The background in 312 BC

In 312 BC, two of the most powerful leaders controlling Alexander’s former empire were Antigonus and Ptolemy. Antigonus had risen to rule over most of Alexander’s Asian territories; meanwhile Ptolemy controlled Egypt and neighbouring lands in Syria and coastal Libya. That year, these two figures had clashed in a decisive land battle at Gaza, where Ptolemy defeated an Antigonid army commanded by Demetrius, Antigonus’ son.

The aftermath of Ptolemy’s victory at Gaza, 312 BC. Ptolemy now pressed his advantage, reclaiming territories as far north as Tyre.

Image Credit: History Hit

With his army shattered following the debacle at Gaza, Demetrius retreated north to Cilicia. Ptolemy then pressed his advantage, reclaiming territories as far north as Tyre. He also permitted Seleucus, the former governor of Babylon and Ptolemy’s ally at Gaza, to head east and reassert his authority in Babylon, providing him with a small army.

Down but not out

News reached Ptolemy, then in Coele Syria, that Demetrius had returned and was stationed in northern Syria with a small army. Believing he had conclusively beaten Demetrius, Ptolemy ordered one of his generals, Cilles, to lead an army north and crush the remnants of the Antigonid’s forces. But this proved careless. Near a town named Myus, Demetrius successfully ambushed Cilles’ army, capturing 7,000 troops and much wealth in the process.

Buoyed, Demetrius returned to his base and requested reinforcements from his father, Antigonus. At that time, Antigonus was residing hundreds of miles away at Celaenae in Anatolia. He had recently defeated the forces of Ptolemy’s allies in Caria and taken control of Asia’s Aegean coastline. On receiving Demetrius’ letter, however, Antigonus once again headed east.

The Nabataean War

In late 312 BC, the one-eyed general Antigonus – now nearly 70 years old – arrived in Syria. Joining with Demetrius, he recaptured all the lands that his son had lost, forcing Ptolemy to retreat his forces to Egypt. Antigonus pursued him, arriving at Ptolemy’s border with over 80,000 men. Yet his gaze would be quickly diverted to the South-East, where the Nabataeans – an Arab nation with an important node at Petra – were hostile to him.

As a precursor to the invasion of Egypt, Antigonus thus decided to launch a campaign against these people. Things didn’t go to plan. Although Demetrius managed to besiege Petra, the campaign proved costly and time-consuming. In the end the two sides reached an agreement. Neither Antigonus nor the Nabataeans made any real gains from the treaty. Yet for Antigonus, it was undoubtedly humiliating.

The rise of Seleucus

It was then however, in the fall of 311 BC, that news reached Antigonus which changed his plans completely. In the east, Seleucus had successfully recaptured Babylon and defeated the Antigonid army in Iran. Upon hearing this, Antigonus shelved any plans to invade Egypt; the threat of losing his eastern provinces to Seleucus was too great. Antigonus therefore proposed peace-talks with his fellow Successors – most notably Cassander in Macedon (northern Greece) and Lysimachus in Thrace (Bulgaria). Ptolemy was later also included. In the end, peace was agreed.

The ramifications of this peace would be far-reaching. At that time in the Macedonian homeland, Alexander the Great’s son, Alexander IV, was 14 years old and many now thought him old enough to take full control. Yet the authoritative Cassander had no intention of allowing this. Cassander had Alexander IV, along his with mother, Roxane, assassinated. Soon afterwards, the Macedonian regent also had Heracles, a bastard child of Alexander the Great, similarly executed.

The Argead dynasty had been wiped out; the consequences would soon be clear for all to see.

The Babylonian War, 308 BC

Back in Syria, with the treaty agreed, Antigonus was free to focus on Seleucus. He dispatched Demetrius with 19,000 men to tackle his new foe. In the beginning of 310 BC, Demetrius and his army reached Babylon. Yet Seleucus, on his arrival, had already departed with most of his forces, leaving Demetrius free to capture most of the city without a fight. One citadel however remained in Seleucus’ control and defiantly resisted.

Not able to afford a lengthy siege, Demetrius left 6,000 of his troops under the command of his general, Archelaus, to continue the siege while he returned west, to his impatient father. Seleucus proved a dogged opponent. Later that year, with the issue still not settled, Antigonus himself was forced to lead an army east to fight this enemy. Our knowledge of this war, dubbed the Babylonian War, is almost non-existent.

Yet we do know that following Antigonus’ sacking of Babylon, Seleucus defeated Antigonus in a major battle in 308 BC and a peace was agreed. In this act, Antigonus’ hold on the East was severed and the ageing general returned west.

The Fourth War of the Diadochi erupts

Meanwhile, a new threat had been growing for Antigonus: his old adversary Ptolemy had been secretly intriguing against him while he was fighting Seleucus, gaining territory and influence in the Aegean. Determined to reassert his power, Antigonus ordered his son Demetrius to cross over from Ephesus and conquer the forces of Cassander and Ptolemy in Greece.

Demetrius landed at Athens in 307 BC, quickly gaining control from Cassander. Further successes were to follow for the young Antigonid at both Megara and Munichya. It was then however, that Demetrius received very different instructions from his father, who had remained at his new capital, Antigoneia, in Syria.

Cyprus

Antigonus had been eyeing one of Ptolemy’s most-prized possessions: the island of Cyprus. He ordered Demetrius to leave Greece with his army and return east. Demetrius promptly obeyed and early in 306 BC, he departed Athens with most of his army and headed towards Cyprus. On his way, Demetrius stopped at Rhodes, hoping to acquire use of the formidable Rhodian navy. The Rhodians however, refused, claiming neutrality.

Demetrius continued east and soon reached Cilicia, where more troops awaited him, sent from his father. Reinforced, Antigonus’ son crossed over to Cyprus, landing on the Karpass peninsula with 15,000 infantry and 400 cavalry in the Spring of 306 BC. He also had 110 triremes, 53 heavy warships and many troop transports. Demetrius solidified their position on the island, capturing the towns of Carpasia and Ourania. He then turned to his main goal: the city of Salamis.

Having secured the Karpass Peninsula, Demetrius’ army and navy headed to the Menelaus’ capital at Salamis.

Image Credit: History Hit

The Siege of Salamis, 306 BC

As Demetrius approached Salamis, the Ptolemaic forces stationed there – some 12,000 infantry and 800 cavalry, under the command of Ptolemy’s brother, Menelaus – were awaiting his arrival on a nearby plain. Battle ensued, and Demetrius won the victory, killing 1,000 and capturing 3,000 of Menelaus’ forces. With his remaining forces, Menelaus retreated to Salamis.

Demetrius besieged the city on both land and sea. He had previous expertise of sieges, most notably at Munichya, and he therefore had many siege weapons in his army – mechanical engines such as catapults and ballistae, designed especially to help assault a settlement.

The ‘Helepolis’

To aid him further, Demetrius also ordered the construction of some formidable siege engines, including two battering rams and a siege tower. This was no ordinary siege tower however. Nine-stories high, it was the largest the world had yet seen. They called it the helepolis, the ‘taker of cities.’ The attackers needed over a month to construct the engines. When completed, Demetrius ordered the assault. Both the rams and helepolis succeeded in clearing the walls; soon, the city appeared to be on the brink of defeat.

That night however, Menelaus sallied out from Salamis and burnt down Demetrius’ siege engines. With them destroyed, the city gained the respite they had needed: the siege continued.

Ptolemy heads to Cyprus

Menelaus had meanwhile sent word to his brother Ptolemy of the situation. Ptolemy had quickly taken action; he was determined not to lose control of Cyprus – an island so critical to his naval power. Gathering a large army and navy, Ptolemy sailed over to Cyprus, arriving at Paphos with a fleet of 140 warships and 200 troop transports carrying 10,000 infantry. As Ptolemy then proceeded along the south coast of the island, his Ptolemaic allies situated on Cyprus further bolstered the army.

Reinforced, the armada quickly reached Kiton. There, Ptolemy sent word to Menelaus. He knew that if they could combine their naval forces together, then their force would have a great numerical advantage over their Antigonid foe. He thus ordered Menelaus, under the cover of night to sneak the 60 ships he had in Salamis out of the harbour to join with his forces before Demetrius could become aware. Demetrius, however, got word of Ptolemy’s plans.

That night, Demetrius placed both his siege equipment and best men aboard his ships, and sailing around to the harbour of Salamis, ensured any attempt by Menelaus to sneak past his lines would prove impossible.

After Demetrius had foiled Ptolemy’s plan, Ptolemy sailed around Cape Pedalium with his navy and confronted Demetrius’ navy off the coast south of Salamis.

Image Credit: History Hit

Deployment

As Menelaus’ forces failed to arrive, Ptolemy realised his plans had been foiled; nevertheless he sailed round Cape Pedalium with his armada and prepared for battle. On seeing Ptolemy’s arrival, Demetrius quickly reorganised. He left ten ships to blockade the narrow exit of Salamis’ harbour, preventing Menelaus’ sally. The rest of his navy, he placed facing Ptolemy.

On his left, Demetrius deployed his greatest ships in a double line, hoping to quickly crush Ptolemy’s right. Demetrius stationed himself in the front ranks of this wing, although he himself was not to be in command. Realising his inexperience at naval warfare, he had sensibly deferred command to his most experienced admiral, Medius of Larissa. For the rest of his ships, Demetrius deployed them in a single line. Adopting a similar strategy, Ptolemy strengthened his own left wing, hoping to quickly break through his opponent’s right.

The Battle of Salamis, 306 BC

The battle commenced with an advance by Demetrius against Ptolemy’s right. Very quickly, Demetrius’ most powerful warships, aided by siege engines they had attached, destroyed his opposing forces. Medius now ordered the ships starboard and to start folding up Ptolemy’s line with Demetrius himself being in the thickest of the action. Meanwhile, Ptolemy had successfully overcome Demetrius’ right flank. His attack proved too slow however and as he began to envelop Demetrius’ centre, he saw with dismay that the enemy had already routed the rest of his fleet.

Believing the battle lost, Ptolemy retreated. Meanwhile, Menelaus successfully managed to break through Demetrius’ 10-ship blockade, but it would prove too late. By the time Menelaus had entered the battlefield, Ptolemy was already in flight.

Ptolemaic humiliation, Antigonid supremacy

The engagement had been a disaster for Ptolemy. His adversaries had captured over 40 of his ships as well as 100 supply vessels, along with their crews and possibly one of Ptolemy’s sons, Leontiscus. As for Demetrius, only 20 of his ships had been damaged, although scholars now debate whether Demetrius lost more on his right wing.

The implications of this victory were far reaching. Salamis surrendered to Demetrius and Menelaus retreated to Alexandria. As Salamis fell, all other Ptolemaic holdings in Cyprus followed suit. In total, Demetrius reportedly captured 16,000 infantry and 600 cavalry – many of whom then joined the Antigonid army. For Ptolemy, the battle had been a disaster, losing control of Cyprus, one of his most cherished possessions.

Yet for the Antigonids, Demetrius’ victory meant that their power was now unmatched on both land and sea; they were the period’s superpower.

Before the Battle of Pharsalus earlier that year, Pompey had been confident of victory. He had certainly proven his formidable military ability in the past. When peers questioned the number of troops the Republic held, Pompey confidently replied, according to Plutarch: “in whatever part of Italy I stamp upon the ground, there will spring up armies of infantry and cavalry.” Yet though willing to fight under the great Pompey, most of his recently mustered legionaries were raw recruits. Whether they could match Caesar’s veterans remained a question.

Caesar, on the other hand, championed realism. He focused on the strengths he held, rather than ones he felt entitled to. Fresh from fighting in Gaul, Caesar commanded an army unmatched in both their skill and in their loyalty to him. Caesar also knew that whereas many of Pompey’s accomplishments were won through classical generalship, Caesar represented a new form of tactical cunning that had gained him victories against outrageous odds. Caesar’s skill would see Pompey defeated and, ultimately, slain on the shores of Pelusium where on 28 September 48 BC he had disembarked seeking refuge.

The Battle of Pharsalus, 48 BC

On 9 August 48 BC, Pompey’s troops met Caesar’s at the Battle of Pharsalus. Caesar’s position was rotten, and both men knew it. His army was approximately 30,000 strong, with a provisions problem resulting from a successful blockade of troops and supplies. Pompey’s army was around twice the size. Pompey positioned himself with the sea behind and mountains protecting his flanks, which meant he had successfully forced his opponent into a desperate corner. Taking no chances, Pompey decided to settle down and starve Caesar out. He needed to win.

So why didn’t he? Sources largely agree that Pompey’s plan was sound, and even Caesar contemplated peace when he realised his situation. Unfortunately for Pompey, when he set off to war he was joined by esteemed figures of the Republic and their counterparts from foreign lands: senators, princes, knights, all exasperated by the slow pace of Pompey’s success. According to Appian, they sought battle, “some by reason of inexperience […] and some because they were tired of the war and preferred a quick decision to a sound one.”

Even Caesar would later write sympathetically about the pressure placed upon Pompey. Yet Pompey’s desire to be liked resulted in him meeting his opponent in open battle: Caesar crushed him. Later the victor would write that he had lost only 230 men in the battle. Pompey lost upwards of 6,000. Pompey fled in disguise to Egypt. Whilst the battle did not end the civil war, it was a decisive victory for Caesar. For many, this was the day the Republic died.

Having smashed the Republic’s army and defeated its top general, Caesar found himself in a position of power. So long as Pompey himself remained active, Caesar knew he would continue to be a dangerous figurehead for his opponents. Caesar therefore made quick in pursuit and set sail for Egypt.

Ptolemaic Egypt

Following the death of Alexander the Great over 270 years before, many of his former generals had established themselves as rulers across the former empire. One such general was Ptolemy, who took control of Egypt and created one of the greatest Greek kingdoms in antiquity. Under his descendants, his dynasty was one of the strongest and most prestigious kingdoms for over a century. By 48 BC, however, much had changed.

At the time of Pompey’s flight, Ptolemaic dynasty had become crippled by internal strife. Rome was also firmly in control of what was essentially a client state. When Ptolemy XII was exiled from his own country, he fled to Rome, indebted to creditors. Pompey had housed the exiled monarch, and thanks to his efforts, helped return Ptolemy to power. So indebted was Ptolemy XII to Rome that Cicero wrote that the Egyptian king had “sacrificed much […] even the very dignity on which the mystique of kingship rested when he appeared before the Roman people as a mere supplicant.”

Egypt had, through Ptolemy XII, become subservient to Rome. Following Pharsalus, it was now Caesar, rather than the Senate, that controlled Rome. Was Egypt now supplicant to Caesar?

Why was Pompey the Great assassinated?

As a result, Pompey’s arrival on Ptolemy XIII’s doorstep left Ptolemy’s advisors in an awkward position.The Egyptians knew that they owed the man. But they also knew that Caesar was in pursuit. Feeling obliged to open their doors to Pompey, yet seeking to align themselves with the winner of the civil war, Ptolemy’s regent – a eunuch named Pothinus – devised a strategy that would win Egypt the favour of Julius Caesar.

On 28 September 48 BC, Septimius, head of the Egyptian army, sailed to Pompey the Great’s ship on a meagre fishing boat with a few military men. Pompey’s wife and advisors sensed trouble; they pleaded with him not to embark on the tiny vessel. Upon boarding and being shown a galling lack of respect, Pompey asked Septimius: “Am I mistaken, or were you not once my fellow soldier?”. Septimius’s response was to nod once soberly, making no reply, according to Plutarch.

Septimius then drove a sword into Pompey. The others on the boat then moved in too with their own daggers to finish the job. Plutarch writes, that, at the moment of assassination, Pompey “[drew] his toga over his face with both his hands, and neither saying nor doing anything unworthy of himself […] endured their blows, having lived for fifty-nine years, and ending his life one day after his birthday.”

Aftermath

Dumping his corpse on the beach, Septimius carved Pompey’s head from his body and brought the decapitated head to Pothinus who made it ready to present to Caesar in a display of loyalty to him. Caesar was greeted with the severed head and signet ring of his opponent. But rather than rejoice, Caesar is supposed to have wept.

In trying to endear themselves to Caesar, the Egyptians had instead deprived Caesar of deciding Pompey’s fate. They had also killed a man close to Caesar’s heart. In granting former opponents clemency, Caesar was able to present himself to the Roman people as a reasonable and judicious figure. Indeed, this was how he had won the public loyalty of several high-profile former opponents, such as Cassius, Cicero, and Brutus (though many would not remain loyal for long). With Pompey’s assassination, Pompey’s men became scattered and Pompey’s sons continued the civil war in place of their father for years afterwards.

Ponthius’ decision to kill Pompey saw him killed as retribution, alongside Septimius, the murderer of Pompey. The assassination placed Caesar firmly in the camp of Ptolemy’s sister: Cleopatra VII. Soon he would fight for her side in an Egyptian civil war against Ptolemy XIII, and for 17 years Cleopatra would rule Egypt. Pompey’s death marked the end of the Republic as Rome had known it. Triumphant in victory, Caesar proclaimed himself Dictator Perpetuo (‘Dictator for life), and began a dynasty that would last until the death of Nero.

Ultimately his life ended in tragedy, brutally assassinated at the hands of his Egyptian allies. If not for this act of betrayal, Roman history as we know it might have look very different.

The Roman Republic in the 1st century BC

Since overthrowing its Etruscan kings in 509 BC, the Roman Republic had by the 1st century BC expanded from its origins in central Italy to master the regions of Macedonia, Greece, much of the eastern Mediterranean and the Iberian and Italian peninsulas. Few in the known world could rival Rome and its armies. As Roman expansionism intensified, individual commanders sought to claim the wealth and glory exploited from conquered lands. Others looks inwards.

So-called “Sulla”, free copy (probably from the time of Augustus) after a portrait of an important Roman from the 2nd century BC.

In 83 BC, Cornelius Sulla, a powerful Roman general, made history when he seized absolute power in Rome. After a bloody victory, he assumed the title Dictator. Rome would never be the same again. Not only had Sulla waged a civil war in which thousands of Roman citizens had perished, but he had also manipulated Roman laws to grab total power. Though he would eventually fade from public life, he had set a precedent and a viable route to acquire power.

Rome had never had a Civil War before Sulla. But another would occur in quick succession. It stemmed from the forming of a political alliance in 60 BC.

The First Triumvirate

The Triumvirate was a secret alliance in Rome between three intensely wealthy and ambitious men: Gaius Julius Caesar, Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus and Marcus Licinius Crassus. Through this political alliance, these men ensured each was kept in considerable power through the covert support of the other two. As their ambitions rested on this informal political alliance keeping them in power, the need to support their fellow triumvirs was essential. Pompey and Caesar, for example, strengthened their relationship by a marriage between Pompey and Caesar’s daughter, Julia. Yet of the three men, in 60 BC, one in particular outshone the rest in both fame and glory. That man was Pompey.

What was Pompey the Great known for?

Pompey’s formidable military record, impeccable reputation, and vast personal wealth, meant that he had become one of the most famous men in Rome. Pompey first gained recognition 20 years before, during Sulla’s Civil War. Pompey quickly made a name for himself by recovering the provinces of Sicily and Africa from Sulla’s opponents. In return, Sulla bestowed extravagant courtesies upon his young general. Not only did he allow him the title of imperator (an honorific that ordinarily only the Senate could grant) but he also permitted Pompey to marry his stepdaughter.

But Pompey demanded more from Sulla, claiming, according to Plutarch, that “more worshipped the rising sun [Pompey] than the setting sun [Sulla]”. Perhaps seeing himself in Pompey’s ambition, Sulla relented and granted Pompey a triumph. Another lavish triumph followed in 71 BC for his reconquest of Spain; a third ten years later for success in modern-day Turkey. Such splendour won Pompey few friends, but his outstanding military and political achievements quickly made him impossible to ignore.

Ambition

By 60 BC Pompey’s influence in Rome was widespread. But his fellow Triumvirs Caesar and Crassus were similarly ambitious. Their conflicting desires would prove the Triumvirate’s greatest problem. Tension brewed and soon spilled into the public eye. During a trial in which Pompey was defending a fellow Senator, Clodius, an old enemy of his (and supporter of his fellow Triumvir, Crassus), began a chant in the crowd aimed at disparaging Pompey and his ambitions to lead military campaigns in Egypt.

According to Cicero, Clodius shouted: “Who’s starving the people to death?” To which the crowd replied: “Pompey!” “Who is eager to go to Alexandria?” asked Clodius. “Pompey!” replied the crowd. Finally, Clodius turned to the crowd and asked them who they wanted to see go instead. “Crassus!” boomed the crowd. In the brawl that broke out afterwards, men pulled Pompey from his speaking platform as Crassus’ supporters began to hurl abuse and spit on him.

It was a long fall from grace for a man with three Roman triumphs. The Triumvirate, it was now clear to see, was fraying and so too was Pompey’s support. Crassus, it appeared, was determined to reign in Pompey’s power. The richest man in Rome was not satisfied with simply being one of the most powerful men in Rome; he wanted to be the most powerful.

The fall of the Triumvirate, 53-49 BC

Such was the extent of Crassus’ determination that soon after the trial incident, Pompey suspected Crassus would send assassins after him. Ultimately, Crassus would meet his own end before any assassination of Pompey could take place. His attempt to recapture Mesopotamia from the Parthians culminated in the catastrophic Battle of Carrhae, in which his opponents outsmarted him before reportedly humiliating him in a grotesque death.

Assignment of Roman provinces to Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus.

Carrhae had been one of the worst defeats the Romans had ever known, with over 30,000 Roman casualties – including Crassus. Of the original Triumvirate, only Caesar and Pompey remained. The alliance of Caesar and Pompey had always been rocky, but the death of Julia Caesar in childbirth the year before in 54 BC had already severed the last legal tie between the two men.

Crassus’ death was the nail in the coffin. The Triumvirate perished. Pompey and Caesar, now finding themselves separated, set upon two diverging paths that ultimately led to one of the most famous wars in antiquity. As Caesar started to achieve success in his Gallic Campaign, the conservative Roman senators back home grew wary. Caesar, they could see, was becoming more powerful with every victory. Could Caesar use his power to manipulate the Republic‘s laws and gain himself a dictatorship? Sulla had done exactly the same.

Attempts to quell Caesar’s power failed, and Caesar, finding himself demonised in Rome, took matters into his own hands. In January 49 BC, he crossed the River Rubicon with his veteran army. Caesar thus committed treason against the Republic. Civil war was inevitable. With no remaining ties to Caesar and empowered by the Roman Senate, Pompey took command of the Republic’s army. Pompey was to battle Caesar.

Incorporating breakaway provinces of Roman Syria, Arabia and Egypt, her own empire was the product of her exceptional ambition and capability. Though she faced a war on two fronts, Zenobia was determined that her son Vaballathus would inherit his birth right. This is the story of Zenobia’s meteoric rise and fall.

The Split

Ten years before, the unthinkable had happened. A Roman army had been completely wiped out by the Sassanians and the emperor Valerian taken captive. Beset by invasion and plague, the Roman empire already hung by a thread. With the capture of Valerian, all hope of central imperial authority vanished. Roman governors realised that authority in Rome was not longer required to become emperor. With an army behind them, all might be for the taking. Enter Postumus, governor of Germania.

By the end of 260 AD, Postumus had seized control of Gaul, Raetia, Batavia and Britannia. He had set up his capital at Trier and even established his own senate and praetorian guard. Preoccupied with the Frankish invasion of Italy, Gallienus – Valerian’s son and co-emperor –was powerless to react to Postumus until it was too late. At least the news from the east was slightly less bleak. 

Palmyra Appoints a King

The city of Palmyra lies at the heart of the Syrian desert. For two thousand years it has been subject to the volatility of the Middle East. In antiquity, it was prosperous trading hub which swore allegiance to Rome. In return, Rome granted Palmyra a degree of autonomy, allowing the city to keep its own assembly. But Rome’s instability and repeated Sassanid invasions had forced Palmyra’s assembly to take drastic action to protect its trade network. They proclaimed the city’s leader, Odaenathas, king. 

Odenaethus

In less than a year Odaenathas succeeded in pushing the Sassanids back across the Euphrates. Next, he turned on the brothers Quietus and Macrianus who had tried to usurp control in the eastern half of the Roman Empire. Having done so, Odaenathas aligned himself with emperor Gallienus. In doing so Odaenathas was bestowed the title corrector totius orientis, which referred to his de facto control over Syria, Judaea, Arabia and parts of Asia Minor.

Odaenathas assassinated

But Odaenathas didn’t last long. In the winter of 267 AD he was assassinated and the ten-year old Vaballathus was proclaimed King of Kings under the regency of his mother.  Odaenathas’ assassination remains a mystery. The unknown author of the Augustan History believes Zenobia devised overthrow, desperate to prevent her stepson Herodianus from assuming the throne.

However, this work is notoriously unreliable. Indeed this theory draws some suspicion for fitting a little too cleanly with the stereotype of a power-hungry wife scheming against her husband to install her son as ruler – much as Olympias or Livia are said to have done to promote Alexander and Tiberius, respectively. Scholars have alternately suggested that Odaenathas was assassinated by Palmyrene plotters who sought to restore the city’s assembly. 

Who was Zenobia?

Zenobia had nevertheless positioned herself perfectly. A likely noble of uncertain heritage, she had been married since around age 14 to Odaenathus as he elevated Palmyra to supreme power in the Near East.  Thanks to contradictory sources, it is hard to get a sense of the real person. The most detailed description we have portrays Zenobia more like a caricature than a woman: 

Her face was dark and of a swarthy hue, her eyes were black and powerful beyond the usual wont, her spirit divinely great, and her beauty incredible. So white were her teeth that many though that she had pearls in place of teeth.  Her voice was clear and like that of a man.  Her sternness, when necessity demanded, was that of a tyrant, her clemency […] that of a good emperor. Generous with prudence, she conserved her treasures beyond the wont of women.

Augustan History, The Thirty Pretenders, 30.16-17

Following Odaenathas’ death, Zenobia emerged as regent and de facto ruler of the empire. But the question remained: was her son’s kingship assured?

The Romans expected Vaballathus to defer to the emperor in Rome, and on a whim the emperor could strip Zenobia and Vaballathus’ royal prerogative. In the past 50 years, there had been no fewer than 19 emperors. The next one might not take kindly to Zenobia or her son. Meanwhile, to the Palmyrenes the monarchy was now hereditary and any affront to its legitimacy was an insult to the city itself. The question was which city held the greater authority: Rome or Palmyra?

Both Zenobia and Roman officials in the eastern provinces ask this of themselves. The answer had two possible outcomes: peace or war. Though Palmyra had only appointed its first king seven years before, there was no open resistance to Vaballathus’ succession amongst the Roman provincial governors. But their support for Zenobia’s regency was tenuous, borne from the necessity to maintain stability in the Near East.

Zenobia’s conquest

Zenobia exploited chaos in Rome to establish her authority. Back in Europe, Gallienus had been assassinated and the resulting power vacuum had caused trust in Rome’s central authority to collapse. This allowed Zenobia to justify a military campaign throughout the Levant, designed to shore up the weaknesses the Sassanids might exploit with a second invasion. In other words, she subjugated anyone who refused to accept Palmyrene dominance.

Zenobia’s army subjugated Judaea, crushed economic rivals – the Tanûkids of Bostra – and killed Trassus, the Roman governor of Arabia (probably to force the other Roman governors to comply). In short time, Zenobia secured Petra and all the territory up to the Egypt. But Zenobia was playing a dangerous game.

Palmyra at its zenith in 271.

Image Credit: User Attar-Aram syria on Wikimedia Commons / CC BY-SA 4.0

In the summer of 270 AD, she seized control of Antioch’s mint. It stopped producing coins with the name of the current emperor, Claudius Gothicus, and instead made coins declaring her son imperator. This was not, however, tantamount to a declaration of war against Rome: the term imperator referred to Vaballathus’ command over the troops, while Zenobia could still claim that she was acting as Rome’s representative. But the emperor, who had become emperor through force of arms, knew the game Zenobia was playing.

In August 270 AD, news of Claudius Gothicus’ death reached Zenobia. In Europe, Claudius’ brother Quintillus competed for power with Aurelian, a soldier of modest origins. With the backing of the Danubian legions, Aurelian brushed aside Quintillus’ challenge and installed himself as the new emperor. Probus, the prefect of Egypt, had meanwhile left Alexandria to eliminate Gothic pirates threatening trade in the eastern Mediterranean. The timing was perfect. A pro-Palmyrene faction emerged within Alexandria to encourage Zenobia to invade. 

Why did Zenobia invade Egypt?

A Palmyrene invasion would cripple Rome, which relied on Egypt’s grain supply, and would inevitably provoke war between Zenobia and Aurelian. In September 270 AD, Zenobia decided it was worth the risk. With 70,000 soldiers, the Palmyrene soldiers under general Zabdas caught the Roman garrisons off-guard; by the winter Probus was dead and Egypt was under Palmyrene control.   

The following year, Zenobia’s general invaded Galatia and annexed the city of Ankara. According to the 5th-century Byzantine historian Zosimus, the Palmyrenes attempted an unsuccessful annexation of all of Asia Minor up to Chalcedon on the Bosporus. In the summer of 271 AD, the Palmyrene Empire stood at its height. 

Zenobia had so far avoided provoking Aurelian. This was because Aurelian was preoccupied with Germanic tribes. To safeguard Rome from the Alemanni, Aurelian built massive fortifications around the city. Aurelian was also forced to abandon the province of Dacia to defend against a Gothic invasion. On the southern bank of the Danube, he regrouped the legions and won a decisive victory by killing the Goths’ leader Cannabaudes. Aurelian was powerless to respond to Zenobia.  

To consolidate her territory, Zenobia resumed minting coins with Aurelian’s visage and the title imperator on the obverse and Vaballathus’ face and the title of rex on the reverse. The symbolic gesture was designed to portray her loyalty to Rome despite her aggressive use of force against Roman provinces. The numismatic evidence and papyri documents are all that remain of Aurelian’s response to Zenobia’s invasion of Egypt.

It seems certain that Aurelian would not have formally accepted Palmyrene authority over Egypt, but in the short-term he would have been forced to cooperate with Zenobia to retain access to Egypt’s grain. Zenobia’s decision to keep these supply lines at all, however, was a crucial miscalculation.

Rome or Palmyra?

The literary sources covering Zenobia’s regency can sometimes be contradictory. Did Zenobia always intend to establish the Palmyrene Empire as independent of Rome? Or did she conduct an invasion of Egypt to protect Palmyra’s trade network? It’s hard to believe Zenobia would have risked turning Rome against her if she was happy for Palmyra to remain subordinate to Rome. It’s perhaps more plausible that early in her regency Zenobia envisioned a separate Palmyrene empire and collapsing Roman authority presented an ideal opportunity. 

In the spring 272 AD, Zenobia officially signalled her attempt to break away from Rome. She minted coins which omitted Aurelian’s visage entirely and recognised Vaballathus as Augustus and herself as Augusta. Aurelian had long anticipated this move. After defeating the Goths, he proceeded to Byzantium. During the winter of 271-2 AD, he prepared an invasion. There was nothing Zenobia could do but wait. The incursion into western Asia Minor described by Zosimus would have proved her armies could not wage an offensive war against Rome. Zenobia ordered her forces there to retreat to Palmyra. 

Aurelian advances

Most cities in Asia Minor acquiesced to Aurelian without resistance, save for Tyana of Cappadocia. Up until that point, Aurelian had brutally sacked every city which had resisted. But at Tyana he had a change of heart. He is said to have dreamt of the 1st-century AD philosopher Apollonius of Tyana, who beseeched Aurelian not to sack his city. Heeding Apollonius’ words, Aurelian spared the city. Thereafter more cities submitted without a fight. 

Aurelian simultaneously opened a second front against Zenobia in Egypt. By summer, Alexandria’s garrison had fallen. This two-pronged assault was too much: less than three months after Zenobia had declared her opposition to Aurelian, her forces were in full retreat. Arabia and Judaea were abandoned in defence of the homeland. 

The battle for Syria

At Immae, 20 miles north of Antioch, Aurelian’s and Zenobia’s armies met. Despite Aurelian’s rapid advance to Syria, he was still wary. The Roman infantry was superior, but the Palmyrene cavalry was still a force to be reckoned with. Aware that Zabdas would seek to exploit his cataphracts, Aurelian devised a solution to draw the Palmyrene horses away from his infantry.

Aurelian and Zabdas drew up their forces the next day, with their infantry in the centre flanked by their cavalry. After some skirmishes, Zabdas ordered his cavalry to engage the Roman horses. With lighter armour, the Roman horses could not hope to win out so they retreated, drawing the Palmyrene cataphracts from the battlefield. After a protracted chase, the Palmyrene cavalry began to tire. But their determination meant they did not see the trap closing. 

The Roman cavalry turned to face the exhausted Palmyrene cataphracts at last. Completely spent, the Palmyrene cavalry was decimated in hand to hand combat. When news reached Zabdas that only a handful of his cavalry had returned, he immediately withdrew his infantry to spare them from the same fate at the hands of the legionaries. 

Zenobia retreats

That night, exhausted and demoralised, Zenobia’s armies began a 250-mile retreat south to Palmyra. Antioch expected brutal retribution. Instead, when Aurelian entered the city, he pardoned all. The news of Zenobia’s decisive defeat and Aurelian’s mercy spread as cities swore allegiance to Rome once more. But Zenobia’s downfall was not yet sealed. She commanded great influence over the region and a decisive victory over Aurelian could force him to come to terms. At Emesa, 150 miles south of Antioch, Zenobia mustered her remaining troops to force one final, bloody showdown. 

Who defeated Queen Zenobia?

Aurelian called on detachments from the legionary garrisons which guarded the border with Sassanid Persia to join him, along with auxiliaries from Cappadocia and Palestine. It was the height of summer and the flat plain Zabdas chose was the perfect battleground for an honest fight. As at Immae, the strength of the Palmyrene cataphracts proved a strategic weakness. Once again, they routed the Roman cavalry and gave chase, leaving their infantry exposed. Both the Palmyrene infantry and cavalry were encircled and massacred. 

All that was left for Zenobia and her son was the city of Palmyra. A year earlier it had been the centre of a vast empire. Now it was blockaded on all sides by the Third Legion. In an attempt to bring a swift conclusion to the campaign , Aurelian proposed terms. He promising to spare Zenobia’s life and the independence of Palmyra. Zenobia retorted that she would sooner appeal for help from her Sassanid enemies than surrender to him. But the game was up. Sooner or later Palmyra would fall.

How did Queen Zenobia die?

By August 272 AD, Zenobia had accepted the futility of a bloody siege. Too proud to surrender, she and her son fled Palmyra for Persia. Before they could cross the Euphrates into Persia, Aurelian caught up with Zenobia. In later Roman accounts of Zenobia’s trial, authors would try to portray her as a coward who betrayed her loyal advisors. In the fervour of Zenobia’s capture, Palmyra was spared.

Zenobia’s fate is the subject of contradictory and far-fetched narratives. In the Augustan History and the chronicle of the 8th-century Byzantine scholar Syncellus, Zenobia goes on to marry a Roman senator and live in a villa outside Rome, bought for her by Aurelian. Zosimus, the 6th-century Byzantine historian describes a more heroic end for Zenobia, starving herself to death before reaching Rome. On the other hand, Zosimus’ contemporary John Malas claims Zenobia and her son were paraded through the streets of Rome in 274 AD and then beheaded. 

Why is Queen Zenobia important?

Queen Zenobia had ruled as regent for five years by the time of her defeat in 272 AD, and just a few months since she styled herself ‘Augusta’ in the spring of that year.

Amidst the controversy it is easy to forget how impressive Zenobia’s achievements were. Married at 14, a mother at 18, and a regent at 27, ruler of the Middle East and one of the most powerful women in the world. Palmyra’s ruins preserve the legacy of one the most extraordinary women of the ancient world. If Zenobia had prevailed, the world might look very different today. 

But the encounter was characterised by uncertainty, with one army nervous despite its numerical and positional advantage, and the other forced to fight uphill with 30,000 fewer men. Both sides knew that the outcome would be transformational for the fate of the Roman Republic.

Pompeian last stand

The loss of the Battle of Pharsalus in central Greece three years earlier, and the subsequent assassination of statesman Pompey the Great, had left the Optimate (republican) forces on shaky ground during Caesar’s Civil War. After their army was destroyed at the Battle of Thapsus by the forces of Julius Caesar in modern Tunisia, they had been forced to operate solely in Hispania, modern day Spain.

Though they had suffered setback after setback, Pompey’s sons Gnaeus Pompeius and Sextus set to building a new army in the region. They weren’t alone. Among their ranks was a man called Titus Labienus. Although once a favoured general of Caesar during the Gallic campaign, Labienus had refused to march on Rome with his former commander and had sided instead with the Optimates. In 46 BC, two of Caesar’s legions, comprised largely of former Pompeian soldiers, defected back to the Optimate side and joined with what remained of Pompey’s army.

Optimate resurgence in Spain

The army began by expelling Caesar’s proconsul in the region. This allowed for exploiting Hispania‘s resources so that the Optimates could raise a third legion. With these legions, Labienus, Sextus, and Gnaeus Pompeius marched west on Hispania Ulterior, and succeeded in capturing almost all of the settlements in the wealthy province. Quintus Pedius and Quintus Fabius Maximus, Caesar’s generals in the area, dared not to meet the Optimate forces on the battlefield. Instead, they camped in Oculbo, calling to Caesar for assistance.

The Roman Theater of Acinipo, Spain, a city founded by retired legions after the battle of Munda.

Image Credit: Joseph Creamer / Shutterstock

Caesar receives word

At the time, Caesar was in Rome, resting victorious following his defeat of Pompey. But as soon as news of the events in Hispania reached Caesar, his focus swiftly changed. He marched with haste to Oculbo, arriving there in just under a month. On his arrival, he wrote a poem named Iter (The Journey), of which only a fragment survives. That Caesar could compose poetry immediately after such a trek speaks to his cool-headedness, which would serve him well in the forthcoming battle.

Caesar had arrived in early December. The Pompeian commanders steered clear of open battle and instead focused on ensuring Caesar’s army would have to hunt for food and shelter as the winter set in. They were well aware that despite their larger numbers, an open battle would benefit Caesar, and they were eager to avoid that outcome.

Caesar makes his move

Caesar struck quickly to force their hand. A siege of Ategua, near modern Córdoba, resulted in defections to his camp and a blow to Optimate morale. Another fight resulted in further defections. Rather than watch their army dwindle, the Optimate commanders decided to give Caesar the battle he sought.

Even in a weakened position, Caesar was expert in manipulating his opponents.

The Battle of Munda

The Optimate forces totalled 70,000 men, while Caesar’s numbered 40,000. There were still dangers: an open battle suited Caesar more than it did Gnaeus Pompeius, and sections of the Optimates’ men were restless and on the verge of defection.

To counter these disadvantages, Pompey the Younger sought to make the most use of the surrounding landscape. He positioned his army at the top of a hill which held a stream at its base, providing them a good defensive position.

Both sides knew that this would be the decisive battle of the civil war. For the Pompeian force, it was win or die: those that had previously deserted Caesar knew that he would not grant them clemency a second time.

A Roman testudo, as performed by actors at a Roman show in Jerash, Jordan.

Image Credit: Shutterstock

Caesar’s charge

Fearful of attacking uphill, Caesar’s legions were also uncharacteristically timid. Knowing that defeat on this battlefield meant the eradication of every previous victory he had fought for, Caesar remarked that whilst in other battles he fought for victory; at Munda he had fought for his life.

Taking personal control of his favourite legion, the Tenth, he seized a shield from one of his cowering soldiers, ripped his own helmet off, and roared: “this will be the end of my life, and of your military service” (Appian, Civil Wars II. 104), before racing towards the enemy, leading his men personally in a move that could have come from Alexander the Great himself.

The critical moment

The subsequent fighting lasted more than eight hours, with both sides trapped in a brutal melee. When Caesar ordered his right wing to focus on the Optimates’ left wing, the Optimates duly responded by diverting a legion from their right wing.

Caesar’s cavalry, until now further behind the main body of the army, then emerged. They drove into the Pompeian’s right wing with great force. They had tricked their Pompeian foes and manipulated them into weakening their own flank.

Caesar’s strategy was not revelatory, but his ability to influence battle and exploit available opportunities testified to his standing as a victorious general and Imperator. 

His decisive action turned the course of the battle. Caesar cemented his advantage by charging the enemy’s camp. As Labienus diverted the Pompeian cavalry to protect the camp, the remaining Pompeian troops made a huge mistake. They interpreted Labienus’ diversion as a retreat, and fled in terror, desperately seeking refuge within Munda itself. Few were successful.

An impression of Roman cavalry.

Image Credit: Shutterstock

The aftermath

30,000 Pompeians were killed in the battle, while Caesar’s army had lost just one thirtieth of its troops.

All who hadn’t fled lay strewn across the land. Titus Labienus, once so significant to Caesar’s success, died a traitor. Every standard of the Optimate legions was captured by Caesar’s army, a symbolic defeat which matched the literal defeat they had suffered.

Gnaeus Pompeius and his brother Sextus managed to escape, but any hope for the republican cause was dead. The former would be executed just a month later, whilst the latter would manage to survive a further ten years, outliving Caesar but as an exile in fear for his life.

Dictator Perpetuo

Though Sextus lived, he was no threat to Caesar. At home, Caesar was presented with a triumph in celebration. This, however, proved unpopular with the Roman people. Plutarch described in his Life of Caesar how “he had not defeated foreign generals, or barbarian kings, but had destroyed the children and family of one of the greatest men of Rome”.

Caesar’s celebrations seemed, at best, in poor taste. Pompey had been a beloved military and political leader to the people. Even though his popularity had waned in the years before his death, the total defeat of his cause – and family – left a bitter taste. All the same, in the year following the battle Caesar was made Dictator Perpetuo – Dictator for Life.

The Roman Republic was dead. The Battle of Munda represented the utter defeat of republicanism in Rome, and ushered in a new era: that of the Roman Empire.

Aguilar Castle history

The earliest building at this location belonged to the count of Fonnollède since 1021. In the 13th century, the keep that had replaced earlier buildings was bequeathed by the viscounts of Carcassonne to their vassal, the Termes.

In 1210, it was invaded and occupied by Simon de Montfort, whose soldiers took and held the owner Raymond de Termes in a dark dungeon in the Carcassonne. Militarily, the castle lay dormant for the next 30 years, until Raymond’s son Oliver de Termes took back the castle in the brief revolt against the crusaders. Aguilar became the refuge of many faydits, Cathar knights and lords without strongholds. In 1246, a royal garrison was installed to supervise the Aragon frontier.

Olivier, however, eventually made an alliance with king Louis IX, who purchased the castle from him in 1260. Despite the heavy fortifications, the castle would be continually under siege by opposers to the French or Spanish rulers until the 16th century.

When the border was pushed back to the south of Roussillon by the treaty of the Pyrenées, the castle gradually lost its strategic importance, and was eventually abandoned in 1569. Today it is in decrepit condition. Since 1949, it has been listed as a monument historique by the French Ministry of Culture.

Aguilar Castle today

The castle consists of an inner keep built in the 12th century, surrounded by an outer pentagonal fortification from the 13th century. This fortification is oriented such that its point guards the side most favourable to attackers. The keep and the inner hexagonal fortification is flanked at each corner with semi-circular guard towers, each equipped with archery outlooks.

There is a small underground chapel of Saint-Anne below the keep.

Getting to Aguilar Castle

Aguilar Castle is located on the town of Tuchan, in the Aude, 35 km north-east of Perpignan and 30 km west of the Mediterranean coast.

The castle is open from the middle of April to the end of October, admission price 3.50 euros for adults and 1.50 euros for children up to 15 years old.

History of Flavian Amphitheatre

Vespasian, who was the first Flavian dynasty emperor, built this vast amphitheatre – the third largest in Ancient Rome after those of Rome and Capua – in Pozzuoli, as it was located at an important crossroad. The Flavian Amphitheatre would have been able to house 50,000 spectators.

Later damaged by ash and rubble from the eruption of the Solfatara volcano, Pozzuoli’s Flavian Amphitheatre lay abandoned and was used as a quarry for its marble. Nevertheless, when it was excavated in the nineteenth century, archaeologists found the Flavian Amphitheatre in a very good state of preservation, with many of its walls and floors intact.

Flavian Amphitheatre Today

Today, the Flavian Amphitheatre operates as a popular destination for those who visit the (now dormant) Solfatara volcano and the local area.

One of the key highlights of a trip to the Flavian Amphitheatre is being able to explore the underbelly of this once-thriving stadium and wander through the rooms and chambers below the arena itself. It is even possible to see the quarters in which the gladiators themselves would have prepared for their contests. This amazing set of underground corridors and passageways remains in an excellent state of preservation and gives a genuine glimpse into the amphitheatre’s past.

Getting to Flavian Amphitheatre

From the centre of Naples, the Amphitheatre is reachable in around 30 minutes by car via the A56. Equally, the closest Metro stop is Pozzuoli Solfatara, from where the site is a 5 minute walk.

History of Fort Hamilton

Even before its construction, the site on which Fort Hamilton was built had already proven a vital strategic point. It was here that, on 4 July 1776, American forces attempted, but ultimately failed, to stop British forces from bringing in ships to quell the American Revolutionary War. Later, during the War of 1812, the site was where American forces repelled British ships from docking.

As a garrisoned post, Fort Hamilton hosted some of the most famous figures in US history, including Robert E. Lee and Thomas ‘Stonewall’ Jackson. It would go on to become a Union fortification in the American Civil War and an embarkation site in both world wars.

Fort Hamilton Today

Today, Fort Hamilton is an active military base as well as housing New York’s only military museum, the Harbor Defense Museum. At this museum, visitors can see a range of historic weaponry, uniforms and exhibits such as about the Battle of Brooklyn.

It’s worth noting that Fort Hamilton was only named as such in the twentieth century, its namesake being Secretary of the Treasury from 1789 to 1795, Alexander Hamilton.

Getting to Fort Hamilton

From the centre of Brooklyn, Fort Hamilton is reachable by car in around 35 minutes via Atlantic Ave and I-278 W. Public transport will take you to the VA Hospital/Main Entrance Bay 2 stop, from where it is a 3 minute walk.