News of Alexander’s death triggered a mutiny to regain the city’s liberty. The revolt pitched Athens against the forces of a superpower and plunged mainland Greece into anarchy.

The Macedonians in Athens

In 434 BC Athens was the mightiest metropolis of the Mediterranean. It was the nucleus of an Aegean empire and its Acropolis gleamed with monuments. But one hundred years later, everything had changed. Athens no longer ruled the waves. Instead that responsibility rested with its northern neighbour: Macedonia.

King Philip II ascended the Macedonian throne in 359 BC. Having learnt much during his itinerant youth, Philip transformed Macedonia from an underdeveloped backwater into a formidable power. Over 20 years, Thrace, Paeonia, Thessaly, Epirus, Illyria and the Chalkidike fell under Philip’s influence. This was just the beginning. Philip then turned his attention south, towards Athens. Alongside several other city-states, Athens attempted to resist Macedonia, but a decisive defeat at Chaeronea in 338 BC ended their struggle. Athens had a new master.

Philip’s success at Chaeronea proved the zenith of his kingship. Barely two years later Philip was dead, murdered at his daughter’s wedding. Power passed to his eldest, battle-proven son: Alexander. Relations between Alexander and Athens were uneasy. Many of its citizens mourned the city’s past and many resented Macedonia’s control. But such unease was tempered by the reality of Macedonian protection, which ensured Athens enjoyed rare peace and prosperity.

Alexander’s rule set the stage for Athens’ prolonged peace, but it was the tireless work of statesmen within the city which ensured it lasted. Phocion was probably more responsible for this than any other. Born into a noble Athenian family after the Peloponnesian War, Phocion cultivated an unrivalled reputation. He had received a stellar education as a pupil of both Plato and Xenocrates, while he had held military commands from a young age. A skilled orator and capable commander, Phocion aimed to emulate Athenian heroes such as Pericles, Miltiades and Aristides.

Initially Phocion had zealously opposed Philip’s expansion. Yet following defeat at Chaeronea, the statesman recognised that Athens’ best interests did not lie in fighting to the last in a hopeless war. Skilfully mediating between his home city and Macedonia, Phocion became greatly admired by both sides. His oratory secured support from the Athenians, while his conciliatory tone earned him the respect of both Philip and Alexander. By 324 BC, Phocion’s achievements had established him as one of the greatest statesmen of the age.

But in 324 BC, this period of stability became seriously strained.

Harpalus on the horizon

In the spring of that year, Athenian guards spotted an armada on the horizon. The fleet belonged to Harpalus, a senior Macedonian official and former favourite of Alexander, renowned for his love of luxuries. By 324 BC, the friendship had turned sour. Fearful of Alexander’s criticism of his decadent governing style, Harpalus embezzled a small fortune from the royal treasury and took a small army to Athens.

Fearing Alexander’s anger at his decadent approach to governing, Harpalus embezzled a small fortune from the royal treasury, gathered a small army and set sail for Athens. A wealthy, powerful, but isolated fugitive. Harpalus’ armada of 6,000 battle hardened mercenaries, 60 warships, plus transport and supply ships approached Athens seeking entry.

In a rare show of unity, the Athenians denied the request. The corrupt Macedonian appeared to be attempting to seize their city. Having sailed south, Harpalus deposited his mercenary army at the southernmost tip of the Peloponnese. He then returned to Athens as a suppliant, keeping his small fortune close. Using bribes to placate the Athenians, the corrupt Macedonian was admitted in June or early July, 324 BC.

The arrival of the Macedonian fugitive and his treasure presented an opportunity. Finally Athenians might have the resources to raise an effective army and throw off the Macedonian yoke. Phocion and his supporters were less convinced. Even Demosthenes, one of Athens’ most bellicose statesmen, was wary. They resolved to detain Harpalus and confiscate his treasury. Hypereides waited for another opportunity.

Exile amnesty

The atmosphere in Athens was tense. Over the next month, three separate Macedonian missions arrived demanding Harpalus face the king’s justice. They were rejected. Harpalus was there to stay, a useful bargaining chip in any upcoming dispute with Macedonia. Not long after Harpalus’ arrival, many Greeks travelled to Olympia for its famous games. Many had also followed rumours that a significant announcement was to be made, authorised by Alexander himself.

Indeed, during the games a certain Nicanor, loyal subordinate to Alexander, took centre stage and declared:

King Alexander to the exiles from the Greek cities. We were not the cause of your exile, but we shall be responsible for bringing about your return to your native cities, except for those of you who are under a curse. We have written to Antipater about this matter so that he may apply compulsion to those cities which refuse to reinstate their exiles.

Diodorus Siculus, 18.8.2-7

Cheers erupted when Nicanor finished speaking. Alexander had ordered all exiles be reinstated into their home cities; any past sins they may have committed were washed away. The decree was well-received by many. For Athens it was disastrous.

The Samos situation

In the proclamation was a special clause targeted at Athens, regarding the city of Samos. Since 366 BC, the city had been an Athenian satellite. Among Samos’ population were a significant number of Athenian settlers who retained their home city’s citizenship and ensured the colony remained closely-aligned. Alexander’s announcement put this arrangement in jeopardy.

By demanding that all Greek cities reinstate their exiles, this included the large number of exiled Samians who had sought support from Alexander for the return of their city. Their pleas had convinced the Macedonian king to act, determining that Athenian control of Samos – one of the last links to its imperial past – would end. Anger erupted in Athens, fuelling a blazing fire of anti-Macedonian sentiment. Still, Phocion and the Athenians attempted to negotiate.

It appears a compromise was initially reached: the Athenians could keep Samos, so long as they handed over Harpalus to Alexander. But Harpalus’ suspicious escape from Athens ensured this compromise fell through. At the beginning of 323 BC Alexander delivered a stinging reproach to Athenian pleas: Samos belonged to the Samians. Athenian discontent intensified.

Death of the king

On 11 June 323 BC, Alexander the Great succumbed to a mysterious illness and died. In his lifetime he had conquered the mighty Persian Empire and lead his armies as far as the Beas River in India Yet his death at 32 with no clear heir plunged his empire into turmoil, sparking conflict and chaos from east to west. Greek mercenaries in the east revolted and began their long journey home. In Babylon itself, a power struggle erupted pushing Alexander’s kingdom to the brink of civil war.

In Athens, Hypereides and his followers used the rumours to their advantage, playing on resentment to encourage revolt. Phocion must have known that Athenian appetite for war was now insatiable. Yet experience had taught him to remain cautious. Twelve years earlier, similar rumours had provoked the nearby city of Thebes to massacre the Macedonian militia. Athens had avoided joining thanks largely to Phocion’s efforts. Alexander’s response to the Theban revolt had been swift and brutal.

Phocion advised the policy that had served him so well over his career: caution: “If he is dead today, he will be dead tomorrow.” In the autumn of 323 BC, a ship arrived in Piraeus, Athens’ port. Among the ship’s passengers were men from Babylon who confirmed Alexander’s death.

While a desire to revolt hardened, Phocion and the Athenian property owners (the citizens who Athens would force to fund the fighting) remained hesitant. They had benefited from Macedonian overlordship. Was Athens ready to throw this all away?

Enter Leosthenes

Phocion and his supporters still had influence in the Athenian assembly. Yet Hypereides had planned to ensure his peoples’ eagerness to engage the enemy could not be curbed. The demagogue introduced to the Athenians a dashing young general called Leosthenes. Although Athenian by birth, Leosthenes had spent little time inside his home city. When Alexander began his expedition against the Persians in 334 BC, Leosthenes served as a Greek mercenary and saw action in at least one of Alexander’s most famous battles.

It is not certain which side Leosthenes actually fought for. Did he fight among Alexander’s ranks or was he one of the dissatisfied Greeks to side with the Persian king Darius? We do know that by 324 BC, Leosthenes loathed Alexander. While Alexander completed his brutal Indian campaign, Leosthenes began his rise to prominence.

Depiction of hoplites confronting a Persian horseman.

Image Credit: Public Domain

Harpalus’ corruption had been just the tip of an iceberg. Many officials had used their resources to raise powerful, personal armies. At the core of these forces were Greek mercenaries. On returning from India, Alexander ordered that they be disbanded, and suddenly thousands of Greek soldiers found themselves unemployed. To the west a camp emerged specifically for professional soldiers seeking service. The base was situated in southern Greece at Taenarum, south of the Peloponnese and beyond Macedonian reach.

Over the next few months various commanders led their mercenary bands west. By summer 324 BC, Taenarum was home to some 8,000 soldiers. It was with this force that Leosthenes came to the fore. Soon after gathering in Taenarum, the charismatic Leosthenes was elected as their leader.

Athens crosses its Rubicon

Leosthenes’ hatred of Macedonia was no secret and he soon attracted the attention of Hypereides. Both sought a war of liberation, but they also knew that discretion was vital. Leosthenes received gold and silver from his Athenian backers and covertly commenced enrolling his comrades for service. His ranks swelled with soldiers.

As rumours of Alexander’s death were confirmed in Athens, Hypereides introduced Leosthenes to the Athenian assembly. Led by this proven commander and funded by Harpalus’ seized treasure, Hypereides made convincing arguments to refute lingering Athenian concerns. Swept away by Hypereides and Leosthenes, the Athenians decided on war. Leosthenes and his men marched through Athens, but the parade did not convince everyone. Phocion admitted the force looked formidable, but where were the reserves? War is rarely a sprint, but a marathon.

Nonetheless, the decision had been made. Leosthenes, Hypereides and the Athenians had crossed their Rubicon. The war to regain their independence had begun.

The Agrianians

One such troop were the Agrianians. Hailing from the upper Strymon valley the Agrianes were a Paeonian tribe with a prestigious history. The Thracians, Illyrians and Paeonians were all famed for their versatility and skill as light infantry, but the Agrianians stood out above the rest. This was in part due to their homeland’s terrain.

Its rugged, mountainous landscape ensured these hardened warriors were well-suited to traversing and fighting on even the most unforgiving terrain, where speed and mobility triumphed above all else. Philip recognised their prowess with this style of fighting. From early in his reign he incorporated units of Agrianians into his reformed army as versatile light infantry.

Depiction of a peltast.

Image Credit: Public Domain

Alexander continued to promote Macedonian friendship with the Agrianians. Indeed, he ensured the closest possible ties with the Agrianian royal house when he offered his bellicose half-sister, Cynane, to the Agrianian king Langarus. Thanks to this close relationship, Alexander in return received the best light infantry the Agrianians could offer to swell the ranks of his forces. When Alexander departed for Asia in 334 BC, an elite Agrianian contingent accompanied his army.

Speed and mobility

For their equipment, each Agrianian was equipped in a very similar style to the peltast. They carried a Phrygian helmet, very light body-armour, while javelins called lonchai were their primary weapon. Alongside javelins, each Agrianian warrior also carried a small pelta shield as well as either a sword or spear for close combat.

As with all light infantry, mobility was key to the Agrianians’ deadliness. In battles, Alexander would place them on the right side of the infantry line – where they would provide cover to Alexander’s prestigious right flank.

Furthermore, on marches through harsh terrain, he included the Agrianians. Not only was their expertise at both traversing and fighting in mountainous areas unmatched but their light armour meant they were ideal troops to accompany Alexander across desert terrain. Consequently, Alexander regularly assigned them for special missions where mobility was key.

Agrianian excellence on the battlefield

It was the Agrianians for instance that Alexander tasked with defeating a numerically-superior Persian force situated on foothills to the right of Alexander’s force during the Battle of Issus. Although vastly outnumbered, the Agrianians easily overwhelmed their Persian counterparts as they excelled at fighting in this terrain.

For Alexander, the unique assets of the Agrianians meant they remained a critical part of his army throughout his campaign. He was therefore always keen to swell his Agrianians with reinforcements from their homeland whenever possible. Alongside the Agrianians, Alexander had another specialised light infantry force:

Macedon’s archers

Organised into companies of 500 men, Alexander had two battalions of bowmen in his army at the beginning of his campaign. Although some Macedonians appear to have served as archers, the most notable contingent was that comprised of Cretans. Situated in the Southern Aegean, the island of Crete was famous for its archers.

Rough terrain dominated the island’s landscape, rendering phalanx warfare useless. Rather than embrace the hoplite tradition of their mainland Greek counterparts the Cretans therefore prioritised the bow as their weapon of choice. Their bow was a self-bow likely made from either yew or cedar wood. Each Cretan equipped themselves with a sword and a small bronze pelta shield. This provided them more protection if it came to hand-to-hand fighting.

As the mainland Greeks irrationally regarded archery with disdain, the Cretans soon became some of the most feared archers in the Hellenic world. For many years before the rise of Macedon, Greek armies had recruited these crack bowmen as mercenaries to compliment their armies. Cretans soon became the elite company in his archer regiment.

Alexander’s archers had a critical role in battle…

In battle Alexander would usually deploy most of the archers to fight alongside the elite Agrianians on his right flank. Together they acted as agile skirmishers who would cover that side of the Macedonian line. On occasion, the Cretans were positioned away from the rest of his archers on the left flank. Their job remained the same: protect the Macedonian flank.

Like the Agrianians, Alexander’s archer corps were highly-mobile. At the Battle of the Persian Gate in the Zagros Mountains, the archers accompanied Alexander’s elite force up a narrow mountain pass that bypassed a Persian defence. Descending on the Persian camp behind, they slaughtered the unsuspecting Persians.

Persian incorporation

Later, Alexander upgraded his archer corps. The Persians were renowned for their archery in Asia. In many ways, these bowmen were even more formidable as their composite bows outdistanced the self-bows of their Cretan counterparts. As Alexander progressed eastwards, he incorporated Persian archers into his army. By 326 BC he had expanded the archer corps so significantly that they were now divided into regiments of 1,000 men or chiliarchies.

The Macedonian phalanx, from “Cassell’s Illustrated Universal History” (1893).

Image Credit: British Library / Public Domain

Born to run

Alexander evidently saw his archer contingents as one of the most crucial parts of his light infantry. Yet for the Cretans it appears Alexander did not always use them solely as archers. Evidence survives that certain Cretans also served as long distance runners, or hemerodromoi.

Messengers were a critical part of Alexander’s communication system while on campaign. Long-distance runners had been employed in Greek and Persian armies long before Alexander, most famously the Athenian Pheidippides following the Battle of Marathon. Thanks to Crete’s uneven terrain, long-distance training races occurred regularly during Cretan military education. Many were thus adept endurance runners. It seems probable Alexander thus employed many Cretans from his archers to also serve as elite long-distance runners when necessary.

Alexander’s Macedonians formed the nucleus of his army for the entirety of his campaigns, yet they were not the only units Alexander relied upon. The Agrianians, Cretans, Thessalians and horse archers all served similarly critical roles for the Macedonian king throughout his campaigning life.

Yet so great was the quarrelling in the immediate aftermath that Alexander’s body was reportedly left unattended for many days in the Babylonian heat. Legend has it that upon returning to the corpse, everyone found it untouched by decay. Perdiccas, the highest-ranking officer in Babylon, then ordered Alexander’s body to be embalmed and placed in a golden coffin. It remained in Babylon for the next two years as Perdiccas oversaw the construction of an elaborate funeral carriage. This was to be no ordinary hearse.

Intent on rendering Alexander as a man who now sat among the gods, his carriage was designed to resemble a great temple. Beautiful Ionic column, paintings depicting Alexander and his army, and plentiful gold adorned the carriage. It was supposed to be pulled by 64 mules, each of which bore a golden crown and bell. Upon its completion, Perdiccas ordered that Alexander’s body be escorted to Aegae in Macedonia, the traditional resting place of Macedonian kings. The plan went horribly wrong.

Legitimacy in a post-Alexander world

Ptolemy, the Macedonian governor of Egypt, was not on good terms with Perdiccas. Aware of the great wealth and potential of Egypt, Ptolemy soon sought to break away from Perdiccas’ overbearing control. He believed he might achieve this by taking possession of Alexander’s body. For Perdiccas, Ptolemy and the other successors, Alexander’s body was much more than just a corpse: it was a talisman representing authority and legitimacy in this new post-Alexander world. Whoever controlled the body held great sway in his empire. Ever since Alexander’s death, Alexander had thus been sure to keep the body in his hands.

Ptolemy realised that if he could gain control over Alexander’s body, his claim and right to rule in this post-Alexander era would greatly increase – the first critical step towards creating his own kingdom. At the same time, he knew it would greatly damage the reputation of his rival, Perdiccas. Ptolemy hatched a plan. In 321 BC, Alexander’s elaborate funeral cart left Babylon for Macedonia. Yet as the procession was making its way through Syria, Ptolemy made his move, bribing the escort, seizing the body and diverting it to Egypt, where he had it housed in Memphis, the traditional Egyptian capital.

Upon hearing of Ptolemy’s hijacking of the body, Perdiccas was furious. His authority as regent had been severely tarnished. The opposite was true for Ptolemy. Apparently drawn by the body, soldiers who had once-served under Alexander came from far and wide to swell the ranks of Ptolemy’s army. Perdiccas marched on Egypt with his army, his aim to regain control of the body and restore his authority. In the ensuing war, Ptolemy emerged victorious and Perdiccas was murdered.

Ptolemy’s propaganda

Ptolemy quickly proclaimed the link between himself and Alexander. Not only was he the first of the Successors to put Alexander’s image on his coinage, but in his famous account of Alexander’s campaign Ptolemy regularly emphasised his closeness to the king as a firm favourite. Ptolemy also cultivated a local legend of Alexander. Rather than being the son of Philip of Macedon, Egyptian tales soon became widespread that Alexander was the son of the last Egyptian pharaoh Nectanebo II.

In 343 BC, the Persians had deposed Nectanebo, who had then died in exile. His pre-made sarcophagus in Memphis had therefore remained empty. It is likely Ptolemy had first placed Alexander in this empty coffin and it was from here that this fabulous story took root. A pharaoh of Egypt could only be legitimate if he was related to his predecessor, so this tale helped portray Alexander as Nectanebo’s rightful heir. It also established a connection between the Macedonian and Egyptian dynasties – a connection that only helped Ptolemy’s cause. At the same time, Ptolemy began spreading the rumour that he was in fact an illegitimate son of Philip II and thus the half-brother of Alexander and Alexander’s rightful heir in Egypt. Both fabulous stories spread rapidly and undoubtedly helped Ptolemy secure his rule in Egypt.

Bust of Ptolemy I Soter, located at the Louvre.

Image Credit: Public Domain / Shutterstock

Ptolemy’s greatest act with the body was where he soon transported it. Following the climactic battle of Ipsus in 301 BC, Ptolemy had Alexander’s body moved to the centre of his new capital at Alexandria and placed in an elaborate tomb. The city had been founded by Alexander back in 331 BC but had only recently been completed. Immediately, Ptolemy set about promoting Alexander adulation. Not only did he have Alexander publicly honoured as the founder of his beloved Alexandria, but he also introduced a state cult of Alexander throughout Egypt. Statues of the great conqueror were erected far and wide while processions and festivals centred around him also appeared.

In 283 BC, Ptolemy I passed away. In his lifetime he had successfully established the closest links between himself and Alexander, depicting himself in both Macedonian and Egyptian eyes as the rightful guardian of Alexander’s tomb and his successor in Egypt. For the next 150 years Ptolemy’s descendants would rule Egypt. Although elsewhere the memory of Alexander slowly faded, for the Ptolemies the great king remained key to their dynasty. This was exceptionally evidenced by the behaviour of Ptolemy’s son and successor.

Ptolemy II Philadelphus

Almost immediately after his father’s death, ‘Philadelphus’, had him deified and worshipped alongside Alexander throughout Egypt. The message was clear: in both life and death these two kings were inseparable. And Philadelphus would not stop there. He also created a new religious festival in honour of his father: the Ptolemaia. Hosted every four years this festival attracted many thousands of visitors not only from Egypt, but all around the Greek World.

Dubbed, ‘the Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus’, It was an extremely lavish parade through the centre of Alexandria. Soldiers, animals, gems, gold and images of Gods – especially Dionysius – all featured, emphasising the unbounded wealth, splendour and power of Ptolemaic Egypt.

Yet the Ptolemaia also had another key purpose. In the middle of the procession was Alexander. First, his statue appeared seated on top of a great float accompanied by another statue of the now-deified Ptolemy I – both wearing gold diadems of ivy leaves. Behind this great float came a golden statue of Alexander in a chariot, towed by four elephants and surrounded by statues of the Gods.

Depiction of Alexander in his death bed.

Image Credit: Public Domain

As the procession passed the centre of Alexandria and Alexander’s tomb its purpose was clear. It reminded the onlookers not only that Alexandria was the home of Alexander’s body but also of the inseparable link between it and the Ptolemies.

A new tomb

For the next 50 years Alexander’s tomb continued to reside in the centre of Alexandria. But upon the accession of Ptolemy IV, ‘Philopator’, the history of the body experienced another twist. In c. 215 BC, desiring to further emphasise the close link between his family and Alexander, Philopator placed Alexander’s body in a new royal burial complex. Whether Ptolemy used Alexander’s original tomb as the basis for this complex or constructed it somewhere else is unclear, but the latter is more likely. The new complex soon became known as the Soma or ‘The Body’ – named after its main attraction.

Barely any evidence survives of what this new mausoleum looked like and scholars have touted various theories. It was almost certainly visually majestic – most likely inspired by the famed tomb of Mausolus at Halicarnassus. It is also possible the complex was circular-shaped and formed the inspiration for the great tombs of future Roman emperors Augustus and Hadrian – both of whom visited Alexander’s body.

Inside this new complex, Ptolemy IV placed Alexander’s body in an underground chamber. He also placed his Ptolemaic ancestors next to this chamber – once again emphasising the closest possible link between the Ptolemies and Alexander. Together with its famous lighthouse and library the Soma was an iconic feature of Alexandria. From far and wide, visitors would journey to Alexander’s city and see his marvellous tomb.

But no dynasty can last forever. By the beginning of the 1st century BC, the Ptolemaic dynasty had become a shadow of its former power. So great was its turmoil that in 89 BC King Ptolemy X had done the unthinkable: in desperate need of money to pay his mercenaries, he melted down Alexander’s golden sarcophagus, replacing it with one made of glass. Ptolemaic power continued to dwindle and within 70 years, a new power would be ruling Alexandria. A power that also had a keen interest in Alexander’s tomb – but for very different reasons: Rome.

One area that gradually experienced improvement and alteration was the baggage train. Traversing the Persian Empire meant that Alexander needed to ensure his baggage train was well-organised. He therefore placed in overall charge of the baggage train a transport officer, a skoidos. The skoidos would look after the baggage train’s defences, marching order, the welfare of the pack animals and distributing supplies. It is believed Parmenion, Alexander’s ill-fated second-in-command, filled such a role until his execution in 330 BC.

Beasts of burden

One of the most critical factors for a successful baggage train was the welfare of the pack animals and it is no surprise that this was one of the skoidos’ main priorities. Although many items in Alexander’s army were carried either by the troops or the servants, they were unable to carry other critical equipment such as hammocks, tents, firewood, loot, medical supplies and perhaps each man’s sarissa when they did not expect to be fighting. This was why his beasts of burden were essential.

Just as for his father, horses and mules remained the predominant pack animals within Alexander’s army. Yet he would also incorporate another animal to carry supplies.

The camel

Introduced into Alexander’s army in either Syria or Egypt, the camel played a critical role in Alexander’s conquests. It could carry more than either a mule or horse, able to transport 300 lb (136 kg) of supplies over a long distance. A horse or mule in comparison could carry only 200 lb (91 kg).

Camels were also well-suited for traversing arid terrain, having barely any limitations on what they could eat and drink if necessary. They were thus ideal baggage animals for Alexander’s marches into the Persian heartlands and beyond – lands where the need for speed across harsh deserts was critical.

Throughout his campaigns, horses, mules and camels remained the engine of Alexander’s Macedonian baggage train. Their speed and endurance were much greater than oxen and this suited his desire for light, fast marches across harsh terrain.

Continuously, he would recruit these animals throughout his campaign; they were then spread throughout his army to supply the men – animals being attached to every dekas units.

Changes afoot

Yet Alexander could not maintain this highly-mobile baggage train during the entirety of his campaign. At times, we hear of Alexander temporarily reintroducing carts into Alexander’s army, most notably in Iran. However, just as Xenophon had before him, he soon had most of them burned to avoid them hindering his army in harsh terrain. A few carts inevitably remained and were tasked with transporting certain heavier, essential items: siege machinery and the wounded.

Family

Just as with the temporary reintroduction of wagons and the use of camels, Alexander would make one other critical change to the Macedonian baggage train as he advanced deeper into Asia.

As he and his army marched further and further away from the Mediterranean, it became clear to Alexander’s soldiers that it would be many years before they could see their wives and children again in Macedonia. Alexander therefore reversed one of Philip’s keystone logistical decisions and permitted women once more to travel with the baggage train. Gradually their number increased. Soon afterwards Alexander even allowed his soldiers to marry captive women. Children soon followed, and the baggage train swelled in size.

Although a radical change from his father’s logistics system and one that undoubtedly slowed down Alexander’s army, it was deemed necessary. Philip’s ban had worked because he had fought in Europe: his men had been able to return home after each campaigning season to see their loved ones. Alexander’s men could not. Nevertheless, even with this change, Alexander always prioritised travelling as light as possible. For him, speed and mobility was key.

Rations

Although Alexander’s baggage train experienced alteration during his conquest, the primary tasks of the skoidos remained the same. Given the sparsity of replacements available in Asia, ensuring the welfare of the pack animals never lost its importance. But another equally-important task was distributing rations to the troops.

Grain products were the major staples of a Macedonian soldier’s diet. Wheat, barley and millet – all were available throughout Asia and India. Not only were they easily portable, but once these products were dried, they could be stored indefinitely. From their ration, each soldier would use the grinding mills carried by the servants to create flour and, after that, make bread. It is also possible the Macedonians consumed grains in the form of biscuits and porridge.

Yet the Macedonian soldiery did not live solely off grain products. Whenever possible, they would also eat dried meat, salted fish and shellfish to supplement their diet. Meat however, was rare and more often the soldiers turned to various kinds of dried fruit such as figs and dates – both readily available throughout much of Asia.

Each Macedonian soldier would carry his food rations. While he was on campaign, these rations would usually be enough for ten days. If Alexander wanted his troops to conduct a swift, march, then the food each soldier would take with him was usually pre-cooked –mostly biscuits, fruit and if possible, salted meat. This lightened the soldier’s pack as they did not require cooking utensils.

Arduous marches

Regardless of a pack’s weight, marching through Asia was undoubtedly hard work for a Macedonian soldier. Some even argue that the Persian Empire’s terrain was Darius’ greatest weapon. Its consistently hot climate, countless deserts and extensive barren lands would have been extremely taxing for any Macedonian burdened with arms, armour and a heavy pack.

Indeed, it appears armour was sometimes even discarded to avoid discomfort during these marches. The requirement for sufficient calories and water was critical. Scholars assume that each Macedonian would need a minimum of 3 lb of grain products – the equivalent of nearly 1 ½ kilograms of bread – as well as half a gallon of water to supply the troops in these conditions daily – some 3,600 calories.

The empire of Alexander the Great.

Image Credit: Shutterstock

For the animals too, scholars have calculated the daily ration of food and water to be considerable. Horses and mules needed eight gallons (30 litres) of water and ten pounds (4.5 kg) of both grain and straw a day if they were to be kept in good condition. As for a camel, although the animal could survive multiple days with barely any water, the animal was most efficient if the Macedonians gave it ten gallons (38 litres) of water a day. It would also require ten pounds (4.5 kg) of grain and twenty-five pounds (11.3 kg) of straw.

Alexander found himself tasked with ensuring his army maintained sufficient supplies. The fate of his conquest depended on it. Yet acquiring supplies was anything but easy.

Acquiring supplies

For most of his campaigning life, Alexander and his army traversed the various terrains of inland Asia, far away from seas and navigable rivers. Yet transporting supplies overland was difficult: there were few carts and pack-animals available in many of these regions and there was also the constant threat of banditry. Furthermore, most agricultural societies did not have a readily available surplus of food.

Alexander did find a solution. A study by Donald Engels assessed how this was likely achieved. Having crushed the Persian king Darius in two major battles in Mesopotamia, Alexander’s power and military prestige appeared irresistible. Many of the remaining Persian officials soon surrendered to Alexander. Alexander realised he could use this to solve his supply problem. He sent messengers to meet the officials to secure arrangements for the army’s supply through their territory – on some occasions taking hostages to ensure the officials stuck to their side of the bargain. In this way Alexander secured supply lines far in advance.

Local officials did not always surrender to Alexander. In these cases, he took a different approach. He would not advance into the region with all his forces. Instead, he would acquire intelligence about the region – information such as its topography, routes, climate and resources – before deciding his next move. He would then either launch a campaign against the region with a small elite force, while the rest of his army remained behind in a resourced base; or he would split his forces into smaller units that would gain supplies by either sacking settlements or foraging.

Finding solutions

During the winter months, when Alexander’s army was stationary, Alexander ensured his forces remained in a heavily settled, fertile area – usually adjacent to either navigable rivers or ports from where they could more easily obtain supplies. Thanks to his forward planning and charisma, Alexander was able to find solutions to the lingering threat of supply problems throughout his conquests.

Logistical failure

There was, however, one occasion when this forward planning of provisions failed the Macedonian king. In 325 BC Alexander headed back from India, across the Gedrosian desert. It proved the greatest logistical error of his life, costing thousands of lives. Some argue this devastating crossing occurred because of the man’s pothos, his desire to outdo all before him or out of revenge for his troops’ earlier mutiny in India. Others believe Alexander simply made a mistake.

The army crosses the Gedrosian Desert, by Andre Castaigne (1898–1899).

Image Credit: Public Domain

Alexander had expected his army to be supplied by the navy, commanded by Nearchus, as it made its way along the coast. Yet monsoon winds delayed the fleet from leaving the harbour in India for months. The result proved devastating. Unsupported by Nearchus’ supplies, Alexander and his army withered as they crossed the desert. By the end, perhaps as many as 75% of his force, mostly those in the baggage train, had perished. This was an exception in a campaign that otherwise epitomised logistical brilliance.

Macedonian roads: uniting the empire

One other area that truly epitomised this brilliance was Alexander’s road building. Among his army were specialised surveyors and teams of road constructors. We hear Alexander tasked these men with clearing obstacles and constructing roads to aid his army through difficult terrain.

Yet Alexander evidently intended these roads to have a much longer lasting impact. Once finished, they not only aided the speed of Alexander’s march but they also greatly increased communication and the feasibility of overland travel throughout his territory. Supply depots were likely also constructed along these new roads.

All this secured lines of supply and communication for the Macedonian army when on campaign. Alexander had intended to build a coastal road with intermittent ports stretching from Egypt to the Straits of Gibraltar to supply his future campaign in the west. Yet his untimely death at Babylon in 323 BC, aged only 32, brought a swift end to these plans. Alexander’s campaigns required precise and advanced logistical planning unlike any previously seen. Its success was crucial and is a factor that is often overlooked.

One part of Alexander’s army that experienced great developments was his siege machinery, but the Macedonian infantry and cavalry would also evolve during Alexander’s reign. Upon his accession Alexander inherited the most revered infantry force of the time. Yet he would quickly make changes to it.

Alexander’s foot companions

Perhaps to ensure their loyalty, Alexander quickly extended the name pezhetairoi, or ‘foot-companions’ to include the entirety of his phalanx, while the elite infantry of Philip II became known as the hypaspists. Whether the pezhetairoi of Philip were the same soldiers who formed the hypaspists of Alexander is unknown.

From then on, the pezhetairoi of Alexander’s army experienced no significant changes for much of Alexander’s conquest. Its soldiers remained in basic units of 16 men, called a dekas, which could be combined to form a lochos of 128 men. 12 of these lochoi combined formed a battalion of 1,536 men.

Depiction of a Macedonian phalanx at the Battle of the Carts, from 1900.

Image Credit: Public Domain

The Hypaspists

Small changes in structure, however, do appear to have occurred for the hypaspists. New sub-commanders, appointed by merit, were introduced into the elite unit. Companies of 500 men were commanded by a pentakosiarch while units of 1,000 were commanded by a chiliarch. The hypaspists consisted of 3,000 men in total, so the unit had six pentakosiarchs and 3 chiliarchs altogether.

Later, following Alexander’s death, his hypaspists would receive a new name to reflect their high-quality: the argyraspides or ‘silver shields’ – used most notably by Eumenes during his great campaign against Antigonus.

Evolution of the ‘Pezhetairoi’

From the Granicus in 334 BC to the Hydaspes in 326 BC, the Macedonian phalanx was the nucleus of Alexander’s army. Yet as Alexander’s campaign went on reinforcements from Macedon ended and the number of his foot-companions slowly dwindled. Death, injury, old-age or having settled somewhere in his great empire – Alexander lost many of his Macedonians for these reasons. So much so that by 324 BC, less than 10,000 remained.

The mixed-phalanx

Struggling from this dearth of Macedonian manpower, Alexander had no option but to radically reorganise his Macedonian phalanx, incorporating Iranian infantry into the battalions. In each dekas, only four of the sixteen men remained Macedonians, stationed at the front and rear in the formation. The rest were Persian levies, not trained with the sarissa and instead using their native armaments: the bow and javelins.

This mixed phalanx lacked the cutting-edge and flexibility of its original, Macedonian counterpart. It thus did not stand the test of time following the death of Alexander. Alexander only intended his mixed phalanx of Iranians and Macedonians to be temporary until reinforcements from Macedon arrived. Yet the Macedonian king also knew he needed to bridge the divide between the conquered and the conquerors in his army if he were to be a legitimate King of Asia. One way he realised he could do this was by replacing his reliance on Macedonian infantry and improving the quality of his Asian footmen.

The ‘Epigoni’

In 327 BC, upon his departure from Bactria, Alexander therefore ordered 30,000 picked Asian soldiers be recruited and trained in the Macedonian manner. They would undergo constant practice in the use of Macedonian arms and discipline for the next two years. At the beginning of 324 BC, they were presented to Alexander at Susa. Dressed in Macedonian attire and well-trained in the sarissa phalanx, Alexander labelled them his epigoni or ‘successors.’

By the end of 324 BC, Alexander’s powerful Macedonian sarissa phalanx was no longer the undisputed key infantry force in his army; now there was an equally prestigious formation. By creating such formidable regiments, Alexander had transformed the infantry significantly since the days of Philip.

Alexander’s Macedonian cavalry

The Macedonian cavalry also evolved during Alexander’s reign most notably with the Companions. Philip had arranged his Companions into ile squadrons based on the regions where they owned their land. Each squadron, 200 men-strong, was commanded by a squadron leader called an iliarch, who wielded great power in the field. Alexander altered this.

In 331 BC, perhaps to curb each squadron commander’s power, Alexander began to reform the command structure. He divided each ile into two smaller units called lochoi. In charge of each of these, he appointed new sub-commanders called lochagoi; the appointments were based on merit.

Depiction of the Companion Cavalry from Marshall Monroe Kirkman’s History of Alexander the Great (1913)

Image Credit: Public Domain

These sub-commanders thus owed their new-found power to Alexander – their loyalty became unquestionable. In such a move, Alexander significantly curbed the power of the original iliarch, as was the regional affiliation of each of the squadrons. Alexander would not stop reorganising his cavalry there. The following year, in 330 BC, Alexander made a crucial decision that would forever change the organisation of his Companions.

The Philotas affair

Philotas, the son of Alexander’s second in command, Parmenion and the overall commander of the entire Companion cavalry body, was accused of being involved in a conspiracy against the King and duly executed along with his father. Such an act had inevitable consequences for the organisation of the Companion cavalry.

Refusing to appoint a new commander of the entire cavalry body, Alexander now divided his Companions between two of his closest friends: Cleitus the Black, the commander of the Royal Squadron, and his closest friend, Hephaestion.

Hipparchies

Furthermore, Alexander changed the name for the basic unit of the cavalry. From 330 BC onwards, he no longer labelled his Companion regiments as ile squadrons but hipparchies. The term ile continued to be used, but now only as a subdivision of each hipparchy – with two ile squadrons together forming one hipparchy.

As for the Royal Squadron, or Basilike Ile, this too appears to have had its name changed at this time to the agema. Consequently, Cleitus and Hephaestion also received a new title following Philotas’ execution to further affirm this reorganisation. They were called Hipparchs.

By 327 BC, Alexander had significantly increased the amount of Hipparchs commanding his companions to eight. From these Hipparchs would be some of the great names of Alexander’s campaign and the Diadochi – men such as Perdiccas, Craterus and Coenus.

Iranian cavalrymen

Alexander also introduced horsemen from the empire into his companion cavalry. By 324 BC, four hipparchies of the Companions consisted solely of picked Iranian cavalrymen. A fifth hipparchy that contained a mixture of oriental and Macedonian horsemen is also possible, while we know that certain Asian nobles were also incorporated into the Royal agema.

Consequently, the Companions were no longer a select Macedonian unit from the region’s nobility. Both among the hipparchies of the companions and with the creation of the epigoni, by the end of Alexander’s reign, certain new units had become as prestigious as the Macedonians.

The Prodromoi

Following 329 BC, any reference to the Macedonian light cavalry disappears completely from our sources. What happened to the prodromoi no-one can say for sure. Although many now suspect Alexander merged them with his reorganised Companions and placed them within the new-look hipparchies. From then on Alexander’s light cavalry came mostly from his Asian units – such as his horse archers from Dahae. By the end of Alexander’s reign, the Macedonian army had evolved significantly from the framework laid by his father Philip. 

Alexander’s siege machinery

Ladders remained the most cost-effective way to capture a settlement and we know Alexander succeeded in taking many smaller towns with such equipment. Yet to conquer more formidable defences – dotted throughout Persia’s vast empire – Alexander required more complex, awe-inspiring engines.

Following in the footsteps of Philip and Polyidus, he was sure to further develop machinery throughout his reign – developments that would be key to some of his greatest military triumphs.

Just as Polyidus was for Philip, one engineer was more crucial than any other to the evolution of siege machinery during Alexander’s famous campaign. His name was Diades. A resident of Pella, Diades had been a student of Polyidus and succeeded him as chief engineer at the time of Alexander’s accession. It would be his siege developments that would be pivotal to some of Alexander’s greatest military feats.

‘A naval action during the Siege of Tyre’ by Andre Castaigne (1898-1899), edited.

Image Credit: Public Domain

The Borer

Diades would create several new siege machines during Alexander’s reign. Arguably one of the greatest was the trupanon, the borer. Designed to ram down a settlement’s walls, simple borers had been in existence before Diades. Yet it was he who radically improved its design.

Like the ram, Diades’ borer consisted of a wooden beam with a metal head. It would be attached with ropes that were connected to pulleys and winches. So, when the mechanics pulled the ropes, it would exert a powerful force on the ram and cause a large breach in the wall. Diades not only increased the borer’s power, but also its protection. The beam was placed inside a mobile wooden shield called a Chelone, or ‘tortoise.’

Alongside the borer, Diades invented many other formidable siege engines. This included a grappling machine, designed for pulling down defences, and a much-improved drawbridge called an epibathra. This drawbridge acted as a gangway which soldiers could use to cross over from either a siege tower or ship. Although the drawbridge had been in use before Alexander’s time, it was Diades who dramatically increased its effectiveness.

Diades would also make modifications to many existing siege engines such as the ram (protected with a tortoise) and the siege tower (increased mobility and better drawbridge). Many of these engines would be used during Alexander’s successful Siege of Tyre – arguably Alexander’s greatest military feat. Consequently, Diades became known as the ‘man who took Tyre.’

Yet Diades was not the only innovative engineer that accompanied Alexander on his great conquest. Alongside other talented engineers such as Charias, they would create various siege machines, designed to counter specific defences. At Halicarnassus for example, we hear the Macedonians employed ditch-filling tortoises to aid an assault on the city.

Posidonius’ ‘Helepolis’

Posidonius, another prominent member of Alexander’s engineering corps, would design his own modified siege tower for his patron. Its wheels were mounted on a sturdy timber chassis, which provided a strong base for the tower. Inside the chassis, 150 men would man the contraption that would push the engine’s wheels towards the enemy wall.

As well as containing other levels for stone throwing torsion catapults, or lithoboloi, the tower had two main floors. One floor was placed at a level that would be the same height as the opposing battlements. The other level was placed higher up, level with the top of a defending tower. Facing such a complex and deadly mobile machine must have been terrifying for any defending force.

Alexander’s artillery

Alongside these improvements to the siege engines, significant developments would also be made to Alexander’s artillery throughout his campaign. Polyidus’ creation of the torsion catapult under Philip was revolutionary for siege warfare and Diades and his fellow engineers continued to improve upon his initial design.

By the start of Alexander’s Persian conquest, no longer were these torsion catapults used to primarily fire arrows at the defenders themselves; thanks to further advancements they were now able to also fire stones with enough power to smash down enemy walls. They were called lithoboloi, or stone throwers.

Hellenistic artillery tower.

Image Credit: Public Domain

Very quickly, Diades, Charias and the rest of the Macedonian engineers made further improvements to these lithoboloi. At the sieges of Halicarnassus and Tyre for example, we hear of highly-destructive torsion stone-throwers called petroboloi being used in Alexander’s army. These devastating machines could either be wheeled or wheel-less and could be placed on land, on siege towers and on ships.

Alongside the lithoboloi, Alexander continued to use other types of artillery such as the arrow-firing torsion catapult – the successor to the non-torsion oxybeles used by his father. Each of these machines, that Alexander used mainly to provide covering fire for his troops, were manned by teams of specialised artillerymen.

Portability

What made these great engines even more fascinating was their portability. Initially, it had been Philip and Polyidus who had started to design siege equipment that could be dismantled and re-used elsewhere. Yet it was Alexander who truly embraced this concept.

Throughout his campaign, both by sea and land, Alexander would have his great siege engines dismantled, transported and then reconstructed at various locations. During the siege of Gaza, for example, Alexander ordered Diades’ siege engines used at Tyre to be dismantled and transported by sea to him, where they were quickly reconstructed. Alexander’s siege equipment was thus formidable.

Indeed, even when its supremacy was eventually toppled by the Roman legion, the Macedonian phalanx never lost its stellar reputation and remains to this day one of the most iconic military formations of all time.

The origins of the formation

In 359 BC, King Philip II ascended the Macedonian throne and inherited an infantry class that was deep in poverty. Having been the victim of numerous invasions by various tribes, the Macedonian footmen were ill-equipped and lacking in training – no more than a rabble.

Recognising that this needed to change, and having already been inspired by the reforms of the Theban general Epaminondas and the Athenian general Iphicrates, Philip initiated reform of his infantry.

Taking advantage of Macedonia’s natural resources – mainly the region’s abundance of high-quality timber called “cornel wood” and bronze and iron reserves – Philip equipped his army’s footmen with a four to six-metre-long pike called a sarissa. Carried in both hands and held four-fifths of the way down the shaft, the sarissa’s extreme length made up for the infantrymen’s light body armour.

In addition, each soldier carried a small pelta shield strapped on his left arm.

A fresco depicting Macedonian soldiers with light armour, spears and shields.

What did the Macedonian phalanx look like and how did it work?

Philip’s men were then trained to fight in large, densely packed formations called phalanxes.

Usually measuring eight rows across and 16 ranks deep, the Macedonian phalanx was virtually unstoppable from the front. The extreme length of the sarissa meant that up to five layers of pikes protruded ahead of the front man – allowing the phalanx to steamroll any opponent.

So long as its rear and flank were protected, the formation was extremely powerful both as a defensive and an offensive weapon.

An illustration of the Macedonian phalanx. This one is formed of 256 men.

Yet the key to the Macedonian phalanx’s power was actually the professionalism of the Macedonian soldiers. Philip ensured that his newly reformed footmen were drilled relentlessly to quickly and effectively alter the direction and depth of the phalanx – even in the heat of battle.

They also regularly endured arduous long-distance marches while carrying heavy packs containing their personal belongings.

Thanks to this regular training, Philip’s introduction of the Macedonian phalanx transformed his infantry from an ill-equipped rabble into the most powerful and well-disciplined force of the age. This was something his enemies soon found out for themselves.

From the hardened Illyrians in the west, to the Greek city states to the south, none could match Philip’s disciplined sarissa-wielding infantry. So long as its flanks and rear were protected, the Macedonian phalanx proved unstoppable.

The Macedonian Empire of King Philip II, prior to his victory at Chaeronea in 338 BC. A keystone to Philip’s success was his creation and use of the Macedonian phalanx.

By the time that Philip was unexpectedly assassinated in 336 BC, the Macedonian phalanx men had already established themselves as the dominant military force on the Greek mainland. Philip’s son and successor, Alexander, thus inherited the greatest infantry force of the time. And he was sure to use it.

The heart of Alexander’s success

For Alexander, the Macedonian phalanx would be the nucleus of his army throughout his conquests – from his first victory on Asian soil at the Granicus in 334 BC, to his final pitched battle against Porus, King of the Parauvas, at the Hydaspes River in India.

Indeed, so vital was the Macedonian phalanx to the perceived invincibility of Alexander’s army, that he even recruited 30,000 Asian levies and had them trained in the Macedonian manner.

This provided Alexander another phalanx formation to rival the one made up of now-grumbling Macedonian veterans; it also provided him a ready supply of pikemen, available for future conquests.

The Macedonian phalanx was thus critical to Alexander’s entire campaigning life. This was partly due to a brilliant battle tactic Alexander used that made the most of his core infantrymen: the hammer and anvil.

The hammer and anvil

This tactic, the bread and butter of many of Alexander’s greatest military successes, was made up of two main parts.

The “anvil” consisted of the Macedonian phalanx – the crucial defensive arm of Alexander’s army. The king would task his footmen with engaging the opposing infantry and then holding them in place with the numerous layers and sheer length of their sarissae.

As the phalanx held its foe in position, Alexander would lead his powerful shock Macedonian cavalry, his hetairoi (companions), against a weak part of the enemy line.

Having landed a critical blow against their opponents, Alexander and his hetairoi would then wheel round behind the enemy infantry, who were already engaged with the Macedonian phalanx, and deal a death blow from behind. They thus acted as the hammer delivering the fatal blow while the phalanx acted as the anvil, sandwiching the enemy infantry in a deadly trap between the two nuclei of Alexander’s force.

Employing tactics such as the hammer and anvil, Alexander’s Macedonian phalanx proved more than a match for any opposing force it faced.

Their riders came from the Macedonian nobility and were called the Companions, or hetairoi, to emphasise their closeness to the king. However, contrary to some beliefs, it was not Philip who created the title ‘Companions’; it had been in use long before 359 BC.

During both the Peloponnesian War and the Spartan-Olynthian War in 381 BC, we hear of the Companions’ prowess in battle against larger forces of enemy cavalry. Philip thus inherited a kingdom that for decades had a rich equestrian heritage among its elite.

Yet many of these nobles had perished along with his Philip II’s brother, Perdiccas III, when fighting against the Illyrians in 359 BC. Upon his accession, it appears he did not have a large surviving force available to him.

Statue of Philip II, 4th century AD,

Image Credit: History Hit / Rheinisches Landesmuseum Trier

Philip quickly solved this by promoting many of his supporters to the Macedonian nobility, thus making them Companions. Later in his reign, Philip also incorporated Thessalians and other Greeks into the nobility to increase numbers.

Equipment

The Companion’s primary weapon was a lance called the xyston. Around two metres in length, the xyston’s shaft was made from cornel wood – like the Macedonian infantry’s sarrisa. Yet unlike the sarissa the Companions wielded the xyston with one hand due to its lighter weight and smaller size.

At its end was a stout iron tip, designed to penetrate both armour and flesh. The Companions also had a short sword, either a kopis or xiphos, as a secondary weapon if the xyston shaft broke on impact.

For their armour, the Companions were equipped with a cuirass made of either bronze or leather. They were also armed with metal greaves and a gorget, both usually made of bronze. Their helmet was the famed Phrygian helmet made of iron. Later however, around the time of Alexander’s succession, it appears they replaced this helmet-style with the more suitable Boeotian style.

Scholars debate whether Philip’s Companions also had a small shield like the pelta of his Macedonian infantrymen. Whether this is the case or not, it appears they discarded it by the time of Alexander’s crossing into Asia in 334 BC.

Squadrons

Philip arranged his Companion cavalry into squadrons called ile. Each squadron consisted of around 200 men and were based on the Macedonian districts possessed by the Companions – we know for example that there was an squadron formed from Companions from the Upper-Macedonian region of Elimiotis.

Among these squadrons was an elite squadron called, the Basilike ile, the royal squadron. This squadron was the elite of the Companions squadrons and comprised 300 men. Each Companion in every squadron was attended by a groom, who would not only tend the horse but was also armed and would fight alongside the squadrons in battle.

The greatest reform Philip made to his Companions was in their training. The Companions were to be the shock-arm of his new-look army, meant to disrupt an enemy’s line and shatter their resolve with the power of their charge and the deadliness of their lances. To do this, he trained them in a special formation: the wedge.

The wedge

The wedge had been traditionally used among the Scythians and Thracians and it was Philip who adopted this formation for his Macedonian cavalry. It was triangular, with one rider at the front and the number increasing in each row further back.

The squadron commander would lead the wedge, being the most visible and easiest position from where he could guide the rest of the formation. In a solid wedge, each squadron of 200 men would be 20-men deep and 20-men wide at its base. The wedge could also be hollow which would give the formation a greater size.

Depiction of the Companion Cavalry from Marshall Monroe Kirkman’s History of Alexander the Great (1913)

Image Credit: Public Domain

Why were the Macedonian cavalry so effective?

Combined with the use of the xyston lance, the wedge formation was devastating at disrupting enemy lines and creating panic. The narrowness of its head meant that the leading horse could exploit and charge through even small gaps in an enemy line. The cavalrymen behind would follow and very quickly the opposing formation would be shattered, which the following infantry would exploit.

Philip knew that used correctly, the shock element of his new-look companions trained in the wedge formation would be devastating.

The wedge was not faultless in its design. Regardless of how much rigorous training Philip provided his companions or of how formidable the Macedonian steeds were, the wedge would only prove devastating if there was a gap in the enemy lines for the horse to charge through.

No matter how disciplined its training, a horse would never charge into a solid unbroken infantry phalanx standing its ground; instead it would shy away and refuse to run into a cohesive line of spears. Any impetus of the charge would be lost. If the wedge was to be effective, they had to first disrupt the enemy formation and create gaps. This was what his new-look infantry was for.

Fighting in unison

Armed with lines of deadly sarissae, the offensive power of the Macedonian phalanx, supported by both archers and javelin men, was perfect for shattering the cohesion of enemy formations: being also under fire from both javelins and arrows, their foe would struggle to oppose the sarissae with the shorter length of their own weapons.

The Macedonian phalanx, from “Cassell’s Illustrated Universal History” (1893).

Image Credit: British Library / Public Domain

Unable to counter, the enemy formation would soon suffer casualties and lose its cohesion; gaps would emerge in the enemy line. And it was these gaps that the companions could exploit in the wedge.

This was the tactic that scholars believe Philip used to gain his first great victory against the Illyrians in 357 BC. His son Alexander would most famously use the wedge formation to exploit the gap in Darius’ line at Gaugamela.

Philip would also develop the hammer and anvil tactic, used most effectively by his son Alexander and many other commanders since. We will talk about this tactic in more detail in a separate History Hit documentary.

For Philip’s new-look Macedonian army, he designed the Companion cavalry to fight in unison with the infantry to gain victory. Neither unit was more important; both were indispensable.

The Prodromoi

Although evidently the most integral to his military successes, the Companions were not the only Macedonian cavalry force Philip reformed. Alongside the heavy cavalry, Philip introduced a new, lighter unit called the prodromoi literally meaning ‘the runners ahead.’

The prodromoi were the lighter compliment to the Companions. Unlike the Companions, they did not have metal armour and instead wore tunics. They also had the traditional Macedonian hat called the kausia.

Bronze statuette of a rider, Greek, 3rd century BC.

Image Credit: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

It appears the prodromoi served a variety of roles and their primary weapon depended on their role at a given time.

Primarily, as the name suggests, the prodromoi served as scouts. They would have been armed with javelins and acted as swift skirmishers. They would use their javelins to inflict the first casualties in a battle from distance.

Later, we also hear of the prodromoi being referred to as sarisaphoroi or ‘sarisa-bearing cavalry.’ This suggests the prodromoi could also serve as lancer cavalry, used primarily against enemy horsemen. At the Battle of Gaugamela for example, we hear of Sarisaphoroi routing the opposing Persian cavalry.

Although their name suggests otherwise, the sarisaphoroi did not carry a lance as long as the infantry sarisa – it would have been too cumbersome for the rider to carry. Instead, they were armed with longer versions of the Companions’ xyston lance, still held with one hand.

Just as with the Companions, Philip divided the prodromoi into ile squadrons and trained them in the wedge formation.

On one side was the extraordinary father-son team of Antigonus and Demetrius, commanding an empire stretching from the Hellespont to Judaea. On the other side was a grand coalition of rival kings, desperate to topple the great Antigonid behemoth. They included warlords such as Seleucus, Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Cassander. This is the story of the Battle of Ipsus, and why it mattered.

Demetrius heads to Greece

Following his failure to capture the city of Rhodes, Demetrius set sail for Greece as ordered by his father. For the past two years, Cassander, King of Macedon, had been fighting a war against the city of Athens. Although initially successful, by 304 BC Athenian resistance was crumbling. Cassander had defeated their fleet and now blockaded Athens by sea and by land.

Just as Athens appeared certain to fall, news reached Cassander that would alter his plans completely: at Aulis, Demetrius had landed his army, which was greatly reinforced since the debacle at Rhodes. Fearful of being surrounded, Cassander quickly broke off the siege and headed back towards Macedonia. During the retreat, the wily Demetrius intercept his forces near Mount Kallidromo. In the ensuing engagement, 6,000 of Cassander’s Macedonian soldiers deserted to his cause.

‘Commander of the Greeks’

Rather than pursuing Cassander, Demetrius turned his attention to affairs in central Greece. In the Peloponnese, the influence of Cassander and Ptolemy was still formidable. Reluctant to leave his forces exposed, Demetrius launched a full-scale campaign in the region.

The result was an overwhelming success. Both Cassander and Ptolemy’s holdings in the Peloponnese were removed completely. Demetrius now aimed at consolidating his new gains in Greece. Not only did he declare the cities free, as decreed by his father, but Demetrius made one other critical move to further Greek unity for his cause.

At the Isthmus near Corinth, Demetrius was proclaimed ‘Commander of the Greeks’, following in the footsteps of both Philip II and Alexander. Nearly all the mainland Greek cities south of Thessaly, except for Sparta, were incorporated into this grand alliance and contributed troops to the young Antigonid’s army. With this act, Demetrius’ control of Greece was secured.

Demetrius then married the Molossian princess, Deidameia and thus allied himself with the Epirote League to the West. His power in Greece unassailable, Demetrius could now look north towards his goal: Macedonia.

The successor kingdoms before the Battle of Ipsus, 303 BC.

Image Credit: Public Domain

Cassander sues for peace

Cassander had been watching Demetrius’ actions from Macedonia with growing alarm. An invasion by the young Antigonid, he realised, would only be a matter of time. Cassander therefore sent envoys to Antigonus in Syria offering peace. Antigonus, however, had no intentions of stopping; he replied that there would be no peace unless Cassander gave up all his belongings to Demetrius and the Antigonid kingdom.

On hearing Antigonus’ haughty reply, Cassander naturally refused. War, he realised, was inevitable and he now called for aid from his neighbouring Macedonian ruler in Thrace.

Lysimachus

Until then, Lysimachus role in the previous wars had been minimal, having been preoccupied with the lingering barbarian threat across the Danube River and with unrest within his own kingdom. Now however, he travelled to Pella to aid Cassander.

From there, they dispatched further envoys to further strengthen the alliance against Antigonus – to Ptolemy in Egypt and Seleucus in Asia. The Grand Coalition against Antigonus was taking shape. On hearing of this new alliance, Ptolemy quickly accepted and prepared his army. Seleucus’ reply would take longer to reach them.

The Seleucid-Mauryan war

At the time, Seleucus was far away in India, campaigning against the Mauryan King Chandragupta. The war did not go well for Seleucus. After suffering a defeat against his Indian foe they concluded a treaty where Seleucus was forced to give up his most eastern lands to the Mauryan Empire.

In return, friendship was agreed; but importantly, Seleucus received a staggering 500 Indian War elephants from the Mauryan king.

Not only were Indian War Elephants both larger and stronger than their African counterparts, but their handlers were some of the most skilled in the world. Seleucus had such a large elephant division that Demetrius famously mocked his opponent as ‘the Master of Elephants’.

Image Credit: Hannibal's army crossing the Rhône, by Henri Motte, 1878 / Public Domain

The march begins

With these beasts in tow, Seleucus began to march his army back to the heartlands of his empire in Mesopotamia.

Not long after he departed India, the envoys from Cassander, having ridden on horseback all the way from Macedonia, finally reached Seleucus’ army and informed him of events in the West. Committing everything to the campaign, Seleucus accepted the call and commenced his long journey west towards Asia Minor.

The first move

Meanwhile, the first move against Antigonus had been made. Two armies, under the command of Lysimachus and Cassander’s best general, Prepelaus had launched a surprise attack on Antigonus, invading Asia Minor and quickly capturing much Antigonid territory in Western Asia Minor. Cassander himself marched to Thessaly to defend against any attack from Demetrius.

Antigonus rallies his men once more

Antigonus had been residing at his capital of Antigonia when he heard of Lysimachus’ unexpected invasion. Although now eighty years old, he prepared to lead his army to war once more. Arriving in Asia Minor in the autumn of 302 BC, Antigonus pursued Lysimachus’ forces around the Anatolian plateau. Eventually, winter descended and both forces retired to await a resumption of the fighting in the Spring.

It would be then, however, that news reached Antigonus that would turn his plans upside down. In record time, Seleucus and his great army, having crossed the mountains of Armenia, had arrived in Asia Minor. If more information on his march survived, we would likely regard it as one of the most fascinating military achievements in history – eclipsing that of even the great Hannibal Barca.

Pressing on, Seleucus soon reached Lysimachus’ army at Heraclea and there united their forces in opposition to Antigonus and Demetrius.

Seleucus led the Royal Hypaspistai during Alexander’s Persian campaign.

Image Credit: Public Domain

Ptolemy turns tail

Ptolemy at that time was besieging the Antigonid city of Sidon in Syria. Yet he would advance no further, as a false rumour had reached his ears that the armies of Seleucus and Lysimachus had been crushed by Antigonus. Ptolemy was unnerved and returned to Egypt with his army.

The call for aid

Back in Asia Minor, Antigonus sent word to Demetrius, ordering him and his army to cross over from Greece and join him for the impending showdown. Demetrius duly obeyed. Having landed at Ephesus, he quickly recaptured many of the cities on the coast that had defected to Lysimachus; he then joined his father at Celaenae. With both sides substantially reinforced, they now awaited the spring and the climactic battle that would occur.

Deployment at Ipsus

As the winter subsided, on a plain near the town of Ipsus in Phyrgia, the two great armies collided. Antigonus had in his army 70,000 infantry, mostly heavily-armed pikemen battle-hardened from many previous campaigns. These he deployed in the centre, along with the best mercenaries money could buy.

On his right wing, Antigonus placed Demetrius, in charge of 5,000 of their finest cavalry, among whom was the young, exiled Molossian king. A man called Pyrrhus. On his left, Antigonus deployed the remaining 5,000 of his horsemen; and in front of his line, Antigonus placed his 75 war elephants, with light infantry stationed close-by protecting the beasts.

Seleucus and Lysimachus’ army was similarly large. In their centre, they deployed their own infantry, 64,000 strong. Many were armed in the Macedonian manner, although Seleucus’ infantry also consisted greatly of various Asian levies, hailing from his kingdom’s heartlands in Mesopotamia, as well as from Bactria and the Hindu Kush.

They divided their cavalry equally on both flanks, placing 7,500 on each wing. As for his elephants, Seleucus deployed a portion of them in front of the army line. The rest he kept in reserve. Seleucus also had a number of scythed chariots, but it appears unlikely he used them.

Diagram of the Battle of Ipsus.

Image Credit: Public Domain

The Battle of Ipsus: 301 BC

The battle commenced with an elephant charge by both sides, with the infantry following up close behind. Demetrius ordered his elite cavalry wing to charge their opposing horsemen (which were under the command of Seleucus’ son, Antiochus).

Quickly overwhelmed, Antiochus and his cavalry retreated from the fight and Demetrius, caught up in the thrill of a cavalry chase, hastened his force in pursuit. Meanwhile, the phalanxes had engaged and very quickly the experience and skill of Antigonus’ foot began to push those of Lysimachus and Seleucus back. An Antigonid victory looked likely.

The critical moment

It would be then, however, that Seleucus used his ‘secret weapon.’ Having finally called off the pursuit, Demetrius reorganised his cavalry and started to return to the battlefield, intending to crash into the enemy infantry line from behind.

Seleucus however had anticipated the move. As soon as he saw Demetrius returning, he deployed his 300 war elephants in reserve to block the young Antigonid’s path.

Demetrius’ cavalry was blocked and powerless – their mounts unwilling to charge directly into elephants; and Seleucus now issued the fateful order.

He ordered their light cavalry, equipped with javelins and bows, to wheel-round onto Antigonus’ now-exposed right wing and hail a rain of missiles into the dense Antigonid phalanx from its weak flank.

He (Seleucus) did not actually charge upon them (the Antigonid phalanx), but kept them in fear of a charge by continually riding around them, thus giving them an opportunity to come over to his side. And this was what actually came to pass.

Plutarch, Demetrius 29.3

Death of a king: who won the Battle of Ipsus?

Outflanked and unprotected, Antigonus’ army soon crumbled. Antigonus himself remained on the field until the end. Even as the enemy forces approached, this octogenarian never gave up hope that Demetrius would return and turn the tide of battle.

Contained by Seleucus’ great beasts, Demetrius did not come. Never losing confidence in his son, Antigonus perished in a shower of enemy javelins. At multiple times in the past 20 years he had controlled great swathes of Alexander the Great’s empire. Now he was no more.

What was the significance of the Battle of Ipsus?

Antigonus lay dead on the field and his son, despairing, fled to Greece. From there, Demetrius and his descendants would continue to fight, eventually taking control of Macedonia for the next 100 years.

Antigonus had been so close to achieving the nigh-impossible in reuniting Alexander’s Empire. He would be the last man who seriously attempted to achieve such a dream. With his death, a new epoch began. Alexander’s former empire was to be forever fragmented between his successors, never to be reunited.

The victors of Ipsus enjoyed the spoils of war, dividing Antigonus’ vast lands in Asia Minor and Syria between them. Yet almost straight away, dividing these battle-won territories stirred up new quarrels. In Syria, immediately, the seeds for a new dispute between Seleucus and Ptolemy arose. Each would claim control, with neither giving ground. War once again loomed.

The anti-Antigonid coalition proved crucial in defeating Antigonus. But ss soon as he was dead, co-operation gave way to fear and enmity. Ipsus was just the beginning: conflict between these newly secured Hellenistic Kingdoms would proliferate for decades.

Perhaps the greatest of these tales belongs to the half-sister to Alexander the Great, the audacious and ambitious Cynane.

Macedonia’s Illyrian foe

Cynane’s origins derive from the contentious relations between ancient Macedonia and their long-time enemies, the Illyrians. They were ferocious warrior peoples situated to the north and west of Macedonia. During the early 4^th century BC, the Illyrian menace was particularly threatening.

Under the leadership of the daunting Bardylis, King of the Dardanians, Illyrian warbands wreaked havoc in Macedonia, seizing much wealth and land. By 359 BC, countless Illyrian raids had left the kingdom of Macedonia on the brink of destruction.

In 358 BC, everything changed. The new king of Macedonia Philip II used his new model army to gain a decisive victory against Bardylis, who perished in battle alongside 7,000 of his men. The Illyrian menace was quelled.

The Macedonian phalanx, from “Cassell’s Illustrated Universal History” (1893).

Image Credit: British Library / Public Domain

In the aftermath, to temper centuries-old hostilities between the kingdoms, Philip joined the Illyrian and Macedonian royal houses together by marrying the Illyrian princess Audata. She was most likely the granddaughter of the recently-deceased 90-year-old Bardylis. About a year later, Audata gave birth to a daughter. Her name was Cynane.

Young Cynane

The fascinating thing about Illyrian women in the 4^th century BC was that they were raised for war; from childhood they were taught to be tough and to fight alongside the men in battle when necessary. Cynane was no different.

From an early age Audata trained her daughter in the art of war, staying true to her Illyrian roots; by the time Cynane had reached her mid-teens, she had become renowned as a formidable warrior princess.

Cynane accompanied the Macedonian soldiery on campaigns where she proved, first hand, her military prowess on the battlefield. Legendary tales soon spread across Macedonia about her – the half-barbarian Amazon. Cynane was a woman you did not want to tangle with. Polyaenus, writing some 450 years later, recalled a famous tale he had heard about Cynane:

She was famous for her military knowledge; she commanded armies, and in the field charged at the head of them. In an engagement with the Illyrians (344-343 BC), she herself slew Caeria, their queen, with a fatal blow to the throat; and she defeated the Illyrian army with great slaughter.

Polyaenus, Strategems, Book 8

Enter Alexander

In 336 BC, King Philip II of Macedonia was assassinated and his son Alexander, the later Alexander the Great, came to the throne. One of Alexander’s first actions was to remove any rival claimants to his throne. This included a man called Amyntas, Alexander’s cousin.

Amyntas was also the husband of Cynane. So one of the first things Alexander did when he came to the throne was make Cynane, his half-sister, a widow.

Heracles fighting Amazons, mythical women warriors thought to live in a remote region of Asia Minor, on terracotta amphora, circa 530 AD.

Image Credit: The Metropolitan Museum of Art / Public Domain

Diplomatic pawn

Alexander wasn’t done with Cynane. He saw her as a pawn that he could use in his diplomatic games: a key asset in a time when marriages between royal houses were critical to securing strong, lasting alliances with neighbouring kingdoms.

Alexander did just that in 335 BC when he arranged to marry the strong-willed Cynane off to one of his most loyal allied kings, a man called Langarus. As you can probably guess, Cynane was not happy with being a pawn in Alexander’s diplomatic games. Not long before the marriage was to take place, Langarus died a very mysterious death.

Hiatus

Between 335 and 323 BC, we do not hear much about Cynane, and you can understand why: our sources tend to focus on Alexander the Great, his conquest of the Persian Empire and his marching of his armies as far as India. Yet upon Alexander’s death in Babylon in 323 BC, Cynane comes back into the fold.

Following Alexander the Great’s death, and especially in the immediate aftermath of his death, there was absolute chaos. To summarise, there was a big dispute in Babylon over who was to rule between two rival parties: one spearheaded by Perdiccas, the most senior commander in Babylon, the other by Meleager, a leading infantry officer.

Disagreement followed, clashes erupted and at one stage civil war appeared imminent. Yet tempers (temporarily) cooled, and eventually a compromise was reached when the Macedonians crowned a man called Arrhidaeus, who became King Philip Arrhidaeus III.

The puppet-king

Philip Arrhidaeus was the half brother of Alexander the Great. Unlike Amyntas he had survived Alexander’s reign because Alexander had not considered him a potential threat to his throne. Although we do not know for certain what condition he had, Arrhidaeus was simple-minded. He couldn’t make a logical decision on his own; he could not rule without help.

For this reason Alexander never saw Arrhidaeus as a rival to his throne. In fact, it appears he liked having him around: Alexander took his half-brother on campaigns with him and he was also in Babylon when Alexander died.

Philip III as pharaoh on a relief in Karnak.

Image Credit: Public Domain

Just as Alexander had not seen Arrhidaeus as a threat, his generals in Babylon thought likewise. Perdiccas, who had become guardian of Alexander’s empire in Asia and chief adviser to Philip Arrhidaeus III, thus wielded the real power.

Cynane’s opportunity

It wasn’t just Alexander’s generals who realised they could use Philip Arrhidaeus III to their advantage. News soon reached Cynane. She too sensed opportunity.

At that time (early 322 BC), Cynane had a 15-year-old daughter called Adea – the child of her marriage with Amyntas all those years before. As there was currently no Macedonian queen, Cynane championed her daughter to be betrothed to Philip Arrhidaeus III.

Cynane’s thinking behind this was straightforward. If Adea became the wife of Arrhidaeus, she would be the closest person to the king. Consequently, she would wield great control over him, replacing Perdiccas as the key influence over Philip and the one to whisper advice into his ear. If Adea then gave birth to a son, Cynane and Adea would become grandmother and mother to the next in line to rule. 

March on Babylon

Cynane had one great trump card to help her achieve her power play: her direct link to Alexander the Great. The Macedonians viewed Alexander as a semi-divine figure, a man who had taken his seat among the Gods as soon as he had breathed his last. Her direct link was a golden ticket for Cynane.

She soon gathered a small army of Macedonians, with whom she began the march to Babylon to put Adea on the throne, defeating a small force sent by Antipater, the most powerful man in Macedonia, to stop them.

When Perdiccas and the other generals heard that Cynane was marching towards them with an army, they were far from happy. They saw Cynane as a direct threat to their status and so had to be stopped.

Confronting Cynane

Perdiccas ordered his brother Alcetas to take command of the Macedonian army in Babylon and stop Cynane in her tracks. Their armies met somewhere on the Asian side of the Hellespont. They had reached a showdown. Prior to any fighting, Cynane and Alcetas met in full view of both armies.

Detail from “Alexander Entering Babylon” by Sébastien Leclerc I (1637–1714).

Image Credit: The Metropolitan Museum of Art / Public Domain

As soon as Cynane saw Alcetas in her way, she berated him, endlessly, in full view of everyone. Yet while Cynane was mid-speech, Alcetas decided he had had enough. He drew his sword and slew Cynane, right there and then. Alexander’s half-sister fell to the floor, dead. Alcetas had hoped that this would terminate Cynane’s power-play, and that the opposing army would simply join his ranks. He could not have been more wrong.

First horror, then anger

When the Macedonian soldiers – including those in Alcetas’ army – saw Cynane fall lifeless to the floor, they looked on in absolute horror. And this horror soon transformed into anger. The reason was simple.

Cynane’s direct link to Alexander and the Macedonian royal family, combined with the legends surrounding her, meant that the Macedonian soldiery held great respect for Cynane. Many perhaps even viewed her as a hero. How dare Alcetas, a mere general, kill the woman directly related to the man that now resided among the gods.

The soldiers were so enraged that they forced Alcetas to comply with Cynane’s wishes. They demanded they escort Adea to Babylon and have her married to Philip Arrhidaeus III as their new queen.

Rise of Eurydice

Alcetas relented; as did Perdiccas, knowing full-well how much their power depended on the army’s support. The marriage went ahead and Adea became one of the most powerful women in the empire, taking the name Eurydice.

For the next five years, Eurydice became a major player in the Wars of the Successors, following in her mother’s footsteps as a strong-willed, formidable warrior-woman. She would soon enter a legendary rivalry with another of the most powerful women of the time: Olympias.

Warlords like Perdiccas and Ptolemy dominated the period, but this was also a world of ambitious and powerful women. Cynane’s story of audacity and military skill shines above the rest, as does the fact that, though she paid the ultimate price, her power play ultimately succeeded.