent to this day. Both Kandahar (Alexandria-Arachosia) and Herat (Alexandria-Ariana) in Afghanistan and Khujand in Tajikistan (Alexandria-Eschate) were originally cities Alexander the Great founded as is, of course, Alexandria itself.

Following Alexander’s death Hellenistic kingdoms emerged across the length and breadth of Asia – from the Alexandria-based Ptolemaic kingdom in Egypt to the Indo-Greek kingdoms in India and Pakistan and the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom in Afghanistan.

A portrait of King Demetrius I ‘the Invincible’, a Greek king who ruled a large empire in modern day Afghanistan at the start of the 2nd century BC. Credit: Uploadalt / Commons.

From these areas, archaeologists have uncovered fascinating Greek-influenced art and architecture, perhaps most remarkably from the Greek-styled city of Ai Khanoum in northeastern Afghanistan.

The Hellenic art and architecture discovered at Ai Khanoum is some of the most beautiful in antiquity and provides a valuable insight to the Greeks in the East. Yet none of these fascinating Greek kingdoms would ever have existed if not for Alexander’s conquests.