In reality, however, nearly a year prior to D-Day, British Commonwealth and American Allied forces landed on the toe of Italy in 1943 and then, a few days later, at Salerno, in what were the main landings to really push towards Rome.
This article is an edited transcript of Italy and World War 2 with Paul Reed, available on History Hit .
Why did the Allies invade Italy?
The Italian campaign came about after the campaign in North Africa ended in May 1943 with the surrender of the Afrika Korps.
The Allies had discussed at Yalta the need to open a second front in the war to relieve pressure on the eastern front. However, the Allies were not then in a position to make a proper landing in France.
Salerno D-Day plan
Image Credit: Public Domain
The American belief was that the only way to defeat the Nazi regime was to land in France, go to Paris, to capture Paris, to push on to Belgium, to capture Belgium, and then to capture Holland – at which point the Allies would have a route into Nazi Germany.
But that wasn’t possible in the summer of 1943. So the compromise was to try and come in through the back door, an idea that British Prime Minister Winston Churchill believed in. Churchill called Italy the “soft underbelly of the Third Reich”. That’s what Italy was to him and indeed to others as well.
The route through Sicily
There was a plan to attack through Italy on a second front, push up through Italy and into Austria, entering Germany that way. And it sounded easy. But by the end of the campaign, veterans called it the “tough old gut of Europe”.
Although the Allies had decided upon an invasion of Italy from North Africa, it wasn’t possible to do that directly. There wasn’t enough shipping or enough aircraft to cover an assault. Instead, it was going to be a two-step operation.
The Allies would go across the Mediterranean, capture the island of Sicily, and use that as a staging post to go to the Italian mainland.
When did the British and Commonwealth troops invade Sicily?
Troops from Sicily arrive under shell fire during the landing at Salerno, September 1943.
The landings at Sicily took place in July 1943, with British and Commonwealth troops arriving on one side of the island and the Americans landing on the other side. There was some tough fighting on the island of Sicily in the countryside.
The beginnings of a rivalry between Britain’s Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and US Lieutenant General George S. Patton emerged and some have suggested that they over-focused on that rivalry, consequently allowing German forces to get away across the Strait of Messina.
While the Allies did capture Sicily, it wasn’t the complete success they had hoped for, and the fight for the rest of Italy was yet to come.
]]>However, a combination of bad luck and poor planning quickly doomed the operation. Some even argue that the campaign never had a chance of success.
Here are 20 facts about Operation Market Garden.
1. By September 1944 the Allies believed the Germans were crumbling
By September 1944 the Allies were in a state of euphoria. The speed of the allied advance since the Normandy landings, alongside news of Stauffenberg’s failed plot to kill Hitler, convinced British and US Intelligence that the Wehrmacht had reached a state of war weariness and would soon disintegrate.
In fact, this wasn’t the case. The failure of Operation Valkyrie had resulted in the German army coming under the full control of the SS. German soldiers were now going to be forced to fight on to the very end.
2. The plan was the brainchild of Bernard Montgomery
Cracks among the Allied high command had started to emerge by September 1944, particularly between Generals Montgomery, Patton and Bradley. Montgomery believed he was the only man who could win the war, much to the anger of Patton and Bradley.
He planned to bypass the German Siegfried Line by marching the Allies through the Netherlands and then down into Germany, ending the war by Christmas. Patton and Bradley strongly disagreed, arguing the northern route into Germany was, in fact, the most difficult due to the numerous, wide rivers they had to cross.
Image of Bernard Montgomery in North Africa in 1942.
3. The operation was made up of two parts
Operation Garden involved the advance of a British tank and mobile infantry force across the bridges of the lower Rhine and then down into Germany.
Operation Market was the landing of 40,000 paratroopers behind enemy lines to take control of the bridges and hold them long enough for the tanks to cross. The plan depended on the Allies maintaining hold of the bridges.
The airborne divisions involved were the 101st US Airborne Division (they would land near Eindhoven), the 82nd US Airborne Division (at Nijmegen), the British 1st Airborne Division and the 1st Polish Independent Airborne Brigade (both would land near Arnhem).
The 101st Airborne had to capture 5 bridges near Eindhoven on the first day of the operation
The British at Arnhem had two bridges to take, the most important of the two being the road bridge. The 82nd US Airborne at Nijmegen had one: the Waal Bridge.
It was the combination of these two operations that made up Operation Market Garden.
Operation Market Garden – Allied Plan. Image Credit: Duncan Jackson / Commons.
4. Montgomery pretended Eisenhower had approved the whole project
Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, had given Montgomery control of the 1st Allied Airborne army, but he had not been told any details regarding Operation Market Garden.
5. The bridges were not the final target
Part of the army would press north past Arnhem, initially to capture the Luftwaffe airfield at Deelen before going further north to Zuiderzee.
An aerial view of the bridge across the Waal River at Nijmegen. 17 – 20 September 1944.
6. The commander of the 1st Allied Airborne was General ‘Boy’ Browning
Browning was the one who would take the airborne corps to war. He had yet to see action in the Second World War and so was desperate for the operation to go ahead.
His American counterpart, Major-General Ridgway, had more experience, but Browning was still made the overall general of the operation.
Browning observes training at Netheravon, October 1942.
7. Montgomery did not communicate his plan with the RAF
When Browning finally revealed the plan to RAF staff on 10 September, RAF transport officers raised several logistical problems regarding the airborne operation: not only was there not enough daylight for the RAF to do two lifts every 24 hours, but each tug aircraft could only tow one glider.
They advised Browning to reassess the plan to ensure it had a greater chance at success. Browning refused to consider it.
Six man parties of 1st Airborne Division paratroops marching toward Hotspur gliders of the Glider Pilot Exercise Unit at Netheravon, October 1942.
8. Dutch resistance groups cautioned the Allies against the plan
They revealed that the German army was not as spent as the Allies believed. Meanwhile Dutch officers warned them that marching an entire division along one road up to Arnhem and the German border was extremely dangerous.
Nevertheless, despite hearing these warnings, Browning was fixed on the plan.
The sunken, flood plain land that surrounded the elevated road to Arnhem was the perfect ambush territory for powerful German weapons such as the 8.8 cm Flak 18/36/37/41 gun. Image Credit: Bundesarchiv / Commons.
9. The British plan was to land 8 miles outside Arnhem
The RAF refused to drop the British closer than 8 miles from the city because they feared suffering heavy losses from anti-aircraft fire.
10. British 1st Airborne commander Roy Urquhart realised the campaign would be a disaster before it began
Just prior to the Operation’s commencement, Urquhart met Browning to inform him he believed the operation would be ‘a suicide mission’.
Additionally, General Gale of the British 6th Airborne voiced strong opposition to the plan, mainly due to how far away from Arnhem the 1st Airborne was to be dropped.
Polish Brigade General Stanoslaw Sosabowski also raised concerns with the plan.
Browning pushed aside this opposition however, claiming such attitudes were bad for morale.
Major-General Roy Urquhart DSO and Bar.
11. The 1st British Airborne landed 1/3 of their troops on 17 September
1/2 of these had to remain at the drop site, however, to guard the landing zones for the next lot landing in the following days. Therefore, only one brigade could march on Arnhem on the first day.
Parachutes open overhead as waves of paratroops land in Holland during operations by the 1st Allied Airborne Army. September 1944.
12. An SS training battalion happened to be training in the woods near the British drop zone
The SS division reacted quickly and managed to hold up most of the British airborne. But Colonel John Frost and the second battalion managed to bypass the defence and enter Arnhem.
Four men of the 1st Paratroop Battalion, 1st (British) Airborne Division, take cover in a shell hole outside Arnhem. 17 September 1944.
13. British command and control quickly fell apart
Trying to move things along, Urquhart became separated from headquarters when he headed to the front lines. The fact that the radios also did not work only added to the confusion.
John Hackett, a British officer who landed on 18 September, said:
‘Everything that could go wrong did go wrong’.
Operation Market Garden. 18 September 1944. By then the Germans had erected a blocking line between the landing zones and the northern side of the bridge. Image Credit: Ranger Steve / Commons.
14. Frost’s division captured the north end of Arnhem bridge and held it heroically
Although much of the British Airborne division never reached the town, Frost and his men captured Arnhem Bridge and defiantly resisted German attacks. Following the battle, the Germans asked if Frost’s men were specially trained in urban warfare, due to the ferocity of their resistance.
Sergeants J Whawell and J Turl of the Glider Pilot Regiment search for snipers in the ULO (Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs) school in Kneppelhoutweg, Oosterbeek, 21 September 1944.
15. The Germans destroyed 2 of the 5 bridges before the 101st Airborne were able to capture them
When the armoured divisions heard that two bridges had been destroyed, they decided to advance up the road to Eindhoven at a more leisurely pace. This provided the Germans more time to dig in.
16. The 6th US Airborne Division had great difficulty taking Nijmegen Bridge
James Gavin, the 6th Airborne commander, could only send one battalion to take the bridge, which had been heavily reinforced in the meantime. The rest were focused on occupying the Groesbeek Heights to the southeast of the city, as ordered by Browning.
Nijmegen and the bridge, pictured after the battle in September 1944.
17. One of the most heroic moments of World War Two happened at Nijmegen
On 20 September, U.S. paratroopers crossed the River Waal in 26 small, canvas boats under heavy fire. When they reached the far side, they seized the north side of the bridge.
The daring feat is regarded as among the most heroic in the Second World War, though it is blackened by the fact that the survivors killed all they faced when taking the bridge, including prisoners.
18. The armoured brigade stopped after crossing the Nijmegen Bridge
The trouble was that the Grenadier Guards, who had just cleared Nijmegen after ruthless urban fighting, were exhausted and had run low on ammunition.
By that point anyhow, Frost’s battalion at Arnhem had almost run out of ammunition and were on the verge of surrender. What remained of Frost’s division was captured on 21 September.
When the British XXX Corps could finally cross the Waal Bridge, it was too late to relieve Arnhem.
19. The Polish Brigade landed on 21 September
They landed east of Driel (under some German fire, but not as much as the film A Bridge Too Far suggests) and went on to cover the withdrawal of the British 1st Airborne Division.
Gen. Sosabowski (left) with Lt-Gen Frederick Browning, commander of the British 1st Airborne Corps.
20. What remained of the British 1st Airborne Division and the Polish Parachute Brigade were evacuated back across the Rhine on 25 September
It signalled the end, and failure, of Operation Market Garden. Arnhem would not be liberated until April 1945.
The grave of an unknown British airborne soldier at Arnhem, photographed after its liberation 15 April 1945.
1. Italian M13/40
The M13/40 was best tank available to the Italian Army in 1940 but by 1942 it was totally outclassed by the latest British and American designs.
Powered by a Fiat diesel engine, it was reliable but slow. The frontal armour thickness of 30mm was inadequate by the standards of late-1942 and also had the disadvantage of being bolted on in some areas, a potentially lethal arrangement for crew members when the tank was hit. The main gun was a 47mm weapon.
Most Allied crews regarded the M13/40 as a deathtrap.
2. British Mark lll Valentine
The Valentine was an ‘infantry tank’, designed to accompany the infantry in the assault in line with British pre-war doctrine. As such it was slow but well-armoured, with 65-mm thick frontal armour. But by 1942 its 40mm/2-pounder gun was obsolete. It wasn’t able to fire high explosive shells and was totally out-classed and out-ranged by German guns.
The Valentine was powered by a bus engine and was very reliable, unlike many other contemporary British designs, but the design was also small and cramped, making up-gunning it difficult.
Valentine tanks in transit / Library and Archives Canada PA-174520
3. British Mk lV Crusader
The Crusader was a ‘cruiser’ tank, designed for speed. The first Crusaders carried the standard 2-pounder gun, but by the time of Alamein the Crusader lll had been introduced which had the much better 57mm/6-pounder gun.
However the Crusader lll still suffered from the same chronic unreliability problems that had plagued the design from the start. Plus, the tank’s small size meant the turret crew had to be reduced from three to two to accommodate the larger gun.
4. M3 Grant
Derived from the American M3 Lee medium tank, the Grant carried both a turret-mounted 37mm anti-tank gun and a dual-purpose 75mm gun. The British modified the 37mm turret to give the tank a slightly lower profile and re-christened the altered design with a measure of historical logic as the Grant.
For the first time, the Eighth Army now had a tank armed with a 75mm gun capable of firing a high explosive round, so vital to deal with dug-in German anti-tank guns. The Grant was mechanically reliable but the 75mm gun was mounted in a side sponson instead of a turret which imposed some tactical disadvantages, including exposing the majority of the tank’s considerable bulk before it could engage a target.
A parade of M4 Sherman and M3 Grant tanks during training at Fort Knox, US / Library of Congress
5. M4 Sherman
The M4 was the American development of the M3 medium design. It mounted the 75mm gun in a proper turret and combined it with a versatile and reliable chassis and engine. The Sherman was designed for mass production and at last provided Eighth Army with a good all-round tank capable of duelling with the best German tanks available to the Afrika Korps.
It inevitably still had some faults. The main problem being a propensity to catch fire easily when hit. This earned it the nickname ‘Ronson’ among British troops because of the advert for the famous lighter that boasted: ‘Lights First Time’. The Germans grimly christened it ‘The Tommy Cooker.’
All tanks have a tendency to catch fire when hit hard but the Sherman suffered more than most in this respect. Not all British tanks crews welcomed the Sherman and Corporal Geordie Reay of 3rd Royal Tank Regiment remarked on its considerable height, saying: “It was too big for my liking. Jerry wouldn’t have trouble hitting it.”
6. Churchill
The Churchill was a new British design for a infantry support tank, a small unit of which arrived in time to be deployed at Alamein.
The Churchill was slow and heavily armoured, but the Mark used at Alamein was at least equipped with the more potent 6-pounder/57mm gun. However the Churchill had suffered a troubled development and was plagued by teething troubles, particularly with its complex engine transmission. It would go on to become a successful design, especially in its ability to climb steep slopes.
7. Panzer Mark lll
An excellent pre-war German design, the Mark III showed a capability for development sadly lacking in contemporary British tanks. It was initially intended to take on other tanks and armed with a high-velocity 37mm gun but it was later up-gunned with a short-barrelled 50mm gun, and then a long-barrelled 50mm. The design could also take a short-barrelled 75mm gun, used to fire high explosive shells for infantry support. Originally built with frontal armour of 30mm, this also was increased on later models.
The Panzer Mark IV “Special” / Mark Pellegrini
8. Panzer Mark lV
The Panzer IV was yet another superior and adaptable German design. Originally intended as an infantry support tank, the Mark IV was first armed with a short 75mm gun. However development ‘stretch’ meant that the Mark lV could be easily up-gunned and up-armoured.
The Mark IV ‘Special’ was fitted with a long-barrelled high-velocity 75mm gun, an excellent anti-tank weapon that out-ranged the 75mm gun on both the Grant and the Sherman. This version of the Mark IV was arguably the best tank in North Africa until the arrival of a few Mark VI Tiger tanks later in the campaign, but the Germans never had enough of them.
Referenced
Moore, William 1991 Panzer Bait With the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment 1939-1945
Fletcher, David 1998 Tanks in Camera: Archive Photographs from the Tank Museum The Western Desert, 1940-1943 Stroud: Sutton Publishing
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Here are 10 key events of the North African campaign.
1. Italian invasion of Egypt
Italian forces moved into the Western Desert from the Italian colony of Cyrenacia (a region of modern-day Libya) in September 1940. They possessed massive numerical superiority over the small British force in Egypt charged with defending the Suez Canal.
Having advanced some 50 miles into Egypt, the Italians established a line of bases at Sidi Barrani.
2. Defeat of the Italian forces
Though outnumbered, the British were superior to the Italians in every other respect. The Italians at Sidi Barrani were soon outflanked and enveloped.
Bardia and Tobruk were taken soon after in similar fashion, with the Australians taking responsibility for the latter. With the surrender of Benghazi, the near total collapse of the Italian forces in North Africa was complete.
3. Arrival of Erwin Rommel
In February 1941, Erwin Rommel was sent to rescue the floundering Italians. His arrival turned the North African campaign on its head. Against orders, Rommel advanced along the coast toward Benghazi.
The British, caught by surprise, fell back. Stretching his supply lines to the maximum, Rommel continued his advance until the British had been pushed out of Libya, with the exception of Tobruk.
4. The Siege of Tobruk
For 241 days, the garrison at Tobruk held firm against constant German assaults.
Between April and August the garrison was made up primarily of men from the 9th Australian Division. In August they were relieved by the British 70th Division and the extraordinary Polish Carpathian Rifle Brigade, who would earn themselves a fearsome reputation.
In December 1941, Tobruk was successfully relieved during Operation Crusader. Having overrun his fuel supplies, Rommel fell back.
5. Tobruk falls
In January 1942, having regrouped following the disappointment of the previous year, Rommel launched a fresh attack into Cyrenacia. As Allied forces fell back, Tobruk again became isolated. The port’s defences were not a strong as they had been the previous year. After a siege lasting less than a week, Tobruk fell. It was one of the worst Allied defeats of the war.
More than 30,000 Allied soldiers were taken prisoner and Rommel also took possession of the stockpiles of fuel, ammunition and vehicles. With momentum on his side, Rommel pressed on, pushing the Allies back into Egypt.
6. First Battle of El Alamein
With his sights set on Cairo, Rommel once again pushed his supplies to the limit by attacking the new Allied line at El Alamein in July 1942. But his forces were exhausted.
The Allies also felt the benefit of their new Grant tanks, which gave them the edge over the German armour. After four days, Rommel halted the attacks. His drive into Egypt was at an end.
The Allies enjoyed massive material supremacy over the Axis forces at El Alamein. But it was Montgomery’s tactics that enabled them to be used to the maximum advantage.
7. Arrival of Montgomery
Bernard Montgomery was appointed commander of the Eighth Army in August 1942. The appointment bolstered morale and coincided with a fresh influx of supplies into North Africa, including heavier anti-tank guns, Grants and new Sherman M4 tanks.
8. Second Battle of El Alamein
At the Second Battle of El Alamein, in October 1942, Montgomery’s forces enjoyed vast material superiority. The Allies also possessed total air supremacy over the battle area.
Combined with Montgomery’s improved tactics, which saw anti-tank guns working in unison with artillery and tanks, the Allies inflicted a devastating defeat on Rommel and proceeded to pursue him out of Egypt and all the way across Libya into Tunisia.
9. Operation Torch
In November 1942, an Anglo-American invasion force landed in French North Africa under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Having secured the surrender of the Vichy French government, Eisenhower’s forces advanced into Tunisia with the intention of securing Tunis. They were halted by German and Italian troops at the Battle of the Kasserine Pass, which exposed the American forces’ lack of experience.
10. Axis surrender
Eisenhower’s force linked up with the British Eighth Army and launched a combined offensive against the German and Italian lines around Tunis. On 13 May 1943, the Axis forces surrendered. More than 200,000 soldiers were taken prisoner. The North African campaign was over.
]]>Doctrinal changes introduced by Bernard Montgomery, assisted by massive advantages in supply produced a much-needed Allied victory that brought the dominance of Erwin Rommel’s formidable Afrika Korps to an end.
Here are ten facts about the Battle of El Alamein.
1. Bernard Montgomery commanded the Allied forces
Bernard Montgomery was born in London in 1887 and trained at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst.
He went to war in 1914 as a lieutenant but suffered a bullet wound to the chest in October of that year during an attack on the village of Meteren. At nightfall he was recovered by stretcher bearers and taken to an Advance Dressing Station where his wound was considered fatal and a grave was dug for him. Fortunately he pulled through. He spent the rest of the war as a Staff Officer.
In his memoir, Montgomery describes his frustration with the British Army of the First World War, remarking on the ‘little contact between the generals and the soldiers’ and the former’s ‘disregard for human life’.
Montgomery went to war again in 1939 in command of the Third Division, serving during the Fall of France in 1940. In August 1942 he was made commander of the Eighth Army.
2. Erwin Rommel commanded the German forces
Erwin Rommel was born in Heidenheim in 1891, to a family with no military tradition. Nevertheless, in 1910, he joined the German infantry and began the First World War as a lieutenant. By September 1914 he had already earned an Iron Cross.
In October 1917, now stationed on the Italian Front, Rommel was set the task of capturing Italian strongholds around Mount Matajur in the Alps. In a series of daring assaults, Rommel captured the entire mountain, staking a claim to almost 20 miles of territory and taking almost 9,000 prisoners.
By 1939 Rommel had advanced to colonel and in February 1940 was appointed to the 7th Panzer Division, his first armoured command. He showed an instant affinity for armoured warfare, which was well suited to his bold, decisive style.
In 1941, with the Italians floundering, Rommel was placed in command of German forces in North Africa.
Erwin Rommel (left) / Bundesarchiv
3. The Allies enjoyed early success in North Africa…
The opening clashes of the desert campaign took place in Egypt and Libya and saw Field Marshall Wavell conduct successful operations against the Italian garrisons east of Sidi Birrani.
These early encounters were notable for two reasons; though the Italians enjoyed numerical superiority of 4:1 they were at a disadvantage in almost every other conceivable way, and the British employed a successful doctrine of coordination, using tanks, artillery and anti-tank guns together. Sidi Birrani, Bardia and Tobruk fell to the Allies who totally outfought the Italian defenders.
4. …but the arrival of the Afrika Korps changed everything
In the wake of successful operations against the Italians, the arrival of the Afrika Korps under Erwin Rommel in February 1941, changed the situation overnight.
Most notable was the change in British doctrine, which saw the coordinated approach that had worked so well against the Italians, replaced by a seemingly insane fashion for sending unsupported armoured formations to seek out the enemy tanks.
In contrast, the Germans had no intention of engaging in tank versus tank battles, believing the natural enemy of the tank to be artillery. Rommel kept his tanks behind a dug-in anti-tank screen, laced with the deadly 88mm. When his tanks did attack, they did only with support from the artillery.
This clash of doctrines resulted in heavy casualties for the British during Operations Battleaxe and Crusader in 1941.
The underlying reasons for this apparently crazy approach by the British lay in the inferiority of their primary anti-tank weapon, the 2-pdr. Almost all British tanks were equipped with the 2-pdr, which was only capable of engaging German tanks at a range of 500 yards or less.
The fearsome German 88mm was capable of destroying British tanks at ranges up to 2,000 yards, and even their 50mm Pak 38 was effective up to 1000 yards. This disadvantage meant the British tanks could do little else but charge forward if they were to have any chance of destroying the German armour.
Until the Allies possessed weapons capable of bridging this gap in anti-tank technology, their options were limited.
5. The importance of supply
At El Alamein, the British enjoyed overwhelming material superiority. In August alone, 446 guns, 254 tanks, including a shipment of Grants from America, and 72,192 tons of stores arrived.
As well as a quantitative advantage, the British saw qualitative improvements in their equipment too. The more powerful 6-pdr anti-tank gun, whose production had been delayed in the wake of Dunkirk leaving the British dependent on the 2-pdr, had now arrived in sufficient numbers to almost entirely replace the 2-pdr.
The influx of American Grant tanks was beneficial; the Grant mounted a dual-purpose 75mm gun, which increased the effectiveness of British firepower in the face of Rommel’s Panzers. But El Alamein also marked the advent of the Sherman M4, which mounted the 75mm gun in its turret rather than in a sponson at the side like the Grant.
With both the Sherman and the Grant capable of firing high explosive as well as armour piercing shells, the British now had a better chance of taking out German artillery, which had exacted such a heavy toll on British tanks in earlier desert encounters.
6. The arrival of ‘Monty’
The appointment of Bernard Montgomery as commander of the Eighth Army marked a turning point for British forces in the desert. Though the Eighth Army’s superiority of resources was the decisive factor at Alamein, its effect owed much to Montgomery’s tactical and organisational changes.
Crucially, Montgomery introduced new training, applying the lessons of earlier campaigns in the desert and reintroduced the doctrine of all-arms cooperation. Monty commented:
‘It had been generally accepted that the plan in a modern battle should aim first at destroying the enemy’s armour, and that once this had been accomplished, the unarmoured portion of his army would be dealt with readily. I decided to revise this concept and to destroy first the unarmoured formations. While doing this I would hold off the armoured divisions, which would be tackled subsequently.’
The M3 Lee – of which the Grant was a variation – entered service in 1941. Note the 75mm gun in the traversable sponson to one side / Library of Congress
7. Monty tested his new doctrine at Alam Halfa
The first test for Monty’s new doctrine came in late August at the Battle of Alam el Halfa. He established a strong layback position along the Alam Halfa Ridge, the taking of which would be a prerequisite to any advance Rommel might attempt toward Alexandria.
Monty planned to lure the Afrika Korps against his anti-tank guns and artillery dug-in along the ridge and he sent two squadrons of Crusader tanks out to patrol south of the ridge to draw the panzer divisions in, in case they were intending to bypass it.
The Afrika Korps arrived in the midst of a sandstorm. British anti-tank gunners held fire until the German tanks were within 300 yards. The Germans were outnumbered but benefited from the addition of the new Panzer IV ‘Special’ armed with a long-barrelled, high velocity 75mm gun.
These new Panzers out-ranged the Grants, twelve of which were soon in flames. But while the Germans focused on the tanks, they failed to consider the possibility of an anti-tank screen, which went on to claim 22 of their own machines.
Significantly, the Germans were not able to draw out the British armour, which stayed safely behind the protection of the anti-tank screen. Rommel commented that ‘the British showed little desire to make a real fight of it’. He went on to remark ‘there was no need for them to do so, since time – as far as material was concerned – was working in their favour’.
8. El Alamein was unusual in the context of the North African Campaign
The Second Battle of El Alamein, compared to previous desert battles, was conducted under unusual circumstances. Firstly, the area of operations was narrow, limiting the role of tanks and manoeuvre. Secondly, the British approach was made possible by their overwhelming material superiority and air supremacy.
9. Resemblance to the Battle of Amiens, 1918
The battles of 1918, particularly Amiens, made abundantly clear the power of combined arms warfare, that is the coordination of two or more of the infantry, artillery, tanks and air power. This critical lesson was enshrined in the Field Service Regulations of 1935, which highlighted concentration of effort and all-arms coordination among the basic principles of war.
However, in the early battles against Rommel’s Afrika Korps, this doctrine was seemingly abandoned. The reasons for this are complex but it resulted in the Eighth Army throwing their tanks, unsupported, into battle to seek out a decisive clash with German armour.
Rommel’s forces, imbued with the lessons of ‘Achtung Panzer!’ and using tanks and artillery in cooperation, cut a swathe through the British tanks in actions during Operation Crusader and Battleaxe.
German prisoners being searched / Library of Congress
At El Alamein, Monty reintroduced the doctrine of all-arms cooperation to stunning effect. Alamein was in essence an updated version of the 1918 battles, using artillery in support of infantry to create a gap in the enemy line, which was then exploited by the armour.
Rather than risking his armour against the German artillery, Monty allowed Rommel’s tanks to give away their own locations by drawing their fire using light tanks and then targeted them with heavy tanks.
10. ‘The end of the beginning’
On 10 November, 1942, Winston Churchill addressed assembled dignitaries at the Lord Mayor’s Luncheon in Mansion House.
He was finally able to report a victory for the Allies in the desert. He noted that the battle had not been fought ‘for the sake of gaining positions or so many square miles of territory’ but to ‘destroy the armed force of the enemy and to destroy it at a place where disaster would be most far-reaching and irrecoverable’.
In yet another noted turn of phrase, he went on to caution:
]]>‘Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. but it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning. Henceforth Hitler’s Nazis will meet equally well armed, and perhaps better armed troops. Hence forth they will have to face in many theatres of war that superiority in the air which they have so often used without mercy against other, of which they boasted all round the world, and which they intended to use as an instrument for convincing all other peoples that all resistance to them was hopeless
Fighting in Africa and the Middle East lasted from June 1940 until May 1945.
Here are 10 facts about the Second World War in the African and Middle Eastern theatre.
1. On the eve of Operation Compass, General Sir Archibald Wavell could call on only 36,000 troops while facing 215,000 Italians
2. Rommel wore British tank goggles on top of his cap as a trophy following the capture of Mechili on 8 April 1941
3. A new government of pro-Germans took power in Iraq in April 1941
By the end of the month it was forced concede ongoing British access through its territory.
4. Operation Tiger resulted in the loss of 91 British tanks. Only 12 panzers were immobilised in return
General Sir Claude Auchinleck, ‘the Auk’, soon replaced Wavell.
5. 90 Axis ships were sunk in the Mediterranean between January and August 1941
This deprived the Afrika Korps of essential new tanks and the food required to ward off hunger and illness.
6. The Allies broke out from Tobruk in November 1941 with vastly superior resources
They had an initial 600 tanks against 249 panzers and 550 aircraft, whilst the Luftwaffe had only 76. By January, 300 Allied tanks and 300 aircraft had been lost but Rommel had been pushed back significantly.
7. Soviet and British troops invaded Iran on 25 August 1941 in order to seize oil supplies
8. Rommel reclaimed Tobruk on 21 June 1942, winning thousands of tonnes of oil in the process
9. The major Allied offensive at Alamein in October 1942 reversed the losses sustained in July
It began with the deception of the Germans using plans devised by Major Jasper Maskelyne, a successful magician in the 1930s.
10. The surrender of 250,000 Axis troops and 12 generals signalled the end of the North African Campaign
It occurred after the Allied arrival in Tunis on 12 May 1943.
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